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“Chasm crossing is not the end, but rather the beginning, of mainstream market 
development.” 
 







Significant savings in CO2 emissions can be won from fabric upgrades, and improved forms of 
heating. An increase in the number of building retrofits and installations of energy efficient 
plant such as biomass boilers or CCHPs must be the aim if the UK is serious in meeting its 
commitment to CO2 reduction at both the domestic and EU level. A way of achieving this 
increase, which will need to be significant, would be to tap into the vast funds under 
management by institutional investors who are required to invest those funds to optimise its 
monetary return, taking into account the level of risk.  
 
The aim of the research is to identify the enabling conditions that would need to exist to attract 
institutional investment in energy efficiency at scale. The UK Green Investment Bank has 
invested £50m into three energy efficiency funds, requiring each fund manager to match the 
amount by attracting investment from institutional investors. It is these funds that have been 
analysed as a single Green Investment Bank case study. Embedded units of analysis are on two 
levels with the individual funds being the first, and the institutional investors investing in those 
funds as the second. A hybrid deductive and inductive qualitative approach to the research was 
taken employing thematic analysis. 
 
The findings of the research reported here indicate that the emerging key enabling conditions 
that would make energy efficiency an attractive proposition are firstly, the way energy 
efficiency investments are classified in terms of an investment asset class, secondly the 
contractual structure of the individual transactions made by the funds, and finally, the 
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Crossing the Energy Efficiency Chasm: An Assessment of the Barriers to 




Investment in energy efficiency measures applied to buildings has been identified as one of the 
most effective ways of reducing CO2 emissions (EEFIG, 2015). It has been demonstrated that 
buildings emit up to 40% of all CO2 and that out of all the CO2 emitting sectors, buildings and 
their associated infrastructure form one where cost effective CO2 reduction can be achieved 
(EEFIG, 2015). However, investment into this area has been limited to date with low level of 
take up of the Green Deal in the domestic housing sector prior to its discontinuation in 2015, 
and minimal investment flowing into non-domestic or commercial and public buildings 
(Richards, 2016, Fankhauser, 2014). Barriers to investment in energy efficiency are well 
known; high upfront and transaction costs, and lack of awareness and understanding of the 
technology and processes involved, for example, so the focus of attention needs to be targeted 
on removing the barriers to allow a greater level of investment (International Chamber of 
Commerce, 2014). The Energy Efficiency Financial Institutions Group (EEFIG) was 
established in 2013 by the European Commission Directorate-General for Energy (DG Energy) 
and United Nations Environment Program Finance Initiative (UNEP FI). It created an open 
dialogue and work platform for public and private financial institutions, industry 
representatives and sector experts to identify the barriers to the long-term financing for energy 
efficiency and propose policy and market solutions to them. It has over 100-member 
organisations.  The EEFIG  proposed that a distinction should be made between investment in 
energy efficiency in domestic and non-domestic property, as the two sub sectors are 
significantly different in their characteristics (EEFIG, 2015), particularly in respect of scale 
and potential for aggregation and so the barriers to investment in energy efficiency within them 
are different with different measures necessary to attract investment. In fact, The EEFIG, in its 
2015 report, identifies three sub-sectors, breaking down non-domestic properties into 
commercial and public buildings along with domestic residential buildings when assessing an 
efficient investment approach. The EEFIG stated that the approaches to and recommendations 
to increase energy efficiency investments in these three segments are materially different 
(EEFIG, 2015). This research is concerned with the non-domestic sector which is diverse in its 




A major issue to overcome is to understand what constitutes an energy efficiency investment. 
Much of the focus within the low carbon investment agenda has been on investments in 
renewable energy, such as wind or solar. Unlike renewable energy projects, energy efficiency 
projects do not generate cash flow from the generation of energy but, in the main, from the 
amount of energy that is saved. Many investors can easily understand and relate to the 
conceptual way a renewable energy project is structured, particularly if they have traditionally 
invested in infrastructure projects that typically provide positive cash flow once in operation 
or they have collateral in a tangible asset (Kaminker and Stewart, 2012, p27). Energy 
Efficiency investments may appear more risky when income is based on energy saved 
(Kaminker and Stewart, 2012, p27), however, energy efficiency projects represent a novel 
transaction structure for many. Energy efficiency projects also may involve, by some 
definitions of energy efficiency at least, what is deemed to be new or innovative technology 
such as biomass boilers, ground or air sourced heat pumps and combined heat and power 
(CHP), making them less attractive to investors and funders, although in reality much of this 
technology has been deployed for many years (Kaminker and Stewart, 2012).   
 
Institutional investors such as pension funds and life insurance companies seek to invest their 
pensioners’ or policy holders’ cash in safe, long term investments that can match their long-
term liabilities (Clark, 1998, p1002), if at all possible, acting in their best interest and having a 
fiduciary duty to do so (Clark, 1998, pp1007-1008). Many of these entities are increasingly 
investing in infrastructure traditionally seen as an ‘Alternative’ investment class, as opposed to 
the more usual investments of fixed income bonds and stocks. Although allocation to 
‘Alternatives’ for investment purposes is only around 9% of available funds (Maslakovic, 
2012) which stood at £6.2tr at the end of 2013 (Maslakovic, 2014a), this still represents around 
£600bn in the UK alone and much more at the European and global level. If access to this 
source of funding could be facilitated for energy efficiency projects then the CO2 reduction 
potential becomes more realisable.  
 
The issue of incentivising investors to invest their funds in projects that involve new or 
innovative technology at scale can be likened to that of marketing new technologically 
innovative products to mainstream customers, a concept developed by American marketing 
executive Geoffrey Moore. Moore (2006) references the Technology Adoption Life Cycle 
Curve (a bell curve) where the area under the curve is divided into classifications of buyers of 
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new high technology products that are demarcated by their attitude to risk. It commences with 
the classification of buyers that are the innovators, moving on to the early adopters, the early 
majority, the late majority and finally the laggards, refer to Figure 1.  
 
(Moore, 2006)   Source: Moore, 2006 
 
Figure 1: Technology Adoption Life Cycle Curve 
 
Moore quotes the High-Tech Marketing Model which states that:  
 
The way to develop a high-tech market is to work the curve left to right, focusing first 
on the innovators, growing that market, then moving on to the early majority, growing 
that market, and so on[…]. In this effort, companies must use each ‘captured’ group as 
a reference base for going on to market to the next group. Thus, the endorsement of 
innovators becomes an important tool for developing a credible pitch to the early 
adopters, that of the early adopters to the early majority, and so on. 
 
Moore, 2006, pp13-14 
 
 
Moore goes on to assert however that the High-Tech Marketing Model is not an accurate 
reflection of the transition from one classification of buyer to the next and he suggests a more 
accurate model is his revised Technology Adoption Life Cycle, identifying a number of gaps 





Source: Moore, 2006 
 
Figure 2: Cracks in the Bell Curve 
 
 
Moore suggests that the cracks in the bell curve between each buyer classification represent a 
situation where conditions need to exist for the technology to be comprehensively adopted by 
the next classification of buyers moving to the right on the curve, from say innovators to early 
adopters or from the early majority to the late majority. He asserts that the real breakthrough 
in the mainstream acceptance of high tech products is the transition from the early adopters to 
the early majority, however he also suggests that this transition is the most difficult to achieve 
and therefore he represents the crack in the bell curve in his model as much wider and describes 
it as a ‘chasm’. He devotes much of his book to describing a marketing strategy to achieve the 
aim of closing the ‘cracks’ and the ‘chasm’.  
 
An analogy can be drawn with energy efficiency investments. Instead of a marketing strategy 
being formulated to market new high technology products to make them attractive beyond the 
relatively small segment of consumers characterised as innovators and early adopters to the 
vast numbers of mainstream consumers, a way needs to be found to identify the enabling 
conditions that would make investments in energy efficiency attractive to mainstream 
institutional investors.  In short, a way has to be found to cross the Energy Efficiency 
investment ‘Chasm’ allowing the vast amounts available for investment to be unlocked and 
potentially be directed towards energy efficiency improvements. This would go some way to 
seeing the potential that energy efficiency improvements have in reducing CO2 emissions to 




This dissertation seeks to set out the background to this issue and describes research undertaken 
that investigated investment in non-domestic energy efficiency transactions. It has the 
objectives of better understanding the decision-making process of institutional investors when 
considering investments in energy efficiency and of identifying those enabling conditions that 
would allow investments to be made in energy efficiency at scale. The background and early 
findings from the research have been published in the Journal for Sustainable Finance and 
Investment (Parker and Guthrie, 2016).  
 
The structure of this dissertation follows on from this introductory chapter one with chapter 
two setting out the background and context of the issue, with chapter three discussing how 
energy efficiency projects are funded and the investments currently being made. Chapter four 
contains a literature review focusing on the energy efficiency gap (the difference between 
current energy use and optimal energy use) , the barriers to energy efficiency investment and 
economics and behavioural perspectives of the issue. Chapter five sets out the research 
questions and identifies a methodology and research method to be pursued. Chapter six outlines 




2 Background and context 
 
2.1 Energy Efficiency and Sustainable Development 
 
The concept of requiring energy efficiency to be implemented at scale is not new.  The Club 
of Rome commissioned 1972 report ‘The Limits to Growth’ identified in its key message that 
a combination of resource depletion and pollution, if untackled, would ultimately – i e within 
the next hundred years - bring the global economy down. It highlighted the issue of resource 
efficiency as a major contributory factor (Meadows et al., 1972).    
 
In response to mounting concern surrounding ozone depletion, global warming, and other 
environmental problems associated with raising the standard of living of the world’s 
population, the United Nations General-Secretary convened an international collection of 
politicians, civil servants and experts on the environment and development in 1983. An 
organisation was formed as the World Commission on Environment and Development under 
the chairpersonship of the then Prime Minister of Norway, Gro Harlem Brundtland which 
subsequently became known as the Brundtland Commission (Kates et al., 2008). The 
organisation was to be independent of the United Nations and was to focus on environmental 
and developmental problems and solutions. 
 
In 1987 the Brundtland Commission issued its report ‘Our Common Future’ which 
subsequently became known as ‘the Brundtland Report’ (WCED, 1987). The Report 
introduced the concept of Sustainable Development and was primarily concerned with securing 
a global equity, and redistributing resources towards poorer nations whilst encouraging their 
economic growth (WCED, 1987). The report also suggested that equity, growth and 
environmental maintenance are simultaneously possible and that achieving this equity and 
sustainable growth would require technological and social change (WCED, 1987). The report 
highlighted three fundamental components to sustainable development: environmental 
protection, economic growth and social equity, with the message that the environment should 
be conserved and our resource base enhanced, by gradually changing the ways in which we 






(Wordpress, 2018)    Source: Wordpress, 2018 
 
Figure 3: The three key elements of Sustainable Development 
 
 
The three key elements identified in the Brundtland Report, environmental protection, 
economic growth and social equity, are graphically illustrated in Figure 3 as different 
components of an interlocking venn-diagram. It has become the commonly accepted 
representation of the Sustainable Development concept as put forward by Brundtland. In the 
overlapping area of the Environment and Social components of the venn-diagram there is the 
label ‘Sustainable Natural and Built Environment’ and it is within this realm that energy 
efficiency predominately resides. However, it also has a role to play in the overlapping area of 
the Environment and Economic components, as it is not only concerned with the reduction of 
energy and CO2 emissions with a clear environmental impact, there is an economic impact also 
at a micro and macro level. The Brundtland Report emphasises in chapter 7: Energy: Choices 
for Environment and Development, the importance of maintaining energy efficiency and 
energy efficiency policies and in part VI of chapter 7 it states ‘…the Commission believes that 
energy efficiency should be the cutting edge of national energy policies for sustainable 
development (WCED, 1987).  
 
The concept of Sustainable Development has further been developed by the United Nations, 
culminated in 2015 with the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its 
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17 Sustainable Development Goals (United Nations, 2015). The broad goals are interrelated 
though each has its own targets to achieve. There are a total of 169 targets to be addressed by 
2030 (United Nations, 2015). The Sustainable Development Goals cover a broad range of 
social and economic development issues. These include poverty, hunger, health, education, 
climate change, gender equality, water, sanitation, energy, environment and social justice. Goal 
7: Affordable and Clean Energy includes a target for energy efficiency which is to double the 
global rate of improvement in energy efficiency by 2030 (United Nations, 2015). Energy 
efficiency is clearly a key component of the Sustainable Development agenda. 
 
Outside the direct Sustainable Development agenda, the issue of energy efficiency has been 
identified as a key component of meeting energy efficiency targets. The International Energy 
Agency for example has since 1993 issued its World Energy Outlook providing medium- to 
long-term energy projections using its large-scale simulation model. Updated each year, the 
WEO highlights recent trends in energy and energy policies including for energy efficiency 
with the latest being published in 2017 (IEA, 2017a). The IEA also publishes a series of energy 
efficiency reports and updates such its Energy Efficiency and Energy Efficiency Indicators 
reports providing information about global trends and statistics concerning energy eficicncy. 
The latest issue of each report was in 2017 (IEA, 2017b, IEA, 2017c). The IEA also publishes 
on energy efficiency policy being implemented around the world (IEA, 2011). 
 
2.2 CO2 emission reduction 
 
Global warming and changing climate conditions due to increased levels of greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions have forced the global community to set reduction targets and identify 
measures by which these emissions can be reduced (CCC, 2008). 
 
The buildings sector is one where substantial reductions in GHG emissions are achievable 
(CCC, 2008).  New buildings are addressed through amendments to building regulations, 
however in developed countries / UK the bulk of emissions are from the existing stock.  A large 
proportion of these emissions are from the non-domestic sector, therefore a significant 
contribution to the meeting of reduction targets can be made by the installation of energy 




The UK has committed itself to stringent GHG emissions reduction targets over and above 
those required in order to meet international agreements, including the recent Paris Agreement 
under which the UK has reassessed its CO2 reduction targets, outlined below.  The built 
environment has not only been identified as a sector that produces a significant proportion of 
the emissions but also as a sector where cost effective reductions can be made (CCC, 2008). 
 
Ambitious CO2 /GHG emissions targets were set by the UK government and by both the 
European Union and the global community via the Kyoto Protocol and more recently The Paris 
Agreement.    
 
The Kyoto Protocol (KP) was a protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) which is an international environmental treaty with the goal of 
achieving “stabilisation” of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that 
would minimise dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (United 
Nations, 1992, p4).  The UNFCCC, agreed at the Earth Summit in 1992, was only the first step 
in the international response to climate change and The Kyoto Protocol was agreed in 1997 and 
became legally binding in February 2005 (Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2010).  
As of January 2009, 184 states had accepted the Protocol, 84 of which had fully ratified it 
(United Nations, 2009).  The industrialised countries, collectively known as “Annex I 
countries” agreed to commit to a reduction in four greenhouse gases (GHGs) including CO2 
and two groups of gases produced by them, by 5.2% of 1990 levels (United Nations, 2009).  
There was also an agreed method of converting the various greenhouse gas emissions into 
comparable CO2 emissions so that reduction figures can be expressed either in GHG or CO2 
terms (United Nations, 2009). A second commitment period was agreed for the period 2012 to 
2020, known as the Doha Amendment to the protocol, however this amendment is yet to enter 
into force. 
 
The EU agreed a GHG reduction from 1990 levels of 8% by 2012 which was redistributed 
between member states according to their national circumstances (Department for Environment 
Food and Rural Affairs, 2006, p9).  The UK’s share was set at a 12.5% reduction which became 
its legally binding Kyoto Protocol commitment.  The UK government went on to set more 
ambitious targets and in 2000 they launched a Climate Change Programme which set a target 
reduction of 20% by 2010 (Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs, 2006, p10).  
In 2003 The Energy White Paper: Our energy future – creating a low carbon economy, 
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introduced a further long term aim of achieving a carbon dioxide emissions reduction of 60% 
by 2050 with real progress by 2020  (Department for Trade and Industry, 2003).  Subsequently 
the Climate Change Act 2008 revised these targets to an emissions reduction of 80% of 1990 
levels by 2050 and 34% by 2020.   
 
A further international agreement on CO2 emissions reduction was reached in December 2015 
(CCC, 2016). The Paris Agreement is an agreement within the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) dealing with greenhouse gas emissions mitigation, 
adaptation and financing starting in the year 2020. The aims of the Agreement (i.e. to limit the 
rise in global temperatures to well below 2°C, to pursue efforts to hold it to 1.5°C and to reach 
net zero emissions in the second half of the century) are more ambitious than the basis of the 
UK's statutory target for 2050 (which aims to limit temperature rise to around 2°C) (CCC, 
2016). Each signatory country determines, plans and regularly reports on its own contribution 
towards achieving the agreed target in order to mitigate global warming. The EU’s target is 
40% reduction on 1990 levels by 2030. The UK government committed to reassess its stated 
CO2 reduction targets in light of the Paris Agreement and has now agreed its fifth carbon budget 








(LEEP, 2012)   Source: Modified from LEEP, 2012 
 
Figure 4: Reduction in emissions of 80% by 2050 (vs. 1990 levels) 
 
Figure 4 above graphically illustrates the size of the task, identifying the output of emissions 
in 2006 and the Climate Change Act 2008 target of an emissions reduction of 80% of 1990 
levels by 2050, representing a 77% cut in the 2006 levels.     
 
The government’s way of ensuring achievement of the target was to set a series of five year 
“carbon budgets” via The Committee on Climate Change (CCC), commencing in 2008, which 
set out what was realistically achievable in each of the five-year periods. The first carbon 
budget for the period 2008 to 2012 established a requirement for the country’s CO2 emissions 
to be limited to 3,018 MtCO2e (CCC, 2008).  This target was comfortably achieved with the 
CCC reporting in its annual progress report in July 2014 that the net carbon account was 2,982 
MtCO2e for the first five year period (CCC, 2014). However, in the same report the CCC stated 
that achievement of the first carbon budget was met through a combination of the impact of the 
recent recession, and low-carbon polices in certain specific areas such as fuel efficiency of new 
cars and wind generation. Limited progress was made in other areas including energy 
efficiency improvement in the commercial and industrial sectors, uptake of electric vehicles 
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and heat pumps, and demonstration of carbon capture and storage (CCC, 2014). The CCC went 
on to state in their report that more generally, the underlying pace of emissions reduction – 
allowing for the impacts of the recession – through the first carbon budget period and in 2013 
was insufficient to meet future carbon budgets. They had previously been more specific in their 
prediction in their 2013 progress report stating that:   
 
The UK has met the first carbon budget and our assessment is that we are likely to 
meet the second carbon budget. However, we are not currently on track to meet 
the third and fourth carbon budgets.  
 
(CCC, 2013, p10) 
 
 
The CCC felt that there was significant work to do in terms of policy initiatives and incentives 
to reduce CO2 emissions if subsequent five-year carbon budgets are to be achieved on the way 
to meeting the UK 2050 target.  
 
In its 2016 report the CCC reported that: 
 
Whilst emissions have fallen by an average of 4.5% a year since 2012, this has been 
almost entirely due to progress in the power sector, particularly reduced use of coal as 
Government policies have driven an expansion of renewable generation. 
 
There has been almost no progress in the rest of the economy, where emissions have 
fallen less than 1% a year since 2012 on a temperature-adjusted basis. That is because 
there has been slow uptake of low-carbon technologies and behaviours in the buildings 
sector (i.e. low rates of insulation improvement, low take-up of low-carbon heat) and 
improved vehicle efficiency has been offset by increased demand for travel as the 
economy has grown and fuel prices have fallen. There is also minimal evidence of 
progress in the industrial and agriculture sectors. 
 
Progress will need to be broader to meet the recommended fifth carbon budget and to 
prepare sufficiently for 2050. For example, while the complete replacement of coal-
fired generation with low-carbon generation in the power sector is an important part 
of our scenarios, this would provide less than half of the total emissions reduction 
required by 2030. 
 
(CCC, 2016, p12) 
 
Therefore, it can be concluded that although progress in meeting the targets has been made, 





(CCC, 2016)   Source: CCC, 2016    
 




2.3 Non-domestic buildings potential 
 
It is estimated that there are approaching two million commercial and public buildings, 
collectively known as non-domestic buildings, in the UK (Warren, 2009). These non-domestic 
buildings emit somewhere in the region of 100 million tonnes of CO2 per year, representing 
some 18% of the UK’s total emissions (Caleb Management Services, 2009). 
 
Caleb Management Services Ltd (2009) has identified a technical potential for 37 million 
tonnes of CO2 (MtCO2) savings, of which 20 MtCO2 are a realistic potential.  Earlier findings 
by the BRE (Pout et al., 2002), support this assessment with very similar figures.  
 
The Committee on Climate Change (CCC) in their first report issued in 2008 identified the 
technical potential for savings of around 34 MtCO2 by the year 2020 broken down in the 




• Improving efficiency of heating/cooling of buildings could save over 5 MtCO2 
• Better management of energy – from motion sensitive lights to optimising heating 
temperatures and timing – could save over 8 MtCO2 
• Use of more efficient lights and appliances has the potential to reduce emissions by 
around 1.5 MtCO2 
• Microgeneration technologies have significant technical potential and could reduce 
emissions from buildings by up to 18 MtCO2 comprising: 
- Biomass boilers – 3 MtCO2 
- Heat pumps – Up to 5 MtCO2 
- Solar thermal – Around 2 MtCO2 




More recently the consultancy firm Accenture undertook research for Barclays in an attempt 
to establish the amount of capital required to develop low carbon technologies, and to procure 
projects to implement them as low carbon investments in the EU during the period up to 2020 
(Whitehouse et al., 2011). They broke down potential low carbon investments across all 
industry sectors into five categories including one for buildings. They also provided estimates 
of the level of CO2 that could be saved should these investments be realised. For the whole of 
the EU they estimated that €88bn would be required in Development capital and €600bn in 
Procurement capital for buildings alone, resulting in 403 MtCO2 cumulative emissions savings. 
The report goes on to break down the figures for individual countries with the UK requiring 
€77bn in Procurement capital, saving 49 MtCO2 cumulative emissions (Whitehouse et al., 
2011). Although the estimated emissions savings are higher than the other estimates stated, the 
Barclays report looks at all buildings including domestic dwellings.  
 
Not only is there technical potential for reducing CO2 emissions in non-domestic buildings but 
the sector has been identified as one where the measures required to reduce emissions make 
economic sense in that they cost less per ton of carbon saved than the value of traded carbon 
credits, therefore they should be viable in investment terms (CCC, 2008). The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, in its 2007 report, identified mitigation potential 
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for different sectors worldwide with Buildings highlighted as having the most potential (IPCC, 
2007), refer to Figure 6. 
 
 
(IPCC, 2007)    Source: IPCC, 2007 
 
Figure 6: Economic mitigation proposals by sector in 2030 
 
 
2.4 Pension fund and institutional investors’ funds to invest 
 
It is estimated that as of the end of 2016 there was around $161trillion of funds under 
management globally, with $101trillion in conventional funds consisting of Pension funds 
($36.4tr), Mutual funds ($40.6tr) and Insurance funds ($24.0tr), which was a 7% increase on 
the previous year (Bardalai, 2018).  This increasing trend is also reflected in the funds under 
management in the UK which is second only to the US with funds totaling £8.1trillion as of 
the end of 2016, a 17% increase on the previous year (Bardalai, 2018).  By far the largest 
proportion of funds comes from institutional investors, public and private pension funds and 
insurance companies. Figure 7 illustrates the typical percentage share of funds under 






Source: Adapted from Maslakovic, 2014a 
 




Source: Bardalai, 2018 
 
Figure 8: Growth of funds under management in the UK 
 
These funds are invested in established asset classes in order to create a well-diversified 
portfolio designed to optimise investment returns (Laboul, 2013). The largest proportion of 
funds is invested in the traditional asset classes of equities and bonds. The investment 
community is generally conservative in its approach to risk, therefore it is unlikely that there 
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will be a significant shift away from these types of investments (Laboul, 2013). However, there 
are an increasing number of alternative asset classes that are increasing in importance, such as 
property, infrastructure and private equity, but these still only account for a small fraction of 
the available funds (Bekkers et al., 2009). As at the end of 2011 42% of managed funds in the 
UK were invested in equities and 38% in fixed income bonds (Maslakovic, 2012). Figure 9 
identifies the asset allocation of funds under management at the end of 2011. Although property 
has established itself as a distinct asset class, infrastructure for example, along with other non-
traditional investments, remains firmly an alternative investment and therefore seen as higher 
risk and would fall within the ‘Other’ classification, which is running at about 9% of the 






Figure 9: Asset allocation of funds under management, 2011  
3 Energy Efficiency Investment 
 
With its CO2 emission reduction potential, investment in energy efficiency in non-domestic 
buildings in the UK could go some significant way to meeting the CO2 reduction targets. 
However, significant investment capital running into billions is needed if this potential is to be 
realised with Accenture estimating €77bn of investment being required in building energy 
efficiency retrofitting to 2020 (Whitehouse et al., 2011), albeit across the whole sector not just 
for non-domestic properties. (Note: the figure quoted above is in Euros as the Accenture report 
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was Europewide and €77bn of investment was identified as required for the UK only). In order 
to realise its potential, a way needs to be found to make these investments attractive for 
institutional investors who are actively looking to make investments that match their 
obligations with ever increasing sums under management.  
 
The introduction of Public Private Partnerships in both the UK and globally has seen an 
increase in institutional investment into the infrastructure sector providing equity and more 
recently debt finance (Maslakovic, 2014b). To some extent this increase in funding of 
infrastructure by institutional investors has been driven by the fact that infrastructure 
transactions tend to have long term steady revenues that can be matched to investors’ long-
term obligations to their pension holders and policy holders. The objective of this research is 
to identify those enabling conditions that would allow investments to be made in energy 
efficiency at scale in much the same way as has been seen in infrastructure, and to better 
understand the decision-making process of institutional investors when deciding whether or 
not to invest in energy efficiency. 
 
 
3.1 What is Energy Efficiency? 
 
The first issue that needs to be addressed is that of definition. What is energy efficiency and 
what is an energy efficiency investment? These may appear to be unusual questions to ask but 
they are relevant if a new investment asset class is to be established and they are at the heart of 
solving the issue of increasing institutional investment into the sector. Although their 
characteristics are different, investment in energy efficiency is often discussed together with 
investment in renewable energy, and termed collectively as low carbon or green investments 
(Usher, 2008, UNEP, 2010). Whereas renewable energy creates a return from producing 
energy, energy efficiency creates its cash flow from energy conservation and therefore through 
costs being saved (Kaminker and Stewart, 2012, p27).  
 
This concept is counterintuitive for investors and funders who will always look for structural 
cash flow protection in an investment (Inderst, 2009, p29). In an infrastructure or renewable 
energy investment this is often in the form of loan guarantees (ibid), direct agreements with 
paying authority or off take agreements. In the context of cash flow from energy saved they 
will look to the operational efficiency of the technology concerned, or will have to rely on the 
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corporate covenant of an ESCO for example (Fawkes, 2013a, p166).  This approach could 
prove more difficult and riskier as it is a move away from the norm (Kaminker and Stewart, 
2012), which is important for investors that may be considering other more conventional 
investment opportunities alongside an energy efficiency potential investment and will 
intuitively tend towards the familiar where they may even have collateral in a tangible asset 
(Baddeley, 2013, p218).  
 
Additionally, investors will need to decide where energy efficiency fits within the established 
asset classes (Fawkes, 2013a, p174). It falls within the ‘Alternative’ investment sphere but will 
it be grouped together with renewable energy? As will be seen from the interviews in this 
research energy efficiency is increasingly being seen as a subset of infrastructure but equally 
energy efficiency could be viewed as a real estate investment as in the main it relates to energy 
saving measures as applied to existing buildings or facilities and could therefore be included 
in a real estate ‘pot'. A third option, that has again has been reflected in the research interviews, 
is that it could be regarded as Private Equity depending on the way the investment is made with 
short terms and high returns. The distinction is important as investors will expect different 
levels of return for classes of investment as risk perception changes between the classes. The 
desire by ethically aware institutional investors and pension funds for investment into Socially 
Responsible Investments (SRI), including those in environmental and low carbon projects, is 
often not at the expense of maximising returns (Viederman, 2008). Although there may be a 
strong ethical theme in an institutions investment strategy they will also have an overriding 
fiduciary duty to their pension holders or insurance policy holders and will therefore need to 
realise the best financial returns possible. Therefore, energy efficiency investments, as with 
other more mainstream investments, will traditionally need to at the very least maintain a 
commercial level of return if they are to compete for the funds available for investment, 
although they can of course use their green credentials to attract those investors that have an 
ethical strategy. 
 
What is energy efficiency and how does it translate into a project that can be invested in and a 
return achieved. Energy Efficiency is typically seen as being applied to the Transport, Industrial 
and Buildings sectors and this, for example, is how the International Energy Agency presents 




Energy efficiency essentially means a reduction in energy input to produce a certain output, for 
example reducing energy usage in a building from 300 kWh/m2 to 200 kWh/m2 per annum 
assuming constant comfort conditions and building usage (EEFIG, 2017). Installation of LED 
lighting is a typical example where a 16-watt LED that replaces a 34-watt fluorescent light 
produces the same light at roughly one half of the energy usage.  Fawkes (2013a) asserts that 
the process of improving energy efficiency or reducing energy input for a given output is a 
process of technical and /or behavioural change that is driven by technical, financial, 
management, social and political drivers. It can certainly be demonstrated that improvements 
in energy efficiency can be achieved from changes in management practices and management 
systems where there has not necessarily been a change or upgrade in technology (EEFIG, 
2017). Large gains in efficiency can be achieved for example by adjusting the control settings 
of existing equipment, or managing industrial processes within tighter limits, or reducing waste 
levels (EEFIG, 2017). However, the largest and most permanent energy savings can only be 
delivered through investment into more efficient equipment and processes (EEFIG, 2017). 
 
Institutional investment into energy efficiency is most likely to be associated with a retrofit of 
a building or industrial process than the financing of a new building or factory where energy 
efficiency measures are integrated within the new facility and are regulated by a new building 
code requirement or an industry reference standard that has referenced new energy efficiency 
requirements. Retrofits or upgrades efficiency gains are typically measured by a performance-
based comparison of new equipment, processes or the whole building/facility against those 
they replaced (EEFIG, 2017). 
 
The EEFIG (2017), in the ‘Resources’ section of its underwriting tool kit has identified major 
energy efficiency technologies that can be implemented to reduce usage. It has also identified 
that energy efficiency is often associated with on-site generation of power (and heat), 
particularly renewables such as solar and biomass, and other technologies such as Combined 
Heat and Power (EEFIG, 2017). These measures do not themselves improve energy efficiency 
on the site but can reduce the usage, and hence cost, of purchased energy coming onto a site or 
into the building (EEFIG, 2017). Similarly, energy efficiency is also associated with demand 
response i.e. the short-term shifting of electrical load however this does not permanently reduce 
load. Although these measures are not true energy efficiency measures, they can improve the 




If a strict view of energy efficiency is taken on-site generation of power and demand response 
should not be included as energy efficiency is about reducing the end use of energy for a given 
output (Fawkes, 2013a, p7, EEFIG, 2017). Renewable energy is just an alternative way of 
generating heat or electricity and does not reduce end-use efficiency (Fawkes, 2013a, p7). It is 
a way of substituting or reducing the consumption of fossil fuels and therefore assists in the 
achievement of a higher overall efficiency in the electricity system but Fawkes (2013a p7) 
suggests that renewable energy systems should not generally be thought of as part of ‘energy 
efficiency’.   
 
The Green Investment Bank (GIB) has specifically identified non-domestic energy efficiency 
along with offshore wind and waste as sectors that it would invest into with the aim of attracting 
greater institutional investment. (Watson, 2013). So how does the GIB define non-domestic 
energy efficiency? Table 1 identifies the GIB’s view of the sector and includes a classification 
for some measures as being applicable to the Public Sector. Of course, those measures 
identified as non-domestic energy efficiency are also applicable to the Private Sector and the 
GIB has supported investments in the Private Sector in these areas. The GIB has also 
specifically identified measures for industrial processes and smart meters. However, its 
noteworthy that the GIB has specifically identified certain renewable energy measures and 
CHP within their definition of energy efficiency measure that they are willing to fund and 
encourage frther institutional investment when they are not strictly energy efficiency measures 








Table 1: The Green Investment Bank view of non-domestic energy efficiency 
 
 
Just as there are many technologies that fall into the definition of energy efficiency, they are 
present in many different types of buildings and portfolios of buildings which affects the 
method of procuring and financing energy efficiency investments within those buildings or 
portfolios of buildings. The level of government subsidies and support for the renewable heat 
technologies, most notably biomass boilers, distinguishes them from building retrofit 
transactions for example that have no such subsidies. Depending on the size of the transaction, 
investment in a retrofit of buildings or portfolios of buildings may be suited to an Energy 




3.2 UK government subsidies and support 
 
As outlined in the previous section, energy efficiency is hard to define and in its purest form it 
relates to conservation measures that save energy use, such as those listed in the building 
retrofit classification of the GIB view of non-domestic energy efficiency. However, renewable 
heat measures such as ground and air sourced heat pumps and biomass boilers can be viewed 
as energy efficiency measures, as they are installed to replace inefficient technology (in terms 
of carbon emissions) and the GIB certainly has classified them as such (Watson, 2013). They 
produce ‘clean’ energy without the emissions of the technology that they replace. The UK 
government has incentivised the use of these measures in the form of subsidies, making them 
a more attractive investment proposition, which will now be considered. 
 
3.2.1 Renewable Heat Incentive 
 
The Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) for non-domestic buildings, launched in November 2011, 
is a government initiative designed to provide support to renewable heat technologies in order 
to increase deployment and aid market development, with the ultimate aim of reducing cost of 
installation (BEIS, 2016). It is available for the first 20 years of a project (BEIS, 2016). The 
RHI supports heat where that heat is used in a building for ‘eligible purposes’: heating a space, 
heating water, or for carrying out a process where the heat is used (BEIS, 2016). Heat utilised 
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to produce or process the renewable fuel, or used for electricity generation, does not qualify 
for RHI (BEIS, 2016). 
 
3.2.2 Renewable Obligation Certificates 
 
Although now phased out, Renewable Obligation Certificates (ROCs) offered a way in which 
generators could secure a certain level of revenue for the life of a project. Electricity suppliers 
were obliged each year to source a certain percentage of their power from renewable sources 
(HMRC, 2016). To achieve this the government implemented the Renewables Obligation 
scheme. Through this scheme it set a percentage level of renewables that needed to be generated 
(HMRC, 2016). Renewable energy generators are issued with Renewable Obligation 
Certificates (ROCs), and suppliers have to present a certain amount of ROCs to the government 
(OFGEM, 2014).  The obligation level was set each year.  
  
For each MWh of renewable electricity that was generated, a generator received a certain 
amount of ROCs (OFGEM, 2014). Initially, one ROC was issued for each MWh that was 
generated. However, the number of ROCs issued ultimately became linked to technology type, 
to give more support to higher risk and emerging technologies. Some types of technology 
received more and some less than 1/MWh (OFGEM, 2014). A project was being supported 
with ROCs for 20 years from date of commissioning (OFGEM, 2014). The benefit of the ROC 
is that it delivered a steady revenue for the life of the project. Generators could either sell the 
ROCs on the open market or contract with an off taker, who might offer to pay a percentage of 
the total value.  
 
The Renewables Obligation and ROCs were ended in April 2017 with the government having 
introduced an alternative subsidy scheme called Contracts for Difference (CfD) in 2014. 
Between the introduction of CfDs in 2014 and ROCs ceasing to be available in 2017 both 
schemes were running and developers could choose which scheme to apply for, to get 
government support (OFGEM, 2014). ROCs will remain available for generators that signed 
up prior to April 2017. 
         




The CfD works by guaranteeing renewable energy generators a price of electricity (called the 
strike price) (BEIS, 2017). The government will make up the difference between the market 
price and the strike price; if the market is lower the generator receives money, if the market is 
higher the generator will have to pay back whatever it has received that was above the strike 
price (BEIS, 2017). 
 
 
3.3 Financing of Energy Efficiency 
 
There have been many proposed financing mechanisms to fund energy efficiency, Ya He 
(2012) identified thirteen major financing mechanisms for energy efficiency including 
mechanisms such as the UK Green Deal which was discontinued in 2015 due to poor take up 
and lack of government support, although a version of it has emerged again in 2017 backed by 
the private sector (Richards, 2016, Affordable Warmth Scheme, 2017). Ya He (2012) also 
included US-centric mechanisms such as Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) (Fawkes, 
2013b, Ya He, 2010). However, the more comprehensive and current summary of the financing 
mechanisms used to finance energy efficiency is provided by the EEFIG in their 2017 
underwriting toolkit, refer to Table 2 (EEFIG, 2017).  
 
This research project is concerned with investment at scale. In order to attract investment at 
scale there would need to be a fully developed liquid market where investments in transactions 
can be traded (CBI, 2018, Fawkes, 2013a, pp174-175, EEFIG, 2017). Scale will allow 
aggregation of investments and securitisation where cash flows from transactions are grouped 
together and a bond is issued and sold to institutional investors for which investors would need 
to have sufficient confidence in the underlying performance to make investment a realistic 
proposition (CBI, 2018, Kaminker and Stewart, 2012, pp26-27, EEFIG, 2017). Clearly those 
conditions do not exist currently, certainly not in the UK, however PACE loans have been 
successfully securitised in the US (Fawkes, 2014).  
 
In order for securitisations to be successful investors will need to understand the performance 
of the underlying energy efficiency loans. The EEFIG in their 2015 report identified the lack 
of evidence on the performance of energy efficiency investments, and the lack of commonly 
agreed procedures and standards, among others, as problems in driving new finance for energy 
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efficiency investments (EEFIG, 2015). The EEFIG response to these issues has been to 
instigate initiatives that directly address them. In order to address the lack of evidence on the 
performance of energy efficiency investments the EEFIG instigated the EEFIG De-risking 
project which created the De-risking Energy Efficiency Platform (DEEP). DEEP is an open 
source database for energy efficiency investments performance monitoring and benchmarking, 
based on evidence from implemented projects. The main objective of DEEP is to improve the 
understanding of the real risks (especially performance risks) and benefits of energy efficiency 
investments based on market evidence (EEFIG, 2016). At its launch in November 2016 the 
DEEP database included more than 7,800 energy efficiency projects in buildings and industry 
from 25 data providers (EEFIG, 2017). The issue of the lack of commonly agreed procedures 
and standards for energy efficiency investments has been, to a degree, addressed by the EEFIG 
DEEP and underwriting toolkit initiatives however it has been significantly developed and 
implemented by the EU funded Investor Confidence Project (EEFIG, 2017, ICP n.d.). The goal 
of these initiatives is to increase energy efficiency financing at competitive terms through 
improving risk assessment and reducing transaction costs (EEFIG, 2016). 
 
One financing method, Energy Performance Contracting identified by Ya He and the EEFIG, 
has been established for a number of years and while it is not appropriate to every situation it 
has long been proposed as the way forward for energy efficiency (Fawkes, 2013c, Fawkes, 
2013b), and is utilised in a significant proportion of investments forming the basis of the 
research and is therefore further outlined in the coming sections.   (Ya He, 2012) 
 
 
Savings or Equity. 
 
Use of consumer or corporate funds to fund energy efficiency 
improvements or projects. 
 
Loans/mortgages specifically 
for energy efficiency upgrades 
in residential and commercial 
buildings, industry and 
commerce. 
 
Normal consumer and commercial lending. In most cases loans 
are not specifically identified as energy efficiency lending as it is 
not known whether energy efficiency is the main purpose of it is 
embedded into a larger project. Most consumer and commercial 
loans are recovered from the borrower in the normal way 
however there are specialist means of means of recovery in the 
global market which have potential for use in the European 
Market, namely On-bill Recovery and Property Assessed Clean 
Energy (PACE).  
 
- On-bill recovery. Once a consumer has applied for a loan 
for an energy efficiency project, the repayments are 
added to, and repaid, through its electricity bill. The UK 
Green Deal was an On-bill recovery mechanism.  
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- PACE. Largely used in the US this form of financing 
allows loans to be made for energy efficiency and 
renewable energy projects repaid via an additional 
payment on a property’s regular property bill. 
 
Loans/mortgages specifically 
for the purchase of energy 
efficient buildings 
 
A green or energy efficiency mortgage is one that issued to 
finance a purchase of an energy efficient building or refurbish a 
building to a higher standard of efficiency.  
Leasing for energy efficiency 
products 
 
Leasing is an established method of financing energy efficiency 
projects and typically cover all material, labour and soft costs 
associated with an energy efficiency project. The energy 






refurbishments or upgrades 
incorporate the optimum level 
of costs-effective energy 
efficiency products 
 
For everyday loans, mortgages, leases for and investments made 
into new buildings, building refurbishments and replacement of 
industrial processes and production plants are, in most cases, 
not for energy efficiency as the primary purpose of the 
investment. This means that many opportunities to improve 
energy efficiency are missed. Banks and financial institutions can 
play an active role in ensuring that  financial projects of all types 
achieve optimum levels of efficiency over and above business as 
usual by adjusting their lending/investing processes to include 
queries about energy efficiency. 
 
Specialised energy efficiency 
funds offering equity or debt 
for projects 
 
Specialist funds for energy efficiency have long been in existence 
created by multi-lateral banks such as the World Bank, the 
Renewable Resources and Energy Efficiency Fund for example. 
More recently a number of specialist funds have been 
established using private and public sector funds offering a 
range of equity and debt financings for energy efficiency often 
using Energy Efficiency Contracts. Examples include the London 
Energy Efficiency Fund, the SUSI Energy Efficiency Fund and the 
three Green Investment Bank funds managed by Equitix, SDCL 
ad Aviva. 
 




Property funds based on purchasing properties and making them 
more energy efficient have been established in a number of 
countries. Examples include the Credit Suisse European Climate 
Value Property Fund and the Low Carbon Workplace Fund. 
 
Financing of specialised 
energy service contracts 
including: 
 
The two most common forms of energy service contract are 
Energy Performance Contracts (EPCs) and Chauffage contracts. 
Both have been in use in Europe for many years. They are 
relatively complex and the cost of developing these contracts 
means they  are restricted to relatively large capital value 
projects. They are described below together with other types of 




- Energy Performance 
Contracts 
 
EPCs are a contractual arrangement between the beneficiary 
and the provider of an energy efficiency improvement measure 
or measures in which the provider, an Energy Service Company 
(ESCO) provides a guarantee of performance for the installed 
measures. The ESCO does not generally provide the requited 
capital but usually works with established lenders to facilitate 
provision of finance, although the customer can also decide to 
directly finance the project with its own equity. The ESCO’s 
guarantee is meant to ensure that the savings are sufficient to 
pay debt service. If the is a shortfall, the host but not the lender, 
has recourse to the ESCO.  
 
- Chauffage contracts 
 
Under Chauffage (Energy Supply Contracting) the contractor 
takes over the provision of an agreed set of energy services. The 
host pays the contractor some historical average of its energy 
cost. The contractor then takes responsibility for all elements of 
energy services, including purchasing fuel for the building and 
upgrading systems. 
 
- Efficiency Services 
Agreements 
 
In an Efficiency Services Agreement (ESA), a developer retrofits 
the host property and the host property pays the developer the 
savings, typically with a negotiated discount to the facility’s 
historical costs.  
 
- Managed Energy 
Service Agreements 
 
In a Managed Energy Services Agreement (MESA) the developer 
assumes responsibility for payment of utility bills on behalf of 
the host asset. Rather than a bill based on savings, the host asset 
pays the developer an amount equal to the historical energy 
usage adjusted for current energy rates, weather, and 
occupancy of the building. 
 




The fundamental difference in th the Metered Energy Efficiency 
Transaction Structure (MEETS) is that energy efficiency is 
measured. This is achieved by combining smart meter 
consumption data and building modelling to produce a dynamic 
baseline, against which savings are measure. Units of energy 
saved are then paid for on a per unit basis. 
 
- Lighting as a Service 
contracts 
 
LED and internet enabled lighting offers rapid paybacks on 
lighting conversions and Lighting as a Service (LaaS) models are 
growing. The provider installs lighting at no cost to the end client 
and finances the project, usually through leasing or asset 
finance. They also take on maintenance of the system and lamp 
replacements with the customer paying a regular service fee.  
 
Secondary financing can be 
achieved through: 
 
In order to grow the energy efficiency financing market it is 
essential to have an active market in secondary financing in 
order to recycle capital. The secondary market is only now 
starting to emerge due to the relatively small scale of the energy 
efficiency market and the lack of standardisation and 
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aggregation of projects. The various secondary market financing 
methods are outlined below. 
 
- Forfaiting funds 
purchasing receivables 
from energy service 
contracts 
 
Energy service contracts such as Energy Performance Contracts 
produce long-term stable cash flows which canbe an attractive 
asset for long-term investors. Forfaiting funds can refinance EPC 
contracts, allowing primary investors and funders to recycle 




Green bonds are likely to be important for the re-financing of 
green mortgages and retrofit projects once a sufficient volume 
of projects can be aggregated. A set of standardised projects can 
be aggregated and refinanced through a bond issuance. Pooled 
retrofits have been refinanced by bonds in the United States. A 
secondary bond market would allow primary lenders for energy 





Yieldcos have emerged for renewable energy portfolios as this 
market has matured and this may have a futre application in 
energy efficiency. A yieldco bundles together a series of 
renewable transactions and this aggregation blends risk and 
allows for steady, predictable returns. It allows parent 
companies to raise cheaper capital for established projects and 
to recycle the capital for new project development.  
 
 
Source: Extracted from EEFIG, 2017   
 
 
Table 2: Financing mechanisms for energy efficiency 
 
 
3.4 Energy Performance Contracting 
 
Energy Performance Contracting (EPC) is a method of implementing an energy efficiency 
project on a building or portfolio of buildings.  It is distinguished from a project supplying 
energy services only, employing an Energy Performance Provider Company (ESPC), in a very 
important way.  An EPC project is a project implemented using an Energy Services Company 
(ESCO) and although they offer the same services as an ESPC, they either guarantee the energy 





ESCOs accept some degree of risk for the achievement of improved energy efficiency in a 
user’s facility and have their payment for services delivered based on the achievement of the 




A form of ‘creative financing’ for capital improvement which allows funding energy 
efficiency upgrades from cost reductions.  The approach is based on transfer of 
technical risks from the client to the ESCO based on performance guarantees given by 
the ESCO.  In EPC, ESCO remuneration is based on demonstrated performance; a 
measure of performance is the level of energy or cost savings or the level of energy 
service.  EPC is a means to deliver infrastructure improvements to facilities that lack 
energy engineering skills, manpower or management time, capital funding, and 
understanding of risk or technology information. Cash-poor, yet creditworthy, 
customers are therefore good potential clients for EPC. 
 
(Bertoldi and Rezessy, 2005, p18) 
 
 
Figure 10 graphically illustrates savings that are achieved in an EPC contract.  Once the energy 
efficiency measures known generically in the EPC industry as Energy Conservation Measures 
(ECMs) are implemented, ongoing operational costs are reduced and the guaranteed savings 
are realised during the period that the contract is in place. During the contract period the ESCO 
provides an operational service managing the facility or facilities.  Once the contract has 







Source: McClain, 2008 
Figure 10: The Energy Performance Model 
 
(McClain, 2008)     
3.4.1 History and Development 
 
As far back as the late 1970s, energy services companies (ESCOs) and an energy efficiency 
business model started to emerge, although at that stage the driver was not necessarily the 
meeting of carbon reduction targets but saving money for the customer and the making of a 
profit for the provider.  The first to offer such a service was a company called Scallop Thermal, 
a division of Royal Dutch Shell, which offered its customers in the UK and US to deliver 
conditioned space at 90 percent of their current utility bills (Hansen et al., 2009, p5).  The 
concept provided that each party would share a predetermined percentage split of the energy 
financial savings and during the life of the contract the ESCO would expect its percentage of 
the cost savings to cover all its costs and provide a profit.  However, in the mid-1980s the oil 
prices dropped and it took longer than expected for the ESCOs to recover their costs, and some 
paybacks became longer than the contracts they related to.  This meant that the ESCOs could 
not make their payment to suppliers or financial backers and ultimately some defaulted on their 
commitments to customers on the shared savings of energy costs (Hanson et al, 2009 p5).  As 




However, the fledgling energy efficiency industry survived with some modifications as with 
the increasing uncertainty in the industry and energy pricing, perceived risk levels grew and 
with them financing interest rates.  In the US a new contract structure emerged which moved 
away from the established or ‘shared savings’ structure towards guaranteed energy 
performance or ‘guaranteed savings’ and became known as Energy Performance Contracting 
(EPC).  This revised concept not only offered guaranteed savings in energy used, but also that 
the value of the saved energy would be sufficient to meet the customer’s debt service 
requirements provided the price of energy did not drop below a specified floor price (Hansen 
et al., 2009, p6).  The use of the original ‘shared savings’ agreements shrank to around 5 percent 
of the US market as ‘guaranteed savings’ became the dominant model (Hansen et al., 2009).  
Invariably a number of variants emerged however they were based on either of the two 
offerings and collectively they took on the term Energy Performance Contracting (ibid).  The 
‘shared savings’ model remained more popular in some markets, such as in the UK.  
 
 
3.4.2 EPC in the UK 
 
The concept of EPC is not well known or used in the UK and Energy Service Contracting is 
known as Contract Energy Management (CEM) (Fawkes, 2013a, p164, Fawkes, 2015, Hansen 
et al., 2009, p27).  The UK market for energy service contracting could be said to have begun 
in 1984 when Shell ‘Emstar’ was established as an energy management company (Hansen et 
al., 2009, p27).  They offered services modernising heating plant, installing new modular 
boilers and controls, clearing up the backlog of maintenance and changing the fuel, which very 
often involved converting oil-fired boilers to gas (Hansen et al., 2009, p27). However, the 
primary focus was heat supply via ‘heat service’ contracts (Sorrell, 2005, p41).  This early 
model proved to be highly successful and influential and other fuel supply companies followed 
Shell, most notably BP with the formation of BP Energy.  Energy supply contracts rather than 
energy performance contracts dominate the energy service market currently in the UK (Sorrell, 
2005, p41).  Initially most contracts were with the private sector as Treasury rules created an 
obstacle to the use of private finance within the public sector, until they were removed in 1992 
to allow the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) to come forward (ibid).  Even with this obstacle 




The energy services market grew steadily during the 1990s, however in the early 2000s serious 
stagnation was experienced (Bertoldi et al., 2007, p20).  Gas and electricity market 
liberalisation proved to be an obstacle as declining energy prices led to clients losing interest 
in energy efficiency and focusing instead on energy purchasing  (Sorrell, 2005, p42).  This 
trend was reversed with the large increases in gas and electricity prices since 2003, providing 
a boost to the contracting market which by 2005 was experiencing an approximate 15% annual 
growth (ibid,).  
 
The market in the UK is differentiated with numerous energy service companies originating 
from different sectors of the market offering differing services under the umbrella of ‘Contract 
Energy Management’ (Sorrell, 2005, p42).  This, together with the numerous overlaps between 
the services being offered, makes it difficult to define the size and boundaries of the UK market 
for energy services contracting (ibid, 44).  Figure 11 illustrates the various types of company 
offering services as energy service companies. 
 
 
(Sorrell, 2005)   Source: Sorrell, 2005 
 
Figure 11: Overlaps in the UK marker for energy service contracts 
 
Combined Heat and Power (CHP) installations have been a feature in the UK energy services 
sector with both large-scale (e.g. hospitals) and smaller-scale cogeneration (such as leisure 




The industry in the UK can be characterised as being dominated by supply contracting and is 
still biased towards the private sector, although hospitals have proved to be a promising market 
for CHP. 
 
Emstar was taken over in 1998 by Dalkia, a French multinational (Sorrell, 2005, p42).  Partly 
due to the unclear definition as to what constitutes energy services, it is very difficult to identify 
a size of the UK market.  Also, how the size of the industry is measured is also an issue, should 
it be in terms of the annual revenue received, the capital value of new investment or the size of 
the annual energy bill under contract (Sorrell, 2005, p45). Most ESCOs indicate their turnover 
by the annual energy bills they handle.  The Energy Systems Trade Association (ESTA), within 
which there is a Contract Energy Management Group, estimates the market size on the basis 
of turnover in 2001 to be approximately £500 million/year.  This is compared to only £127 
million/year in 1993, implying an annual growth rate of around 18% over this period.  If this 
is compared to the total annual gas and electricity expenditure for the UK, the expenditure for 
the industrial, commercial and public sectors combined was approximately £10 billion in 2000 
(Department for Trade and Industry, 2001) as cited by Sorrell, 2005.  This suggests that 
provision of energy supplied by ESCOs represented 5% of the market.  
 
In 2017 EEFIG stated that the size of the global market for EPCs was US $24 billion and of 
this US $2.9 billion was in Europe (EEFIG, 2017). 
 
 
3.4.3 Structure of EPC contracts 
 
EPC projects include a number of processes and stages.  Bertoldi and Rezzessy (2005) have 
attempted to identify a comprehensive list of elements/steps that an EPC project may include 
in their report for the European Commission in 2005, provided below: 
 
 
➢ Site survey and preliminary evaluation; 
➢ Investment grade audit; 
➢ Identification of possible energy saving and efficiency improving actions; 
➢ Financial presentation and client decision; 
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➢ Guarantee of the results by proper contract clauses; 
➢ Project financing; 
➢ Comprehensive engineering and project design and specifications; 
➢ Procurement and installation of equipment: final design and construction; 
➢ Project management, commissioning and acceptance; 
➢ Facility and equipment operation & maintenance for the contract period; 
➢ Purchase of fuel & electricity (to provide heat, comfort, light, etc); 
➢ Measurement and verification of the savings results; 
➢ Operation and maintenance. 
(Bertoldi and Rezessy, 2005, p29) 
 
Two aspects of the elements identified in the list are worth explaining further, the investment 
grade audit and measurement and verification of the savings results.   
 
Firstly, an investment grade audit (IGA) attempts to provide a much more accurate assessment 
of the energy or cost saving potential that certain ECMs will have over the life of the project.  
A traditional audit will assume that all conditions stay the same; all paybacks are the same in 
varying conditions and ignore the human element (Hansen, 2003).  IGA auditors consider the 
conditions under which ECAs will function during the life of the project and attempt to more 
accurately predict a building’s future energy use by adding a ‘risk assessment component’ 
which evaluates conditions in a specific building and/or processes (Bertoldi and Rezessy, 2005, 
p29). 
 
Secondly, measurement and verification (M&V) of the savings made is an important issue, as 
it forms the basis of not only the commercial guarantee provided by the ESCO, but of the 
funder’s risk assessment of the energy efficiency project.  It is a means by which customers, 
ESCOs and funders can rely on to effectively translate savings achieved into the project cash 
flow.  The output of the M&V exercise will ultimately quantify the payments from the customer 
to the ESCO within whatever contractual structure is used. 
 
An industry standard M&V methodology has been developed called the International 
Performance Measurement and Verification Protocol (IPMVP), providing guidance for 
measuring the savings produced by energy efficiency measures.  The IPMVP is administered 
by the Efficiency Valuation Organisation, a not for profit organisation supported by the US 
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Department of Energy and a broad international coalition of industry bodies and entities such 
as facility owners and ESCOs (Van Der Like, 2007, p3).  The IPMVP ensures that the approach 
taken is fully documented and agreed at the pre-contract stage.  It identifies, against each 
Energy Conservation Measure, the level of expected savings, how they are to be achieved, and 
which measurement option is to be used, of which there are four alternatives.   
 
The choice of option A, B, C or D should be related to the level of perceived risk in achieving 
the expected savings, as each option varies in terms of complexity and cost to the project.  
Options A and B (isolation retrofit approach) focus on the performance of specific ECMs such 
as items of equipment and installed retrofits that can be measured in isolation from the rest of 
the building (Van Der Like, 2007, p4).  Before and after measurements are taken and compared 
to determine the savings.  A lighting retrofit is a good example for Option A where performance 
can be verified once and is unlikely to change.  Installation of variable speed drives is a good 
example for Option B, where continuous monitoring would be more appropriate (Van Der Like, 
2007, pp4-5).   
 
Options C and D (whole building approach) are used when the nature of the ECM is not easily 
measured in isolation from the rest of the building operations. Typically, this could be control 
changes that affect many areas of the building.  The Option C approach assesses savings at the 
whole facility level by analysing utility bills before and after the implementation of the ECMs 
(Van Der Like, 2007, p5).  Option D uses computer simulations and modelling of the whole 
facility.  Options C and D are much more time consuming, requiring skilled resources, and 
therefore they are going to be the more costly approaches (Van Der Like, 2007, p5).  As cited 
by The Clinton Foundation, 2009 the 2007 IPMVP guide (updated in 2009) states that M&V 
costs are typically less than 10% of the project costs (Efficiency Valuation Organisation, 2009).  
In fact they range from as low as 1% up to 10%, depending on the option selected (Clinton 
Foundation, 2009).  
 
EPC projects can be financed in a number of alternative ways.  ESCO financing is where the 
ESCO itself provides the finance, possibly through its own funds. However, this method is not 
popular as it tends to tie up the ESCO’s funds and potentially restricts its ability to conduct 
business going forward.  Alternatively, financing can be via the energy user or customer’s own 
funds, however this would normally only be used in the guaranteed savings model where a 
guarantee is in place as security against the investment.  Thirdly, EPC can be financed by third 
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party financing where either the ESCO or the customer sources debt from a financial institution. 










Third party financing with energy user / customer borrowing 
 
(Bertoldi and Rezessy, 2005) Source: Bertoldi and Rezessy, 2005 
 
Figure 12:  Third party financing with ESCO and energy user / customer borrowing 
 
Figure 12 illustrates the contractual relationships between an ESCO and the financial institution 
and between the energy user / customer and the financial institution in the different third-party 
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financing structures.  When the ESCO is the borrower the customer is protected from the 
financial risks of the project, as the debt is off balance sheet, appearing on the balance sheet of 
the ESCO (Bertoldi and Rezessy, 2005, p20).  This is because the debt service is treated like 
an operational expense and not a capital obligation.  This is important, as for highly leveraged 
companies or public authorities the obligation does not show up on their balance sheet. More 
debt could mean that its borrowing capacity is adversely affected (ibid). The exact criteria for 
this accounting treatment will vary from country to country.  Although large ESCOs could to 
an extent contribute their own funds, they prefer not to as it ties up valuable capital in projects.  
They are essentially service companies and are not in the business of providing or risking 
finance.  While the larger ESCOs would be able to borrow significant amounts of money, partly 
secured against the cash flow on the project and partly against the strength of its balance sheet, 
the smaller ESCOs would not have the ability to do so. 
 
Figure 13 illustrates the relationships between the ESCO, customer and lender in the two major 
EPC models: shared savings and guaranteed savings.  Under a shared savings contract the cost 
savings are split for a pre-determined length of time in accordance with a pre-arranged 
percentage. There is no standard split as this depends on the cost and length of the project and 
the risks taken by the ESCO and the consumer (Bertoldi and Rezessy, 2005, p23).  Under a 
guaranteed savings contract the ESCO guarantees a certain level of energy savings and in this 


















GUARANTEED SAVINGS MODEL 
 
  (Stoner, 2003)   Source: Stoner, 2003 
 
Figure 13:  Major types of Energy Performance Contracting models 
 
Under a shared savings contract the ESCO assumes both performance and credit risk.  The 
ESCO obtains the financing and assumes the finance repayment risk and the credit risk of the 
customer, should the customer go out of business or simply default on its payments.  This could 
put the ESCO at risk.  This is a model where the debt is off the customer’s balance sheet.  The 
ESCO shares in any savings that exceed expectations, therefore customers in this arrangement 
would need to guard against the ESCO attempting to set the saving threshold too low and 




Under a guaranteed savings contract the ESCO assumes the design, installation and savings 
performance risk but none of the finance repayment or credit risks which reside with the 
customer.  Therefore, guaranteed savings contracts are not applicable to ESCO financed 
projects, funded either through internally provided funds or third-party financing.  The 
customer obtains the funding, which has the advantage of producing the cheapest form of 
finance as the funding institution will base the majority of its credit assessment on the customer 
itself, although it may also be based to some extent on the energy saving guaranteed provided 
by the ESCO.  The customer repays the loan and assumes the repayment risk.  If the guaranteed 
savings are not realised, which are sized to match the debt service, the ESCO is contractually 
obliged to cover the difference.  If the savings exceed the guaranteed level then the customer 
pays an agreed percentage of the savings to the ESCO (Bertoldi and Rezessy, 2005, p24).  
Typically the contract will state that the guarantee provided by the ESCO, which is the value 
of the energy saved will be sufficient to meet the customer’s debt obligations, is on the proviso 
that the price of energy does not go below a stipulated floor price (Bertoldi and Rezessy, 2005, 




(Bertoldi and Rezessy, 2005)   Source: Bertoldi and Rezessy, 2005 
 
Table 3:  Guaranteed savings and shared savings: a comparison 
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Increasingly ESCOs are reluctant to be the borrower of the funding as in the shared savings 
model.  It restricts their further borrowing and, in some case, some ESCOs just can not raise 
the money due to their small size.  However, customers or clients value the off-balance sheet 
treatment of the financing therefore a contract variant has emerged along the lines of a typical 
Project Finance structure.  In this structure a Special Purpose Entity or Vehicle (SPE/V) is 
established whereby it contracts with the customer to provide the services and also has a 
contract with an ESCO to provide those services.  The SPV raises the finance, protecting the 
ESCO from the funding risk and at the same time allowing the contract to remain off the 
customer’s balance sheet.  This type of financing can be more expensive as it relies solely on 
the project itself with no recourse to the ESCO or customer and therefore it requires the funder 
to understand the nature of the project and to be able to price the risks accordingly.  Figure 14 




SPECIAL PURPOSE ENTITY/VEHICLE (SPE/V) MODEL 
 
  (Stoner, 2003)  Source: Stoner, 2003 
 




3.4.4 Criticism of Energy Performance Contracting 
 
Energy Performance Contracting does not appear to have fulfilled its full potential (Fawkes, 
2013a, p170, 2013d).. As we have seen, there is a need for energy efficiency improvements in 
buildings that could significantly contribute to the reduction in CO2 emissions if implemented 
on a large scale. Whilst EPC would appear to be a method of achieving that aim, this has not 
proved to be the case (Fawkes, 2013d). Although not implemented widely in the UK, EPC has 
been adopted in various forms by organisations such as The Greater London Authority, The 
Department of Energy and Climate Change (now part of the Department of Business, Energy 
and Industrial Strategy) and The Green Investment Bank. Energy Performance Contracting as 
a procurement method is not without disadvantages and criticism, which may go some way to 
explain the reason why it has not been implemented more widely.  
 
The lack of low-cost financing for EPCs is a contributory factor of its restricted use. When the 
procurement method was developed in the US it was financed mainly by municipal debt, which 
is particularly cheap financing only available to parts of the US public sector, and is not 
available in other jurisdictions. The option of the ESCO itself financing projects is not popular 
or attractive to the ESCO, as for the larger companies it creates balance sheet restrictions while 
the smaller providers would have trouble raising the capital even if they had intended to 
(Fawkes, 2013a, p170, 2013d). 
 
EPCs are inherently long-term and complex agreements. They are typically between seven and 
fifteen years long, to make sure savings exceed payments. Being over such a duration other 
factors then have to be taken into account such as changes in how the buildings are used or 
even that they could have a change in ownership. The transactions can take a long time to agree, 
be complex and hard to negotiate and the transaction costs can be high. A Method of M&V 
needs to be agreed and put in place that may involve independent M&V specialists being 
engaged. This all involves much time and effort on behalf of the client in order to achieve the 
optimum transaction, which may be further hampered by the EPC contractor looking to 
maximise the amount of capital expenditure within a deal,  maximising its mark up on the 




EPC transactions are most suited to the public sector and buildings with an owner-occupier 
rather than the commercial rented building sector, as issues such as the split incentive between 
landlords and tenants can make the deal structure difficult to work effectively (Fawkes, 2013d). 
 
If EPC is not the full answer to the need for energy efficiency investment at scale, and Fawkes 
(2013c) is not suggesting that it is without its merits in certain circumstances, then what is the 
approach that should be taken? Although EPC appears to be the model being proffered as the 
solution, other forms of contractual arrangement have emerged in recent years, most notably 
Efficiency Services Agreements (ESA). ESAs are increasingly being used in the US having 
been pioneered by a company called Metrus but are now being implemented more widely. 
However they haven’t yet been used in the UK in any meaningful way, with one or two notable 
exceptions (Fawkes, 2013b).  
 
Efficiency Services Agreements work per the contractual arrangement illustrated in Figure 15 




(Metrus Energy n.d.)   Source: Metrus Energy n.d. 
 
Figure 15: Efficiency Services Agreement contractual structure from Metrus 
 
The Efficiency Services Agreement (ESA) creates pay-for-performance energy efficiency 
financing for an energy efficiency upgrade project with no upfront cost. Through the ESA, the 
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developer (and/or financier), in the Figure 15 it is Metrus, pays for 100% of development and 
construction costs. After the project is operational, the customer or client takes a portion of the 
realised savings from reduced energy consumption to make service payments to the developer. 
ESA service payments are based on actual energy units that are saved, avoided kilowatt hours 
of electricity or avoided therms of natural gas etc. 
 
The developer enters into the ESA directly with the customer or client and pays and manages 
an ESCO/contractor to implement and help maintain the project.  The developer retains 
ownership of all project-related assets for the duration of the ESA term and pays for 
maintenance services in order to optimise performance.  As in the EPC arrangement, project 
performance is quantified using agreed-upon M&V protocols.  These verified savings provide 
the basis for the ESA service charge. The ESA contractual structure makes the payments made 
by the end user firmly operating expenses and therefore it is a fully off-balance sheet structure. 
 
 
3.5 Investments by Institutional Investors in Energy 
Efficiency 
 
The next important consideration is that of how energy efficiency investments can be made by 
institutional investors. Of course, investors could make direct investments in companies that 
carry our energy efficiency improvements as part of their equity allocation however when it 
comes to providing funding to individual energy efficiency projects, investors have not been 
forthcoming (Kaminker and Stewart, 2012, pp26-27). This is due to a number of factors not 
least the relatively small size of the projects (Kaminker and Stewart, 2012, pp26-27). Many of 
the larger energy efficiency projects can be in the range of between £2m to £10m which is 
small when compared to infrastructure or PFI type projects which often exceed £100m, 
however they can be as small as £10k. This issue, coupled with the unfamiliarity of the sector 
and the use of non-standard protocols and processes underlying the deals, investors are dis-
incentivised to invest directly.  Investors would need to expend significant time and cost in 
fully understanding and executing the deal structure and due to the non-standard nature of the 
transaction they would need to repeat it again for the next bespoke project. While the issue of 
transaction standardisation is in the process of being addressed through initiatives such as the 
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Investor Confidence Project there is currently insufficient confidence within the investor base 
for direct investment in energy efficiency for it to be seen in any great numbers (ICP n.d.). 
Investors also require familiar contractual structures to understand how the revenues will be 
generated and get translated into their returns. This additional need goes against direct 
investment on a large scale. 
 
A further way of investing would be indirectly via a Fund structure, much the same way as 
investors invest funds into a Private Equity fund or an Infrastructure Fund where a fund 
manager is appointed to manage and invest the funds injected by the institutional investors in 
accordance with a prescribed fund strategy. Investors would not only need to have the 
confidence in the underlying investments in energy efficiency, which is increasing via 
initiatives such as the Investor Confidence Project, but they would also need to be convinced 
of the fund manager’s knowledge, experience and understanding of the sector.  This way of 
investing is more attractive to institutional investors while the sector is relatively new. If the 
investor can be confident in the fund manager then it will rely on it to make a investments on 
its behalf without having to invest time an effort to fully understand the underlying investments 
which it would be unlikely to do. 
 
Limited Energy Efficiency Fund structures have emerged however even fewer that would 
enable institutional investors to invest their funds. A number of public funds have been created 
to investing to energy efficiency such as the London Energy Efficiency Fund (LEEP), the 
Mayors Energy Efficiency Fund (London) and the Central Energy Efficiency Fund in Scotland 
but these do not have the possibility for institutional investors to directly invest their funds as 
they are either fully funded publicly, have received some funding from European Union 
Structural Funds or have agreements with commercial banks or a combination of the three 
sources (Energy for London, 2013, London Assembly, 2018, Natural Scotland, 2004).  
 
The Zurich based Susi Energy Efficiency Fund is a prominent private sector fund, seeking to 
invest in energy efficiency across Europe and has raised its capital from institutional investors 
in Euros (SUSI Partners, 2017). It has €200m commitments from mainly German, Swiss and 
Dutch institutional investors and the European Investment Bank (SUSI Partners, 2017). While 
this fund has been open for investors from the UK it may not have been attractive when 
considering the unfamiliar nature of the investments and the fund manager and the need to 




The Green Investment Bank (GIB), in an effort to attract institutional investment into energy 
efficiency rather than attempt to encourage direct investment, decided in 2011 to make £50m 
investments into two dedicated energy efficiency funds, and launched a competition in order 
to select fund managers (BIS, 2012). The two successful fund managers were Equitix, which 
is an established fund manager specialising in social infrastructure investments, and 
Sustainable Development Capital LLP (SDCL) a company that had extensive energy efficiency 
advisory experience, if not in a fund management role, the funds were launched 2012. A 
requirement of the GIB was that the funds should also have a matching £50m invested from 
institutional investors (BIS, 2012). In fact, both fund managers have been able to significantly 
exceed the £50m requirement with sums of between £100m and £150m being raised in each 
fund. Subsequently a third energy efficiency fund was added to the GIB list of supported funds, 







4 Literature review and positioning the research 
 
Investment in Energy Efficiency at scale via institutional and pension fund investment has not 
been widespread and indeed the objective of this research is to identify ways in which this can 
happen. The energy efficiency literature to date has not focused on this aspect but has 
concerned itself with investment in energy efficiency from an end user perspective. It examines 
the organisational and behavioural aspects of a firm or individual investing in a relatively small 
energy efficiency projects and has not as yet addressed the issue of applying large scale funds 
to aggregated projects. The energy efficiency gap, that is to say the difference between current 
energy use and optimal energy use, is discussed extensively, examining the issues and reasons 
why cost effective measures are not implemented in order to close the ‘gap’ (Jaffe et al., 2004, 
Jaffe and Stavins, 1994a, Allcott and Greenstone, 2012). These reasons have been translated 
into barriers to implementation and much has been written about the identification of what is 
preventing companies or individuals from undertaking energy efficiency measures, with many 
of the issues based in behavioural or organisational economics (Sorrell et al., 2004, Sorrell et 
al., 2000, Palm and Thollander, 2010, Valentová, 2010).  
 
It is important to understand these issues if institutional investment into energy efficiency is to 
be encouraged. Investors need to know that there is a continuing and liquid market and there 
are investments to be made at scale in the future if they are to spend time and effort 
understanding the market (Fankhauser, 2012).  
 
Although their characteristics are different, investment in energy efficiency is often discussed 
together with renewable energy, and termed collectively as low carbon investments (Usher, 
2008, UNEP, 2010). Whereas renewable energy creates a return from producing energy, energy 
efficiency creates its cash flow from energy conservation and therefore through costs being 
saved. Through the linking of renewable energy and energy efficiency investments, the 
literature concerning institutional and pension fund investment in renewable energy is 
important when considering investment in energy efficiency at scale. Much of this linkage 
relates to energy efficiency in the commercial property and industrial sectors, however there is 
an increasing recognition that investment at scale is required in the domestic sector also 




This literature review firstly examines the energy efficiency gap and the identified barriers to 
energy efficiency investments and then looks at literature concerning low carbon institutional 
and pension fund investment, in general, and renewable energy, in particular where relevant.        
 
 
4.1 Energy Efficiency Gap        
 
The energy efficiency gap, the difference between current energy use and optimal energy use, 
is discussed in the literature with the focus on attempting to explain why the phenomenon 
exists. Why for example are technologies such as thermal insulations materials and energy 
efficient appliances not more widely used, when simple net present value calculations show 
them to be cost effective (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994a)? Shama (1983) describes the gap as the 
paradox of gradual diffusion of apparent cost effective energy efficiency technologies (Shama, 
1983). Jaffe and Stavins go on to develop a framework for thinking about the ‘paradox’ and 
their analysis provides some keys to understanding why the technology diffusion process is 
gradual (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994b, Jaffe et al., 2004). They identify a series of market failures 
and other issues that create this phenomenon, which have collectively become known as 
barriers to energy efficiency (Sorrell et al., 2004). These barriers have typically been 
characterised as economic, behavioural or organisational in nature (Weber, 1997). 
 
 
4.2 Barriers to Energy Efficiency 
 
According to Weber (1997) the following questions need to be asked in order to determine 
the existence of barriers to energy efficiency: 
 
What is the barrier?   e.g. hidden costs, risk, lack of capital, lack of information, inadequate 
financial incentives etc. 
Who or what is it an obstacle to?   e.g. firms, public, organisations, departments within 
organisations, individuals. 
What does it prevent?   e.g. purchase of more efficient equipment, retrofitting insulation to a 
building, establishing a monitoring & targeting scheme. 
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Weber (1997) discusses barriers to energy efficiency in three broad groupings, namely neo-
classical economics, behavioural perspectives and organisational perspectives. He then 
proceeds to state that in reality each barrier may have aspects of each. Sorrell et al. (2000) 
provide an illustrative example of these perspectives, provided here as Table 4. 
 
 
Source: Sorrell et al, 2000 
 
Table 4: Perspectives on barriers to energy efficiency 
 
 
4.3 Economics perspective 
 
Much of the literature on energy efficiency barriers is based in neo-classical or orthodox 
economics; it assumes that consumers make decisions regarding energy efficiency measures in 
a fully rational way and then attempts to identify the drivers for the energy efficiency gap 
(Sutherland, 1996, Jaffe and Stavins, 1994a). The approach states that individuals maintain 
rational preferences and that they make choices through market transactions (Sanstad and 
Howarth, 1994b).  These choices, for example to decide to accept or reject a cost-effective 
energy efficiency measure, reveal that additional factors are present, such as hidden costs or 
benefits, assuming rational consumer behaviour is correct. This approach is criticised as 
representing an unrealistic description of actual behaviour (Hodgson, 1988).  
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Many of the early works attempting to identify market barriers to energy efficiency, which 
according to Sorrell’s definition of a barrier is a mechanism that inhibits investment in cost-
effective energy efficiency technology, were criticised by neo-classical economists (Sorrell et 
al., 2004). They asserted that these ‘market barriers’ such as those proposed by Hirst & Brown 
(1990), namely uncertainty in future fuel prices or the unavailability of capital, are ambiguous 
and may simply be benign characteristics of an efficient market (Sutherland, 1996, Hirst and 
Brown, 1990). For example, the unavailability of capital may only be related to low income 
households as they would be deemed high risk borrowers. The funding market could be 
working efficiently even though it may inhibit energy efficiency investment by the low income 
sector of society (Sutherland, 1996).                
 
Sorrell (2000, 2004) states that these criticisms were useful in formulating the neo-classical 
approach to the issue which seeks to identify where public policy should be targeted in order 
to encourage energy efficiency. The argument is that this should be achieved through 
encouraging economic efficiency where there exists some form of market failure (Jaffe and 
Stavins, 1994a, Sutherland, 1996, Golove and Eto, 1996). Therefore, it is only the identifiable 
market failures that warrant policy intervention, however not all market barriers are market 
failures. Sorrell (2000, 2004) characterises these market failures in the following ways; as 
incomplete markets, imperfect competition, imperfect information and asymmetric 
information, however it is the last two, imperfect information and asymmetric information, that 
have the most impact on barriers to energy efficiency and to explain the energy efficiency gap. 
 
 
4.3.1 Imperfect information 
 
Markets need to produce and transmit sufficient information for market participants to 
undertake fully efficient transactions. This may not occur where information has public good 
characteristics and many people are able to benefit from it without affecting its supply. Private 
firms may be unwilling to supply information because they would be unable to retain all of its 
benefits, which is a common rationale for government intervention (Sorrell et al., 2000).  
 
Relating this to barriers to energy efficiency investment, it is claimed that the energy services 
market provides insufficient information about the energy performance of different 
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technologies (Huntington et al., 1994). This can take the form of information on current energy 
consumption, energy specific investment opportunities and specific equipment. Huntington et 
al (1994) state that information problems are the principal source of market failures that 
account for the gap in energy efficiency investments. 
 
 
4.3.2 Asymmetric information 
 
Asymmetric information is a form of imperfect information where one party to a transaction 
may know or understand more than the other. A seller may know more about the quality of a 
good than the buyer. The effects of asymmetric information can manifest themselves in a 
number of ways.  
 
Adverse selection can relate to a situation where a seller has difficulty in communicating 
information that they have to potential buyers. Consumers may not be able to observe and 
understand the quality of the product and only select products on the basis of what is visible, 
such as price, making them reluctant to purchase the higher quality product due to the price 
premium. For example, energy efficiency and conservation management issues within a 
building may be controlled by a highly efficient Building Management System (BMS), but 
remain invisible to potential buyers who may hold more store in the quality of the finishes or 
the fabric of the building, and then are reluctant to pay the price premium for having the quality 
BMS installed (Howarth and Sanstad, 1995).  
 
Moral hazard is a term that originated in the insurance industry to describe insurance 
companies’ lack of ability to effectively monitor the actions of their policyholders. The 
policyholder may act in a way to make the insured loss more likely to occur (Sorrell et al., 
2000). In the context of the energy efficiency gap, moral hazard is normally discussed in terms 
of principal-agent relationships. For example, construction companies, acting as agents, are 
employed by the client as principal. The construction company may have incentives to act and 
take actions in a different manner than the principal would like, perhaps to cut corners on 
energy efficiency measures for example in order to increase profits. This is potentially possible 




‘Split incentives’ is a highly recognised barrier to energy efficiency and are typically seen 
where a landlord of a building may be unwilling to retrofit with energy efficiency measures as 
the resulting savings in energy use will be realised by the tenant. At the same time the tenant 
would be unwilling to retrofit as they may move out before benefiting from the cost savings. 
Jaffe and Stavins (1994) have interpreted split incentives as a market failure resulting from 
asymmetric information. One party may have the relevant information on the costs and benefits 
of an energy efficiency investment but it may be difficult to convey this to the other party. If 
there were no information problems landlords and tenants would be able to enter into contracts 
to share the costs and benefits of the investment. 
 
 
4.3.3 Jaffe & Stavins framework 
 
Jaffe & Stavins (1994) use this approach to identify a framework for characterising different 
types of barrier into those that are market failures and those that are not, while also classifying 
them as explaining the energy efficiency gap and those that do not, refer to Table 5.  This 
framework complements the neo-classical economist’s assertion that only identifiable market 
failures warrant government policy intervention. 
 
 
Source: Sorrell, 2000 summarising from Jaffe & Stavins, 1994 
 





4.4 Behavioural perspective 
 
The behavioural aspects of barriers to energy efficiency concern the actions and behaviour of 
individuals in the decision-making process. These may be influenced by the costs associated 
with the implications of an investment decision, the level of information that is available to 
inform a decision. An individual’s biases can influence investment decisions that are based on 
past experience or the chance of gaining an assumed benefit. Decisions are influenced by the 
assumed level of risk being taken in the investment process and how risk adverse an individual 
is also a factor. These decisions are based on the concepts of transaction cost analysis, bounded 
rationality and ultimately cognitive bias in its different forms.  
 
Investment decisions are made with reference to both risk and return and the biases identified 
by prospect theory are particularly relevant as they primarily concern loss and regret. Models 
of investment and the investment decision process have been formulated identifying that 
cognitive issues play a role in the decision process. This is demonstrated in the differentiated 
model of risk and return involving energy policy and investment. However, the model 
considered most appropriate for consideration is Clark’s model of investment decision making 
as it specifically identifies institutional investors (pension fund trustees) as the decision makers. 
It includes all the aspects identified as important in other models including investors’ approach 




4.4.1 Transaction Cost Economics  
 
Transaction cost economics builds upon the concepts introduced by the neo-classical or 
orthodox economics approach. As with the orthodox approach it is concerned with the 
behaviour of individuals, assuming that they are fully rational. However, it also assumes that 
transactions are rarely costless. It focuses on costs and risks of transactions and uses these to 
explain organisational governance structure. The concept of transaction costs derives originally 
from the work of Ronald Course but transaction cost economics as a theme of organisational 
economics derives from Williamson (1979) and draws on the behavioural assumption of 




Transaction cost economics focuses on the nature of different transactions and the costs and 
risks associated with those transactions (Sorrell et al., 2004). Transaction costs are assumed to 
include legal, administrative information gathering and other costs associated with negotiating 
and entering a transaction. Arrow (1969) asserted that transaction costs in general impede and 
in particular cases completely block the formation of markets. Golove & Eto (1996) indicate 
that one of the implications of Arrow’s assertion in terms of energy services may be that the 
slow diffusion rates of efficient technologies may be better understood in terms of transaction 
costs associated with the development of such markets, than by the types of neo-classical 
market failure discussed previously. Both Sanstad & Howarth (1994) and Golove & Eto (1996) 
argue that transaction economics has much to offer in understanding barriers to energy 
efficiency, with the latter particularly arguing that both neo-classical market failures and 
transaction cost based failures represent legitimate possible objects of government 
intervention.  (Sanstad and Howarth, 1994a, Golove and Eto, 1996).           
 
 
4.4.2 Bounded rationality 
 
Transaction Cost Economics not only takes into consideration costs associated with a 
transaction but also the behavioural assumptions to explain why a transaction takes place or 
the form in which it takes place. Sorrell (2000) states that Williamson introduces two important 
behavioural assumptions: 
   
• bounded rationality: which implies that people make decisions subject to constraints 
on their attention, resources and ability to process information; and 
• opportunism: which implies that self-interest seeking can take anti-social forms such as 
lying, stealing and cheating. 
 
It is the concept of bounded rationality that has the most relevance to energy efficiency. The 
concept was first introduced by Herbert Simon in the 1950s and directly contradicts the 
assertion that agents make decisions in the manner prescribed by formal optimisation models 
followed by orthodox economists (Simon, 1955). He suggested that people make decisions 
subject to constraints on their attention, resources and ability to process information; therefore, 
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their decisions are likely to differ significantly from the predictions of optimisation models.  
These constraints lead individuals and organisations, who are otherwise rational, to make 
decisions through imprecise routines and rules of thumb rather than full analysis with the 
optimum outcome. In a survey of energy information programmes it was concluded that ‘it is 
clear that, with the exception of some energy labelling programmes, energy information 
programmes on their own have not to date resulted in significant energy savings’ (Robinson, 
1991). The provision of accurate information on costs and benefits does not necessarily 




4.4.3 Cognitive bias - Heuristics  
  
The concept of bounded rationality in the context of everyday decision-making including those 
involving the making of investments involves individuals use of decision-making shortcuts 
known as heuristics (Baddeley, 2013). Investors use tools and techniques, or heuristics, based 
on given information and their past experience to allow them to determine which investment 
to make. Investors’ decision-making may not be completely rational, since there are emotional 
and mental factors involved in the process of decision-making which the investors go through 
by collecting relevant evaluation of the information. Following factors are included in the 
heuristic decision-making process:  
 
Representativeness:  Tversky & Kahneman (1974) describe representativeness as the heuristic 
that is used while making judgments regarding the probability of an event under the state of 
being unsure of something. Investors’ tendency to make decisions established on previous 
experiences is known as stereotyping. Kahneman & Tversky (1982) first proposed it by 
defining representativeness as; (i) the level to which an event’s characteristics are similar to its 
parent population, and also (ii) contemplates prominent features of the procedure by which it 
is yielded.  (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982) 
 
Overconfidence: Dittrich, Güth & Maciejovsky (2005) observed in their experiment that 
around two thirds of the participants were prone to overconfidence. They further observed that 
those investors who lose their money in investment, gain more confidence. Confidence might 
have several dimensions, giving more courage, and playing a vital role in gaining success. 
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Confidence alone is not the sole factor to success but still it is usually celebrated and 
encouraged. Self-confidence is always considered to be a positive trait. In certain cases, 
investors while overestimating their skills and knowledge indulge into excessive trading 
(Dittrich et al., 2005).    
 
Anchoring: Anchoring and adjustment is a heuristic that involves making an initial estimate 
of a probability called an anchor, and then adjusting it up or down in the light of new 
information (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). This then typically results in assessments that are 
determined by an anchor value or reference point. 
 
Gambler’s Fallacy: Assessment of probability, when lack of understanding leads to an 
incorrect estimation and prediction regarding the outcome of events. The incorrect assumption 
or assessment is called gambler’s fallacy. This fallacy arises when investors predict 
inappropriately and the anticipation of a favourable outcome may or may not be valid 
(Baddeley, 2013). 
 
Availability bias: This heuristic involves the judging of an event to be more likely if 
occurrences of the event can be easily recalled, for example, more frequent classes of events 
are easier to recall (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). It also leads to an effect in which the first 
and last events in a series have a disproportionate impact on current judgements. 
 
These decision-making heuristics are presented by Jahanzeb et al. (2012) in their model of 
cogitive decision processes as one arm of cognitive bias, or cognitive illusions in their 
terminology, provided in Figure 23.  
 
 
4.4.4 Cognitive bias - Prospect Theory  
 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) developed this theory. It is the theory which explains that 
people value their gains and losses differently. If two equal choices are given to an investor, 
one in terms of potential gains and the other one in terms of potential losses, the chances are 
that the investor would choose the former one. This theory is also called ‘loss-aversion theory’. 




Framing and Loss aversion: Framing is the first part of the prospect theory which leads to 
outcomes and contingencies associated to a particular problem. It is the way facts are presented 
which influences the choice of an investor. Kahneman & Tversky (1979) found that unlike 
expected utility theory, investors mark gains and losses differently. They found that the 
investors generally conceive the loss of $1 twice as painfully as compared to the pleasure of a 
$1 gain.  
 
Regret aversion: This kind of aversion arises when an investor desires to avoid the pain of 
regret occurring from a bad investment decision or having forgone or overlooked opportunities 
which would have untimely been lucrative. 
 
Mental Accounting: Thaler (1980) established this concept of Mental Accounting and further 
conceptualized that ‘Mental Accounting Matters’ (Thaler, 1980, Thaler, 1999). Mental 
Accounting is the tendency for people to separate their accounts and classify them on the basis 
of variety of subjective criteria, showing the source of money and the intention of each account, 
and this determines the purchasing decision. It provides the way for decision makers to set the 
points of references for the accounts that determine losses or gains. 
 
Self-control: Investors are assumed to avoid the losses and shield their investments. According 
to the views of Thaler & Shefrin (1981) investors should always show some sort of tolerance 
and should be looking to improve their self-control . Psychologically it is also known as self-
regulation.  (Thaler and Shefrin, 1981) 
 
The concepts of Prospect Theory are presented by Jahanzeb et al. (2012) as the second arm of 
cognitive bias, or cognitive illusions in their model of cogitive decision processes, refer to 







Source:  (Jahanzeb et al., 2012) 
Figure 16: Conceptual model of cognitive decision processes 
 
4.4.5 Renewable energy investment 
 
It is recognised that increased investment in renewable energy technology combined with 
energy efficiency can help meet future energy demand and minimise the risks of conventional 
energy supply, such as those posed by the accident in Fukushima (Wüstenhagen and 
Menichetti, 2012). There is significant literature dealing with investment into renewable energy 
but the issues surrounding attracting institutional investment into energy efficiency at scale 
have yet to be explored. Energy efficiency has however been discussed alongside renewable 
energy as an investment asset class. Usher (2008), for example, discusses the UNEP SEFI 
(2007) analysis of the sustainable energy sectors defined as new renewables and energy 
efficiency. Energy efficiency only accounted for 6% of the 2007 figure of $117.2 billion 




Important changes in the social and institutional context are required if the scaling up of 
sustainable energy investments is to be achieved (Krewitt et al., 2007). Grubb (1990) suggests 
that although technological advances and breakthroughs are required, the major change that is 
needed to achieve the scale required is one of attitudes. This change in attitudes is required 
across the spectrum of actors involved from policy makers to citizens, industry and market 
operators and importantly investors. Wüstenhagen et al. (2007) state that management of this 
social acceptance and particularly acceptance by the financial community could ultimately be 
an important success factor for future energy and climate policies. This issue has direct 
relevance to the original Green Deal initiative in the domestic arena as its failure was to some 
extent linked to its non-acceptance in a social and financial context (The Green Age, 2013).  
(Wüstenhagen et al., 2007) 
 
The investors’ basic model represents investments as a function of both risk and return. 
Investors rationally weigh the levels of risk and return of possible investment opportunities and 
will select those opportunities that provide the best return for a given level of risk, an 
assessment of risk adjusted return (Wüstenhagen and Menichetti, 2012). In renewable energy 
investment, government policies can influence the assessment of risk adjusted return for a 
particular investment by increasing the returns (e.g. feed-in tariffs) or reducing the risk (e.g. 
loan guarantees or underwriting of the risk). There would appear to be some debate as to the 
level of influence policy has on the investment decisions of private investors, with surveys of 
venture capitalists such as the one undertaken by Wüstenhagen and Teppo (2006) suggesting 
that the influence is not significant . However, the established view is that policy will have an 




Source: Wüstenhagen and Menichetti , 2012 
 




The basic model is an oversimplification of the situation and in reality, other influencing factors 
are present. An extension to the basic investment model of risk and return comes from portfolio 
theory, which was first introduced in the 1950s by Markowitz (1952). He demonstrated the 
concept of portfolio diversification, noting that risk can be reduced by combining different 
assets together in a portfolio that has different risk profiles. Therefore, there is a difference 
between the risk return profile of one investment and that of the portfolio of investments, 
essentially diversification reduces risk. As this approach is now an established tool for 
institutional investors, Wüstenhagen and Menichetti (2012) suggest that investments in 
renewable energy assets may become more attractive as a way of diversifying their portfolio. 
Indeed diversification among different renewable assets may also be beneficial within a 
portfolio (Laurikka, 2008). Assessment of the effect of a diversified renewable energy portfolio 
can represent a cognitive barrier to investing in the sector.  (Wüstenhagen and Teppo, 2006) 
 
Additionally, the basic investment model is affected by the type of policies that are introduced 
as they tend to be targeted at certain segments of investors. Taking solar photovoltaics for 
example, the investor base could range from utility companies, insurance companies and 
pension funds through to retail investors who will require emphasis on different issues in their 
assessment of a worthwhile investment. This may take the form of rates of return or levels of 
down-payment (Wüstenhagen and Menichetti, 2012).  (Simon, 1955) 
 
Further cognitive issues of risk perception are also important in the investment model. It has 
been previously noted that the concept of bounded rationality introduced in the 1950s by Simon 
(1955) is important in the decision making process when considering whether to make an 
investment in a cost effective energy efficiency project. The concept is just as valid in the 
assessments made by institutional investors and suggests that alongside objective measures of 
risk and return, perceptions of risk and return are important and those perceptions are 
influenced by cognitive factors.  Cognitive factors have been identified as biases that can lead 
to conservatism in adjusting to new information and to decisions in which losses are weighted 
differently than gains (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, Kahneman, 2003, Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979). Biases that have been identified within behavioural finance include anchoring-
and-adjustment, availability, representativeness and status quo-biases (Pitz and Sachs, 1984, 
Barnes, 1984, Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988, Katz, 1992, Baddeley, 2013, Baddeley, 2017). 
In the wider financial world, behavioural economics and finance theories making use of 
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cognitive factors have demonstrated how in reality financial markets deviate from orthodox 
economic models, in much the same way as for decision making by individuals. This has been 
demonstrated in areas such as investor behaviour in stock markets (Lakonishok et al., 1994, 
Jordan and Kaas, 2002, Chan and Lakonishok, 2004, Shefrin, 2007), and currency speculation 
(Froot et al., 1992, Bikhchandani et al., 1992, Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2001). 
 
In terms of renewable energy investment, if bounded rationality and cognitive biases do indeed 
have an influence on investors’ decision-making then policy becomes very important factor in 
that decision-making process. While actual risk and return certainly still matter, not all 
investors will have all of the information available to comprehensively judge the levels of risk 
and return before making an investment decision (Wüstenhagen and Menichetti, 2012). 
Therefore, in addition to lowering risk or increasing return, policies also need to manage 
expectations and perceptions. Risk return perceptions, for example, can be negatively 
influenced by frequent policy changes and unclear targets (ibid). 
 
A further relevant aspect of the bounded rationality concept is that of path dependence, which 
is where past events have an impact on present choices (North, 1990, Goldstone, 1998). 
Wüstenhagen and Teppo (2006) identified evidence for path dependence in the venture capital 
market, slowing down the flow of venture capital investments into the renewable energy sector. 
Past investments in fossil fuels may influence the risk return perceptions of decision makers, 
leading them to see more opportunities in fossil fuel investment than in renewable energy, as 
it is a sector they are more familiar with (Pinkse and van den Buuse, 2012). 
 
These cogitative issues and other influencing factors build a more refined model of risk and 






Source: Wüstenhagen and Menichetti , 2012 
 
Figure 18: Differentiated model of risk and return involving energy policy and investment 
 
   
4.4.6 Investor preferences and trustees’ fiduciary duty 
 
Investment decisions are made, particularly in the case of pension funds, by their trustees on 
behalf of their beneficiaries the pension holders. They may be advised by investment advisers 
but ultimately the trustees have a fiduciary duty, a legal responsibility to exercise reasonable 
care, skill, caution and loyalty in making these investor decisions (Viederman, 2008). The 
model of investment decision making formulated by Clark (1998) is considered most 
appropriate as it specifically identifies institutional investors (pension fund trustees) as the 
decision makers, it includes all the aspects identified as important in other models including 
investors’ approach to risk and return and it particularly references elements of prospect theory 
in the framing of investment decisions. Clark (1998) states that trustees make three types of 
fundamental decisions. Firstly, they allocate assets between asset classes (stocks, bonds, 
property etc), secondly, they evaluate and choose between types of investment products (e.g. 
index fund, growth funds) and finally they evaluate and choose investment (or fund) managers 
(Clark, 1998). Clark (1998) goes on to suggest that trustees take those decisions in accordance 
with Tversky and Kahneman’s prospect theory by framing them around various norms, habits 
and expectancies. In terms of institutional and pension fund investment there are some implied 
rules by which, in the case of pension funds, the trustees are governed when they make 
investment decisions. Rules of proprietary conduct such as the fiduciary duty mentioned above 
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which can be translated into the responsibility a trustee has to the schemes pensioners to 
achieve the best risk weighted return possible, and the implementation of an appropriate asset 
allocation policy, the modern portfolio theory approach being the most developed.  
 
Gordon Clark’s model of the investment decision process, Figure 19, highlights both the rules 
of proprietary conduct and habits of prudence as influencing those decisions (Clark, 1998). The 
habits of prudence encompass those behavioural economic issues that dictate individual 
decision making and can be particularly applied to the financial decision-making process. With 
respect to habits of prudence, in his model Clark has framed the investment decision process 
in cognitive bias, prospect theory terms with both loss aversion and regret. Clark has also 
included preferences for similarity and certainty which are in fact a demonstration of path 
dependence where past investments influence the risk return perceptions of decision makers, 
leading to a bias towards similar investments. Clark’s outer layer of constructs of reliance, 
reciprocity and respect are cited as being norms of relationships with external advisers, 
particularly fund managers, which have an overarching influence on investment decisions. 
 
 
Source: Clark, 1998 
 
Figure 19: Framing trustee decision-making 
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Funds need to be managed in the best interests of the ultimate recipients of the funds, namely 
the pension holders. ‘Best interests’ have come to equate with short-term financial interests 
and the maximisation of financial returns and to preclude taking environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) issues into account in investment decisions (Viederman, 2008, Jansson et 
al., 2014).  
 
However, this view of fiduciary duty has been challenged most notably in a 2005 report by law 
firm Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, commissioned by the United Nations Environment 
Programme’s Finance Initiative (UNEP FI) which suggests that there are circumstances where 
ESG issues should be considered. Firstly, where investments are exactly similar on financial 
grounds, secondly where ESG issues can be expected to impact on a company’s financial 
performance and finally when beneficiaries support it (Jansson et al., 2014, Freshfields 
Bruckhaus Deringer, 2005). This challenge to the established view has fuelled a heated debate 
among academics and industry practitioners concerning the extent to which institutional 
investors should include ESG issues in their investment decision making process and has seen 
some of the largest pension funds start to include such concerns (Jansson et al., 2014, BNP 
Paribas, 2016, BNP Paribas, 2017). Jansson et al (2014) undertook research among Swedish 
future beneficiaries of pension funds to try to understand how they define their ‘best interests’ 
in the investment process. They concluded that there is support for a model that includes both 
financial motives of risk and return together with value-based motives of integrating ESG 
issues. 
 
Clearly investments into non-domestic energy efficiency would fall within a socially 
responsible investment (SRI) strategy making low carbon investments. It would be a useful 
output of the research if it establishes to what extent a desire to include ESG issues in the 
decision-making process influenced the decision to invest in energy efficiency.  
 
 
4.4.7 Investment initiatives 
 
The issue of overcoming the barriers to funding and investing in energy efficiency is gaining 
momentum with a number of recent industry initiatives on a wider European and global scale. 
In September 2015 a conference organised by the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
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Development (EBRD) and the United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative 
(UNEP FI) brought together 70 financial institutions. They endorsed a declaration pledging to 
further engage in financing energy efficiency and further integrate energy efficiency into their 
business operations. Opening the conference, entitled ‘Building a Global Energy Efficiency 
Financing Alliance’, Josué Tanaka, Managing Director for Energy Efficiency and Climate 
Change at the EBRD said: 
 
The financial sector is uniquely placed to channel finance to energy-saving 
opportunities and address the current investment gap. Our aim is to make sure the 
financial community can tap into this potential by forging links with the most up-to-





The Energy Efficiency Financial Institutions Group (EEFIG) was established as a specialist 
expert working group by the European Commission and UNEP FI, in late 2013, to engage with 
financial institutions and other stakeholders to determine how to overcome the well 
documented challenges inherent to obtaining long-term financing for energy efficiency. The 
work of the EEFIG resulted in the publication in February 2015 of their report entitled ‘Energy 
Efficiency – the first fuel for the EU Economy: How to drive new finance for energy efficiency 
investments’. Its conclusions, for the Buildings sector, includes, recommending that the focus 
of attention should be on a strong and stable regulatory framework and access to building 
performance and benchmarking information (EEFIG, 2015). 
 
The Investor Confidence Project is a project of US based ‘Environmental Defense Fund’ that 
was created to consult with the Energy Efficiency community in the US to develop a series of 
common protocols for Energy Efficiency projects. The intention therefore is to allow investors 
to be confident in the knowledge that Energy Efficiency projects utilising the protocols, will 
have been procured, structured and will be managed in a way that they understand and can rely 
on without having to undertake specific due diligence on each new transaction. After gaining 
funding from the European Union the Investor Confidence Project has launched in Europe with 







This literature review has sought to identify that the issues around the energy efficiency gap, 
the difference between current energy use and optimal energy use and explain why it exists in 
terms of barriers to the implementation of energy efficiency. Much of the literature is based 
around orthodox economics and identifies market failures, as the assumption is that individuals 
make rational decisions. However, the concept of bounded rationality is contrary to the 
orthodox view and effectively states that people make decisions without the full information in 
their possession and therefore they are not able to make them rationally.  
 
Additionally, investments by institutional investors in renewable energy have also been 
examined and although energy efficiency investments are notably different, they have been 
linked together as low carbon investments. The issues of bounded rationality and cognitive 
factors also influence investors’ decisions when considering investing in renewable energy.  
 
Cognitive factors should be considered in any analysis of energy efficiency investments made 
by institutional investments as they influence the decision-making process. Investors may make 
decisions irrationally contrary the orthodox view not only because of lack of full information 
but due to different biases that may be exerting varying degrees of influence. Wüstenhagen and 
Menichetti’s model concerning renewable energy investment also considers cognitive biases 
as influencing decisions (Wüstenhagen and Menichetti, 2012). 
 
Clark’s model which frames institutional investor’s / pension fund trustee’s decision-making 
processes when considering investments and identifies not only the rules of proprietary conduct 
but also habits of prudence, those cognitive biases that are most prevalent in the decision-
making process with those identified in prospect theory being most prevalent (Clark, 1998). It 
is apparent from the literature review that these issues need to be considered in the investor 
decision making process and Clark’s model is particularly relevant as it specifically references 
institutional investors decisions when placing their funds across all investment classes. This is 
a useful starting point from which to consider investment decisions concerning energy 
efficiency specifically. The model also includes all the aspects identified as important in other 
models including investors’ approach to risk and return and can therefore be considered the 
best amalgamation of other developed models. The review has also discussed the possibility 
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that ESG issues are increasingly being considered as part of the investment decision-making 
process.  
 
The gap that has been become evident is that there has been little or no research and into 
identifying institutional investors decision-making processes when considering energy 
efficiency investments in particular and whether the current move towards ESG issues 
influencing investment decisions have a bearing on decisions to invest in energy efficiency. 
Whether the current investment initiatives identified also have a bearing is also unknown.   
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The previous chapters have sought to identify that energy efficiency of buildings and industrial 
processes is one area that is cost effective to approach in terms of investment and CO2 emission 
reduction. Buildings are a major contributor to CO2 emissions and it would appear that for the 
level of investment required it is one of the sectors that could have the most effect in its CO2 
reduction and could contribute significantly to the UK governments emission reduction targets. 
However, significant investment would be required for this to become a reality.  
 
Institutional investors hold a significant level of funds that they seek to invest in order to 
maximise their return.  The current research seeks to analyse the investment decisions made by 
institutional investors and pension funds when they decide to make an investment with a view 




5.2 Research questions 
 
In analysing the literature, together with the benefits of implementing energy efficiency at 
scale, the following research question has been formulated together with three sub questions. 
 
What are the barriers to attracting capital investment at scale for energy efficiency in the 
context of institutional and pension fund investment? 
 
1. How do institutional investors decide whether to invest in energy efficiency? 
 
2. Why, when environmental social and economic benefits are apparent, have 




3. What are the enabling conditions that would facilitate institutional investors 





The approach to research is driven by a philosophical epistemological position which 
culminates in the research design and methods employed. Ontology is the study of being, the 
nature of existence embodying the understanding of what is (Gray, 2009). Epistemology tries 
to understand what it means to know and provides a philosophical background for deciding 
what kinds of knowledge are legitimate and adequate (Gray, 2009). While ontology is about 
what you are looking at, epistemology is about how you look and find out about these events 
in the social world (Thomas, 2009). Depending on the researcher’s epistemological stance, a 
theoretical perspective is taken which then in turn influences the research methodology and 
methods employed (Gray, 2009).  
 
Two prominent epistemological positions that have emerged are objectivism and 
constructivism, which take opposing positions (Gray, 2009). Objectivism holds that reality 
exists independently of consciousness and that there is an objective reality (Gray, 2009). A 
theoretical perspective closely linked to objectivism is positivism or postpositivism where 
knowledge about the world can be obtained objectively, and what we see and hear is 
straightforwardly perceived and recordable (Thomas, 2009). The things of the social and 
psychological world can be observed, measured and studied scientifically, in much the same 
way as physicists study levers, atoms and pulleys (Thomas, 2009). Constructivism rejects this 
view of human knowledge. Truth and meaning do not exist in some external world but are 
created by the subject’s interaction with the world (Gray, 2009). Meaning is constructed not 
discovered so subjects construct their own meaning in different ways, even in relation to the 
same phenomenon (Gray, 2009). A theoretical perspective closely linked to constructivism is 
interpretivism (Mertens, 1998, Habermas, 1970) where the social world is not 
straightforwardly perceivable because it is constructed by each of us in a different way. It is 
not simply ‘out there’ it is different for each of us (Thomas, 2009). It focuses on the ways that 
people make sense of the world, especially through sharing their experiences (Easterby-Smith 




Having an epistemological perspective is important as it can help to clarify issues of research 
design, meaning the overarching structure of the research including the kind of evidence that 
is being gathered, from where, and how it is going to be interpreted (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2002).  
 
The epistemological position of the research and researcher is based in Objectivism, where 
there is assumed to be an objective reality. The theoretical perspectives previously mentioned 
dictate how the research is carried out, within a framework that Creswell (2009) suggests is a 
philosophical worldview or as some, such as Lincoln & Guba (2000) and Mertens (1998) both 
cited by Creswell (2009), call paradigms (Creswell, 2009, Lincoln and Guba, 2000, Guba, 
1990). It is how we seek knowledge and how we use it or according to Guba (1990), a basic 
set of beliefs that guides action. Therefore, the proposed research will follow the postpositivist 
worldview, which represents the view after positivism, which is typically seen as an approach 
to quantitative deductive research, however it can also be aligned to qualitative inductive 
research (Creswell, 2009). Postpositivim acknowledges that researchers are influenced by their 
contexts and therefore influence research (Braun and Clarke, 2013). There can be both positive 
and interpretive qualitative research and Guba and Lincoln (1994) state that both qualitative 




5.3.1 Qualitative approach using Case Study analysis 
 
The research questions and the analysis of investors’ decision processes lends itself to a 
qualitative rather than quantitative research approach. Within qualitative research the role of 
the researcher is to gain a deep, intense and ‘holistic’ overview of the context under study, 
often involving interacting within the everyday lives of individuals, groups, communities and 
organisations (Gray, 2009). It is a naturalistic approach that seeks to understand phenomena 
within their own context-specific settings (Gray, 2009). Capturing data on the perceptions of 
actors in the field of study, means being attentive, suspending preconceptions about a subject 




The analysis of investors’ decision processes again lends itself to a case study research method. 
Yin (2009) defines the case study in two parts as: 
 
1. A case study is an empirical inquiry that 
o Investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, 
especially when 
o The boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. 
 
2. The case study enquiry 
o Copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more 
variables of interest than data points, and as one result 
o Relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a 
triangulating fashion, and as another result 
o Benefits from prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection 
and analysis. 
 
The research being undertaken considers a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context, 
investment decisions being made by highly capitalised institutional investors and fund 
managers in an extremely competitive commercial environment. The boundaries between 
phenomenon are not evident with many variables being present. Although the main source of 
data is the output from semi-structured interviews, various documentary evidence was also 
consulted even if a full triangulation of the research outcome was not feasible. The research 
starting point was identified a priori constructs which for the basis of theoretical propositions 
that guide the data collection. 
 
Yin (2009) suggests that case study research is one method that can be applied to exploratory, 
descriptive and explanatory research, however the use of how and why questions is more 
explanatory and likely to lead to the use of case studies as preferred research methods. The first 
two sub research questions posed in this research, which are being directly addressed, are how 
and why questions and are explanatory in nature. The third sub research question is a what 
question but however it is likely to be answered in the course of addressing the first two 
questions. For these reasons a case study approach is deemed an appropriate method for the 





5.3.2 Thematic Analysis 
 
Having established that use of case studies is an appropriate research approach, the next stage 
is to identify an appropriate method of analysis of the qualitative data produced from, in the 
main, semi – structured interviews. Thematic analysis is deemed appropriate to analyse large 
quantities of data. Thematic analysis is a systematic approach to the analysis of qualitative data 
that involves identifying themes or patterns of cultural meaning; coding and classifying data, 
usually textural, according to themes; and interpreting the resulting thematic structures by 
seeking commonalities, relationships, overarching patterns, theoretical constructs or 
explanatory principles (Mills et al., 2010). Thematic analysis is not a research method in itself 
but rather an analytic approach and synthesising strategy used as part of the meaning-making 
process of many methods, including case study research (Mills et al., 2010).  
 
Boyatizis (1998) describes thematic analysis in the following way: It is a process for encoding 
qualitative information. The encoding requires an explicit “code.” This may be a list of themes; 
a complex model with themes, a complex model with themes, indicators, and qualifications 
that are causally related; or something in between these two forms. A theme is a pattern found 
in the information that at a minimum describes and organises the possible observations and at 
a maximum interprets aspects of the phenomenon. Themes may be initially generated 
inductively from the raw information or generated deductively from theory and prior research 
(Boyatzis, 1998). 
 
According to Boyatzis (1998) thematic analysis has a number of overlapping or alternate 
purposes. It can be used as a means (1) of seeing, (2) of finding relationships, (3) of analysing, 
(4) of systematically observing a case, and (5) of quantifying qualitative data. As a 
sensemaking approach thematic analysis is a tactic for reducing and managing large volumes 
of data without losing the context, for getting close or immersing oneself in the data, for 
organising and summarising, and for focusing the interpretation (Mills et al., 2010). 
 
The method of analysis employed in the research is a hybrid approach as advocated by Fereday 
and Muir-Cochrane (2006) and further discussed by Boyatzis (1998) and Braun and Clarke 
(2006, 2013) that uses both deductive and inductive applications of thematic analysis. As 
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Boyatzis (1998) stated, themes may be generated inductively or deductively and this reflects a 
postpositivist worldview. In the research a deductive approach is initially taken following 
Crabtree and Miller’s (1999) process of formulating an a priori template of codes based on the 
research questions, constructs and conceptual framework, outlined in the Section 5.4 Method 
(Crabtree and Miller, 1999). As the analysis proceeded this framework of codes developed both 
deductively, in that the original a priori constructs were refined and further subdivided, and 
inductively as other constructs, concepts and codes emerged from the data as it was being 
analysed.    (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2006, Braun and Clarke, 2006) 
 
 
5.3.3 Validation and Reliability  
 
Validity in qualitative research is a difficult issue as the notion of validity has been formulated 
by a positivist, quantitative approach to research and holds a perspective that “validity,” the 
accuracy and truthfulness of the findings, can be based on notions of “reliability” (repeatable, 
generalisable), or the stability of methods and findings (Altheide and Johnson, 1994). Crabtree 
and Miller (1999) state that in comparison to quantitative research, qualitative analytical 
methods rarely have the luxury of deductive universal categories, numerical proofs or statistical 
generalisability. Crabtree and Miller (1999) go on to assert that qualitative researchers have 
had to take different tacks in attempting to make assertions of validity and provide the 
following list of issues to be addressed: 
 
• Reflexivity; 
• Depth of description;  
• Accuracy; 
• Rigor; 
• Intellectual honesty; 
• Searching for alternative hypotheses and interpretations. 
 
 
Reflexivity refers to the technique whereby the researcher focuses on themselves to evaluate 
their influence on the findings and interpretations (Crabtree and Miller, 1999). Depth of 
description is critical both in avoiding superficiality and in ensuring that the issues, concepts 
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and contextual realities have been suitably explored (Crabtree and Miller, 1999). Accuracy is 
a primary responsibility of the investigator (Crabtree and Miller, 1999). Validity in quantitative 
research is inexorably tied to the notion of rigor and intellectual honesty (Crabtree and Miller, 
1999). There must be certainty that the investigator has been tireless in recording, examining 
and interpreting the data and in searching for alternating hypotheses and interpretations 
(Crabtree and Miller, 1999). Crabtree and Miller (1999) assert that if the researcher understands 
the issues that need to be addressed then the research will be successful. 
 
Yin (2009) suggests that to assist the qualitative case study researcher to determine that their 
approaches are consistent or reliable they should document the procedure of their case studies 
and document as many of the steps of the procedures as possible. He also recommends setting 
up a case study protocol. Refer to Appendix B. 
 
An established validation strategy is the use of quasi-statistics, that is the drawing of simple 
quantitative data from qualitative methods, frequencies and variances for example (Sitko, 
2013). This approach was advocated in the 1960s, and it has been seen as a reflection of that 
era (Taylor et al., 2016). In the 1950s and 1960s qualitative research was strongly influenced 
by positivist concepts of validity and reliability and many researchers tried to justify qualitative 
studies according to standards associated with quantitative research (Taylor et al., 2016). 
Today, few qualitative researchers would attempt to validate their research in this way, 
however it is still a relevant approach, particularly as the current research is being carried out 
from a postpositivist perspective. It enables the assessment of the evidence in the data that 
supports or does not support the conclusions being made and therefore an attempt to use quasi-





It has been established that the analysis of investors’ decision processes lends itself to a 
qualitative case study research approach. In terms of selecting a case or cases to analyse it is 
not practicable to use direct investing as a basis for analyse as there is not sufficient level of 
investment activity in the market. As this research concerns institutional investment at scale it 
is more appropriate to use institutional investment into dedicated energy efficiency funds as 
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the basis of the analysis. Four funds have been identified as being available for institutional 
investment, the Zurich based Susi fund and the three GIB invested funds run by Equitix, SDCL 
and Aviva.  
 
It was decided to use the three GIB invested funds as the basis of the research and to discount 
the Susi fund on the grounds of pragmatism, accessibility and standardisation of the fund 
structure. The fact that the GIB were involved in the Equitix, SDCL and Avivia funds, investing 
the same amount of initial capital, intended to be invested in the UK and being based in the UK 
were important factors. Pragmatically speaking, gaining access to the Susi fund managers and 
its investors would be difficult, being based outside the UK. Therefore, it was decided to 
analyse the three GIB invested funds. 
 
The GIB took the decision to invest in energy efficiency funds run by external fund managers 
a only viable way of increasing institutional investment into the sector at its current stage of 
development. The research that is being undertaken seeks to investigate and understand the 
decision-making process of institutional investors with regard to investment into energy 
efficiency via the three established energy efficiency funds.  These funds all have the common 
characteristic of an initial £50m investment from the (GIB). One of the aims of the GIB is to 
encourage private investment into its stated areas of interest, including non-domestic energy, 
efficiency and due to its state funded status an investment made by the bank needs to have a 
matching investment made by the private sector. Therefore, in relation to the energy efficiency 
funds the three fund managers are obliged to secure an additional £50m of private sector 
investment in their respective funds, matching the GIB’s investment. As the funds are deployed 
they are drawn down on a pari passu basis between the GIB and the private investors. 
 
Although the funds are all labelled as energy efficiency funds and the GIB has made its £50m 
initial investment in each under its stated area of interest (non-domestic energy efficiency) the 
investment strategy for each fund is very different although there can be some cross-over in 
approach particularly by Equitix and SDCL. The Aviva Investors fund focuses on investments 
in Energy Centres situated in NHS hospitals. Its revenues are derived from government backed 
entities and the fund managers concentrate on low risk contractual structures and consequently 
generate modest returns based on the low risk of their investments. Equitix has traditionally 
operated in the infrastructure investment world and has applied its infrastructure contractual 
discipline to its energy efficiency investments model. To date they have tended to concentrate 
75 
 
to date on small scale biomass transactions that attract government support in the form of 
Renewable Obligation Certificates (ROCs) and the Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI). These 
types of investment therefore rely partly on government funding and partly on the performance 
of a private or corporate entity. Returns will reflect the inherent risk in the transactions. The 
third fund run by SDCL takes an even bigger shift away from government backed income and 
focuses on an Energy Performance Contracting model, whereby transaction revenues are 
derived from the ability of an Energy Service Company (ESCO) to achieve an agreed level of 
energy saving from which finance repayments are made. Should the ESCO fail in achieving 
this then they are obliged to make up the shortfall. This type of arrangement is therefore 
generally reliant on private sector performance rather than any government backed revenue and 
the returns offered reflect this increased risk.  
 
Table 6 summarises the transactions entered into by each of the funds. A fuller explanation of 
the transactions can be found in Appendix A. 
 
 
Table 6: Examples of transactions entered into by each GIB fund 
GIB Fund Transaction Year Value £m EE Sector 
Equitix Roundwood Energy 2013 10.00 Biomass 
Tomatin Distillery 2013 1.20 Biomass 
Bernard Matthews’ Turkey Farms 2014 24.50 Biomass 
Sheffield CHP 2015 30.00 Biomass 
Nottingham CHP 2015 30.00 Biomass 
Expansion of Wick district heating 
scheme 
2016 10.00 Biomass 
    
SDCL Kingspan 2014 5.00 Building 
Retrofit 
NCP Car Parks 2014 10.00 Building 
Retrofit 
Citi 2014 5.2 Building 
Retrofit 
Moy Park Poultry Farms 2014 unknown Biomass 
Santander 2015 17.50 Building 
Retrofit 
St Bartholomew’s Hospital 2015 4.50 Energy Centre 
    
Aviva Addenbrooke’s Hospital 2013 36.00 Energy Centre 
Cheltenham Hospital 2014 2.20 Energy Centre 





The research is intended to investigate the decision-making process of institutional investors 
in these three funds and of course the reasons for investing and the criteria investors have 
established for making their investments can vary widely, particularly when considering the 
wide range of underlying investment types that constitute energy efficiency and the varying 
strategies employed by the three funds. The one common denominator is the GIB and its £50m 
initial investment. For this reason it is considered appropriate to follow a single case study 
methodology with embedded units of analysis (Yin, 2009). In this case the single case study is 
the GIB fund investment with embedded units of analysis on two levels. The first level is the 
three funds themselves and then the second the individual institutional and pension fund 




(with embedded units of analysis)
Green Investment Bank (GIB) Energy Efficiency Funds
Equitix Energy Efficiency Fund
Fund Manager: Equitix
GIB - £50m committed funds








UK Energy Efficiency Investments 
Fund
Fund Manager: SDCL 
GIB - £50m committed funds








REaLM Energy Centres Fund
Fund Manager: Aviva Investors
GIB - £50m committed funds















Although the case study approach can involve a number of different data collection methods 
such as reviewing relevant documents or direct observation, and some confidential documents 
have been received from the fund managers, the most appropriate method in this case involves 
undertaking a series of semi structured interviews with individuals at each level of analysis, at 
the GIB, the fund managers and the individual investors. The original intention was that there 
would be up to 25 interviews overall, no less than 20, with an increasing number of interviews 
as the investigation moved from the GIB to the funds and then to the investors. It was intended 
that there would be three interviews with GIB personnel involved in the energy efficiency 
sector and particularly with the investment made in the funds, six with fund managers across 
the three fund management companies and the remainder, between eleven and sixteen with 
individuals representing the investors in the funds themselves. It was also intended that of the 
investor interviews a proportion of them would be with investors that had considered investing 
in the energy efficiency funds but ultimately declined to invest.  
 
At the end of the data collection process there had indeed been three interviews with GIB 
personnel and six with individual fund managers encompassing the three funds and the 
remaining thirteen interviews were with representatives of investors in the funds, one of which 
was with a declined investor.  The interviews were carried out between November 2014 and 
January 2016. Although the main data collection process was via semi-structured interviews, a 
confidentiality agreement was signed with Aviva Investors enabling a certain amount of 
confidential papers, predominately investment committee papers that outlined the case for 
investment by their fund into various energy efficiency investments, to be reviewed as part of 
the research process. In addition, publicly available documents that outlined the various 
investments made by each fund, albeit in not great detail, were also reviewed. The third aspect 
of a case study research method of direct observation was not possible as this would entail 
being present at a confidential investment committee while the investment decision was being 
made. Table 7 outlines the semi-structured interviews that were undertaken. It illustrates which 
type of entity they are from, the GIB, fund manager or investor and in respect of the fund 







Table 7: Outline of the semi-structured interviews undertaken 
  GIB
1 1.1 13th April 2015   Senior Investment Exectutive
2 1.2 15th May 2015   Senior Investment Exectutive
3 1.3 9th June 2015   Senior Investment Exectutive
  Fund Managers       
4        Aviva 2.1 24th Feb 2015   Fund Manager
5 2.2 9th June 2015   Managing Director 
  - Infrastructure Finance
6        Equitix 3.1 13th Nov 2014   Investment Director
7 3.2 15th Oct 2014   Investment Manager
8 3.3 23rd Oct 2014   Investor Relations Manager
9        SDCL 4.1 27th Feb 2015   Partner
  Investors                    
10        Aviva 2.3 8th July 2015   Head of Infrastructure Equity   Pension/Insurance Co/Fund Manager
  (Global Assets under management 
  of £315bn)
11        Equitix 3.4 14th Nov 2014   Principal   Investment Manager 
  (Small scale investment advisor 
  of 122 employees)
12 3.5 22nd April 2015   Chief Investment Officer   Corporate Pension Fund 
  (£1.9bn of annual revenue)
13 3.6 17th July 2015   Head of Pensions and Treasury   Local Gov Pension Fund  
  (Market Value of Assets £877m)
14 3.7 27th July 2015   Head of Infrastructure Research   Investment Manager
  (Major global consulting firm with 
  $3.6bn of annual revenues)
15 3.8 27th July 2015   Team Leader   Local Gov Pension Fund  
  - Sustainable Development & Energy   (Market Value of Assets £877m)
16 3.9 23rd Nov 2015   Head of Division   Multilateral Development Bank
17 3.10 23rd Nov 2015   Investment Officer   Multilateral Development Bank
18 3.11 23rd Nov 2015   Senior Economist   Multilateral Development Bank
19 3.12 18th Jan 2016   Alternatives Investment Manager   Declined Investor - Local Government
  Pension Fund
  (Market Value of Assets £11bn)
20        SDCL 4.2 9th June 2015   Sustainable Investment Executive   Investment Fund
  (Small scale sustainable 
  venture capital firm)
21 4.3 29th june 2015   Sustainable Investment Executive   Investment Fund
  (Small scale sustainable 
  venture capital firm)
22 4.4 22nd Jan 2015   Chief Investment Officer   Investment Fund
  (Independent investment fund with 
  £8bn of assets under management)
n/a 4.5 23rd Nov 2015   Head of Division   same interview as 3.9




Interview dates Investor type
Interview 
count





The constructs identified in Clark’s model of trustee decision making, refer to Figure 19 in 
section 4.4.6, have formed a priori constructs to the research being conducted together with 
those identified relating to low carbon investments and to government intervention. Using these 
constructs, a model of the investment decision specifically relating to energy efficiency was 
formulated prior to the commencement of the research, see Figure 21. The habits of prudence 
remain as per Clark’s general model, as they will always frame any investment decision. In 
particular Clark suggests that loss aversion and a preference for certainty are significant 
pension trustee habits. The remaining two prudential habits of prudence, a preference for 
similarity and regret are less so, however they collectively work to ensure that investment 
decisions where large sums are involved will be made on a conservative basis. The model has 
a series of influencing factors which have been formulated as constructs to the decision process 
and includes many of the assumed issues that are to be considered in the research. The habits 
of prudence and influencing factors are enveloped by the rules of propriety conduct that all 
pension fund trustees and other institutional investment decision makers are bound by. The 
reference to Modern Portfolio Theory in the rules of propriety conduct from Clark’s model has 
become Strategic Asset Allocation Policy as it assumes that there are a much wider series of 
approaches to this issue across different investor types. Another deviation from Clark’s model 
is that of the norms of relationships. Clark’s model refers to general decision-making where 
institutions employ and invest with many fund managers and such decision-making processes 
would need to take a particular institution’s relationship with these companies into account. In 
Clark’s model these norms of relationships, reliance, respect and reciprocity, are encompassing 
the decision process in global sense, and their presence in the process is an established 
phenomenon. As this research is looking at a very specific asset type, energy efficiency, which 
is very new in investment terms, the issue of the fund manager has been made a specific 
influencing factor rather than a global consideration and the norms of relationships are part of 







Figure 21: Energy Efficiency Investment Decision process 
 
The starting point of the research process was to formulate a case study protocol based on the 
approach outlined by Yin (2009). This served as a guide to carrying out the research in a 
disciplined manner in order to aid the reliability of the outcome. The following quote from Yin 
illustrates the usefulness of developing a case study protocol as not only a guide but also in 
demonstrating the reliability of the research. 
 
The protocol is a major way of increasing the reliability of the research and is intended 





The contents page of the case study protocol formulated for the current research, which sets 
out the issues to consider when carrying out the research is provided in Appendix B along with 
two other documents, an information sheet and consent form. The information sheet was 
provided to each interviewee before the interview commenced and was discussed at the 
beginning of each meeting to set out the background, the issues and the purpose of the research. 
The consent form gave the interviewee an opportunity to confirm that they had read the 
information sheet and understood the basis of the research and among other things that they 
agreed to be audio-recorded and they agreed to take part in the research.  It also gave them the 
opportunity to withdraw from the process if they so wished however, all of the interviewees 
signed the consent form prior to their interview. The semi-structured interviews then 
proceeded, and were recorded and transcribed. The transcripts were sent to each of the 
interviewees to review and comment on prior to being finalised.  
 
The questions in the research have centred on a number of key topics and the semi-structured 
interview questions have also been categorised in this way: 
 
• Asset allocation and return requirements 
o Return requirements 
o Strategic Asset Allocation Policies 
• Low carbon investments 
o Return requirements 
o Internal low carbon and sustainable policies 
• Decision to invest/not to invest 
o Competing investment opportunities 
o Green Investment Bank involvement 
o Habits of prudence, loss aversion, preference for certainty and similarity, 
regret 
• Fund Manager 
o Fund manager familiarity 
• UK government and EU polices 
o UK and EU legislation 




The various constructs in the energy efficiency model have been identified as falling into one 
the topics. The rules of propriety conduct that are not identified as being part of a particular 
topic, namely fiduciary interest, beneficiary interest and impartiality, would fall into all of the 
topic areas.   
 
The semi-structured questions based on the above topics are provided in Appendix C. As 
discussed previously, a form of thematic analysis in a combined deductive and inductive way 
was employed to analyse the data collected. The process was deductive as a priori constructs 
were initially identified and therefore established prior to the interview transcripts being 
analysed and to a lesser extent the transaction documents. The research was also inductive as 
new unexpected constructs, concepts and ultimately codes emerged from the data. The results 
from the thematic analysis process were further applied to the analysis of the investor decision 
making process, facilitating the identification of the enabling conditions that would need to 
exist for institutional investors to invest in Energy Efficiency at scale. The a priori constructs 
identified prior to the data analysis process were based on the constructs of the conceptual 




A priori constructs: 
 
• Investment return requirements    
• UK and EU legislation    
• CO2 reduction targets    
• Familiarity with fund manager    
• Strategic asset allocation, use of Modern Portfolio Theory     
• Competing investment opportunities    
• Internal low carbon and sustainability policies      
• Green Investment Bank (GIB) involvement      
• Behavioural Finance, habits of prudence:  Loss aversion    
        Preference for certainty    
        Preference for similarity    
        Regret    
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• Behavioural Finance, norms of relationships: Reliance    
(with Fund Manager)     Reciprocity    




There are two are issues to note. The construct ‘Strategic asset allocation, use of Modern 
Portfolio Theory’ refers to the use of Modern Portfolio Theory. Although reference to Modern 
Portfolio Theory in Clarks original model has become Strategic Asset Allocation Policy in the 
energy efficiency investment decision model as it assumes that there are a much wider series 
of approaches to this issue across different investor types, it is left in as part of the particular a 
priori construct in order to test this assumption. Secondly the norms of relationships with 
respect to the fund manager, of reliance, respect and reciprocity are not specifically referenced 
in the energy efficiency investment decision model. As discussed previously they are intrinsic 
to the fund manager familiarity influencing factor and not a general encompassing ‘given’ in 
the investment decision process as in Clarks model. Again, it was felt worth testing this in the 
research and they were included as separate behavioural finance constructs. 
 
The a priori constructs were firstly mapped to the research questions to allow a reference back 
to the constructs when responding to the research questions at the conclusion of the process. 
The constructs and the research questions were also mapped to the individual semi-structured 
interview questions that were grouped into the key categories identified above. This mapping 
process involving the a priori constructs, research questions and the semi-structured interview 
questions is provided in Appendix D. 
 
The a priori constructs formed the initial set of codes and sub codes to be used to analyse the 
semi-structured interview transcripts. These can be seen in Appendix E highlighted in blue in 
the code system. As the data analysis progressed further codes were identified inductively as 
unanticipated issues and concepts arose during the process, and these are highlighted in yellow 
in code system in Appendix E. The transcripts and the codes were inputted into MAXQDA 
which is an established Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) 
within which various passages and quotes within the transcripts can be assigned a code or codes 
from the original set of identified codes or a new code as appropriate. Finally, once the 
transcripts had been fully coded, the codes were mapped to each semi-structured interview 
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question and this can be seen in Appendix F. This mapping allowed the data analysis to be 
carried out and a narrative to be produced for each key category listed above. It also enabled a 
response to the individual research questions and a final conceptual model of the energy 




6 Data Analysis 
 
6.1 Research outcomes 
 
As outlined in section 5.4 Method, the data collection via semi-structured interviews 
encompasses twenty-two interviews, summarised in table 5 in section 5.4 Method. Of the 
twenty-two interviewees three were conducted with personnel from the European Investment 
Bank either current or previous employees, six were from the fund manager organisations and 
thirteen from investors. Of the investors interviewed, all but one had considered the investment 
into one of the energy efficiency funds and ultimately made an investment. The one investor 
that considered the opportunity and declined to make an investment provides an alternative 
perspective on the decision to invest in energy efficiency. In addition, a further investor that 
considered investing but ultimately decided not to investment that was approached to 
participate in the research and declined, did in fact provide some insights into their decision 
informally via discussion and email. The results of the analysis of the interviews are provided 
in this chapter. The sample of participants is based on a theoretical sample rather than a 
statistically significant one where the research is looking to draw out insights and conclusions 
in a qualitative approach (Eisenhardt, 1989, Yin, 2009).  
 
The interview questions were orientated around the five broad topics identified in section 5.4, 
within which a number of questions were asked of the research participants. The data collected 
is analysed in this chapter and more specifically each of the five topics are analysed in sections 
6.2 to 6.6. To recap, the five topics are: 
 
• Asset allocation and return requirements 
• Low carbon investments 
• Decision to invest/not to invest 
• Fund Manager 







6.2 Asset allocation and return requirements   
 
Asset allocation is important in the context of institutional investment, as investors are 
primarily risk averse and will tend towards their traditional investment classes of equities and 
bonds (Bekkers et al., 2009). It is useful to understand in practice how the investment made in 
energy efficiency is classified. Is it viewed as an infrastructure investment or as renewable 
energy, even though in reality it does not concern energy generation? However it is classified, 
it is hard to see energy efficiency sitting anywhere but in the wider ‘Alternatives’ classification 
which has traditionally attracted only about 5% of investors allocation of funds, although its 
recently increased up to 9% and in some specific cases even higher and is typically used in 
order to diversify an investor’s portfolio. It would be interesting to gauge whether investors are 
willing to increase that percentage if they view energy efficiency as a new sub-sector of 
‘Alternatives’ that could prove profitable for them potentially increasing the funds available 
for investment in the sector, or whether it just fits into one of their current classifications where 
it competes with other conventional investment opportunities. 
 
 
6.2.1 Investment Correlation and Asset Allocation Strategy 
 
A main driver of diversification is to de-risk the investment portfolio and seek out investments 
that, while providing the required level of return, are not correlated with the more conventional 
investments in equities and bonds. Therefore, when adverse market events occur that 
negatively affect more conventional investments, a fully diversified portfolio is not affected in 
the same way protecting returns from those adverse market returns. One interviewee from the 
GIB noted: 
 
It’s a small portion of their funds, so they’ll probably take the view that it’s 
uncorrelated. So, it’s not negatively correlated, it’s completely uncorrelated. So, 
they’re just looking for some uncorrelated yield. 
 
So, it’s not even diversification, it’s just non-correlated. So, in the case you have a black 
sort of event in the market, this stuff should be completely uncorrelated. Which for the 
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most part is true. You know, health sector returns that you’re getting paid on energy 
efficiency should be completely unrelated to the market’s return. 1 
 
 
This response indicates that energy efficiency investments are considered to be a good 
diversification with a low-level correlation to mainstream investments which therefore should 
make it an attractive proposition in a strategy that aims to create a balanced, diversified 
portfolio. For investors or their investment managers to fully assess investments, information 
about the risk and return of a particular asset type is required. 
 
The investors in the study all appear to employ an asset allocation strategy to varying degrees. 
An asset allocation strategy in its most sophisticated form uses a Modern Portfolio Theory 
approach that attempts to maximize portfolio expected return for a given amount of portfolio 
risk, or to minimise risk for a given level of expected return by selecting the proportions of 
various assets. It uses a mathematical approach to model diversification of investment, with 
the aim of identifying a collection of investment assets that has collectively lower risk than any 
individual asset, and was developed in the early 1950s (Markowitz, 1952). There has since 
been an acknowledgement that behavioural issues play a part in investment decisions and 
investment strategies now tend to reflect this (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
 
The interview outcomes bear out that, as would be expected, some form of strategic asset 
allocation policy is being used with some interesting issues arising. A wide range of approaches 
is taken. Many pension funds and institutional investors use investment consultants to assist 
them in placing investments and in some cases, assist in their asset allocation strategy.  
 
Yes, we do [have a strategic asset allocation policy]. I mean the advisors play a big 
part in that and we have a range, a target asset allocation, for each of the constituents 
and that is monitored. 2 
 
 
It is these investment consultants that appear to employ the more sophisticated approach with 
the investors themselves using a more limited methodology. The following quote is from an 
                                                          
1 Interview 1.1, Investor (GIB), 13th April 2015. 
2 Interview 3.12, Declined Investor, 18th January 2016. 
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investment manager confirming that they apply a sophisticated strategic asset allocation 
approach based on Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT). 
 
For many of our clients, we help them with their strategic asset allocation in general. 
It’s based on Modern Portfolio Theory approach with usually stochastic modelling and 
that type of thing.  
 
It’s a pretty sophisticated approach, yes. I mean, it wouldn’t be consistent with most 
consultant approaches in the marketplace. 3 
 
 
However, the investment manager appears to believe that the level of sophistication that they 
employ is not consistently used among their peers.  A further quote from a second investment 
manager confirms that their involvement in establishing their clients’ (institutional investors) 
strategic asset allocation strategy is variable however when they are fully involved then their 
process does involve MPT. The quote also confirms the lack of data around energy efficiency 
investments required to fully inform their strategic asset allocation approach.  
 
For all mandates, there will be a strategic allocation. Now, sometimes, [name of 
investor] gets involved in that decision. Sometimes, that is handed to us as a “Basically, 
go and fill it, please” mandate.  
 
In terms of the way we make recommendations, yes, we do use tools like Modern 




The fund manager interviewees felt that although the investors had strategic asset allocation 
strategies they were most likely assisted by investment managers who formulated them and 
managed them on their behalf: 
 
Again, it’s speaking generally, but the investors that we work with tend to be very large 
institutional investors, and because of that, tend to have quite sophisticated asset 
allocation processes and policies in place.  
 
                                                          
3 Interview 3.7, Investor (Investment Manager), 27th July 2015. 
4 Interview 3.4, Investor (Investment Manager), 14th November 2014. 
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In the UK, at least, and I think it’s quite common globally but in the UK certainly, many 
investors rely on pension fund consultants to manage their exposures and to do the 
allocation processes or support the allocation processes for them. 5 
 
 
‘I think, my sense is that there is not a [strategy] – maybe there is, I haven't seen any 




The research findings bear out that, as would be expected, some form of strategic asset 
allocation policy is being used with some interesting issues arising. One of the investors, a 
typical large corporate pension fund, discussed the fact that they had a strategic asset allocation 
approach that was risk rather than return based.  
 
We did have a strategic asset allocation… 
 
We didn’t have so much a fixed return target. We knew what returns we would have to 
need as a minimum, but we were only at the very early stages of the de-risking journey 
in saying, “Well actually shall we just fix that as a target?” It was still maximised 
returns with minimum risk. It was a risk driven thing rather than a return driven thing. 
 
We had quite a large alternatives exposure. Clearly it depends how you define the 
buckets, but we had probably about 30% allocation to alternatives including real 
estate, private equity, hedge funds, infrastructure. We didn’t have anything specifically 
on renewable energy. 7 
 
 
Their assessment of investments was based on investment risk and they did not focus on 
achieving particular returns per investment type although they did work to a minimum. With 
this approach they had increased the ‘Alternatives’ exposure to around 30% which is 
significantly higher than the more usual allocation of 5% - 9%. The 30% of ‘Alternatives’ did 
include real estate, which in some cases is a classification on its own however it still represents 
an increase in allocated funds. The other investment classifications within alternatives were 
private equity, hedge funds, and infrastructure which included renewable energy. The 
                                                          
5 Interview 2.1, Fund Manager, 24th February 2015. 
6 Interview 3.2, Fund Manager, 15th October 2014. 
7 Interview 3.5, Investor, 22nd April 2015. 
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investment in energy efficiency was deemed an infrastructure investment and this was 
generally but not universally the case.  
 
 
6.2.2 Asset classification 
 
Asset classification is an important issue as it is an integral component of an investor’s asset 
allocation strategy. Investors will need to understand fully the risk and return characteristics of 
an investment in energy efficiency if they are to see a value in increasing fund allocation within 
their asset allocation strategy. 
 
It is apparent from the interviews that energy efficiency is firmly seen as part of the 
‘Alternatives’ classification but it cannot be easily defined and it is unlikely to become a 
separate ‘Alternatives’ sub class. This is because it is little understood with currently low 
numbers of investments available. This has resulted in investors to date tending to classify such 
investments in other ‘Alternatives’ sub classes such as Infrastructure or even Private Equity.  
 
Perhaps more typical would be a limited allocation to what might be called 
Alternatives; and Alternatives might get 3%, 5%. Alternatives that covers half a dozen 
sub-sectors like Real Estate, Hedge Funds, Commodities, Private Equity and 
Infrastructure. 8  
 
 
I think they would probably all regard energy efficiency to sit within an infrastructure 
bucket of some sort […].  
 
Generally, they fall within an alternative assets part of their portfolio […]. 
 
It depends on the size of them as to really how granular they are in terms of asset 
allocation between sectors; so, some will just look at alternatives, some will look at 




                                                          
8 Interview 2.3, Investor, 8th July 2015. 
9 Interview 3.1, Fund Manager, 13th November 2014. 
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Although energy efficiency is most often viewed as an Infrastructure investment, the issue is 
further complicated in terms of asset allocation by how the investment is structured. If it is 
‘packaged’ in a certain way then investments can be viewed very differently.   
 
[The] majority of our funds under management to date are infrastructure funds. We 
have three funds, excitingly named Equitix I, II and III, that all invest into core 
infrastructure. 
 
Our investors within those funds have tended to make the investment via their 
alternatives pot. So, a lot of them will have real estate, private equity, government 
bonds etc., and then they will have a smaller allocation to alternatives, and 
infrastructure typically falls under the alternatives bracket. A lot of pension funds do 
have an alternatives bucket, but some are only coming up to speed and actually starting 
to allocate money to alternatives. 
 
With regards to the energy efficiency funds, it is seen by investors both as an 
alternatives investment or as a private equity style investment, due to the structure of 
our fund. Our core infrastructure funds are 25 years, so we invest into solid social 
infrastructure, like schools and hospitals, social housing. Whereas our energy 
efficiency fund is a 10-year fund, we intend to sell the assets at some stage during the 
life of the fund, which is more akin to a private equity style structure. So, it has been 
viewed by investors in different ways, so some have invested via their private equity 




The above quote is by a fund manager and this particular fund manager has packaged its energy 
efficiency fund in such a way that it resembles and acts like a private equity investment. It is a 
10-year fund rather than a 25-year fund more typically associated with infrastructure 
investment, with the fund strategy of selling assets during the life of the fund.  
 
An investor in that fund manager’s funds bears out that its investment was, in the first instance 
at least, regarded as a private equity investment. 
 
The history of this is a little bit different, in that we initially invested in Equitix as a 
private equity firm[…]. We've only, in the last couple of years, reclassified the Equitix 
piece as infrastructure. 11 
 
 
                                                          
10 Interview 3.3, Fund Manager, 24th October 2014. 
11 Interview 3.6, Investor, 17th July 2015. 
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If the investments are to be viewed as private equity then investors would probably require 
higher returns.  
 
In terms of private equity investments, the pension funds are looking for higher returns, 
generally a shorter life of an investment. Infrastructure typically yielding lower returns 
but matching long term liabilities for pension funds. 
 
So, it depends on the returns expected from each investment. Private equity tends to be 
higher than alternatives, more in the 8% to 10% bracket. 12 
 
 
This view of energy efficiency projects and the way that they are presented can also have a 
counter-productive effect in that they do not meet the return expectations of private equity 
while also not meeting the risk expectations of infrastructure. 
 
[Investors] might have a separate private equity type bucket, and might perceive the 
risk of investing in energy efficiency as being higher than core infrastructure but the 
returns are not high enough to warrant it being it in a private equity bucket.  
  
A risk-adjusted return, probably, would fit quite nicely in their portfolio, but it might 
sit in a gap between infrastructure and private equity, for example. 13 
 
 
The shorter investment period for energy efficiency also presents an issue with some investors 
when looking to make investments as infrastructure. 
 
Yes, for us we only do infrastructure so it would have to be infrastructure like […].  
 
I think there is a strong case that some of the things that people are investing in as 
energy efficiency aren’t infrastructure; because they are simply not long enough term. 
And an obvious example might be replacing light bulbs with LEDs. Is it really 
infrastructure and you have got a payback of five years or even at the end of cash flow 
it will be five years. It depends on your definition of infrastructure. 14 
 
 
Additionally, investors do not always understand the characteristics of the type of investment 
itself and confusingly see energy efficiency as a renewable energy investment which it is not. 
                                                          
12 Interview 3.3, Fund Manager, 24th October 2014. 
13 Interview 3.1, Fund Manager, 13th November 2014. 
14 Interview 2.3, Investor, 8th July 2015. 
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One fund manager even experienced a situation where some investors did not know how to 
classify a potential energy efficiency investment, seeing it falling somewhere between 
infrastructure and renewable energy and as a result declining to invest as it did not match their 
allocation policy. 
 
In terms of where they sit, most investors tend to see them in an infrastructure class. 
Some might put them in a renewable energy sub-class of that or perhaps they might 
have renewable energy and infrastructure onside.  
  
I think, it is, between the two, probably more infrastructure than renewable energy if 
there were two classes separately, but when renewable energy falls under 
infrastructure, they’d probably say […]. 
  
Sometimes, it’s across the two. We’ve seen some investors who don’t quite know what 
pool to put it in, but they like it and so “we’ll do it”, but, equally, we’ve seen investors 
who don’t know which pool to put it in and so don’t proceed because it doesn’t fit within 
their asset allocation policy. 15 
 
 
A definition of infrastructure itself is hard to pin down with a distinction being made between 
liquid investments such as tradable equities in infrastructure companies, which will just as well 
be classified in the equities pot or listed funds and illiquid investments, such as those in non-
listed funds similar to the funds in question. 
 
Right, well in terms of the infrastructure, we have a 2% target. I think we’re currently 
1.4% of portfolio. But that 1.4% doesn’t include other infrastructure asset classes that 
maybe a liquid or on a listed market. So, there’s probably, I’d say, about another 1½, 
2% there, I don’t think we’ve gone above, 3 to 3½, you know. 
 
And in terms of energy efficiency or renewables perhaps they have that kind of spin on 




One investor viewed ‘Alternatives’ investments, including those it had made in energy 
efficiency, as part of a strategy of enhancing its returns to close a funding gap, a deficiency in 
the assets it needs to meet its future liabilities and allocated at least 25% of its assets to the 
asset class. 
                                                          
15 Interview 3.1, Fund Manager, 13th November 2014. 




Broadly, we've got three asset classes. We've got equities and, at the moment, equities 
are a shade over half of the portfolio and that's because, well, basic portfolio theory, 
isn't it? We believe that over long-term equities will generate returns and that kind of 
ticks that box in terms of growing the portfolio. The second bucket is fixed interest 
bonds and that's about a quarter of the portfolio […]. 
 
We have the added complication of, due to historical reasons, we have a funding gap. 
That's to say that we only have somewhere around 70% of the assets that we need. We 
also have to generate an enhanced return to close that gap and we've got an allocated 
period of 20 years in which to close that gap. So that's what we're looking in the fund 
to do. 
 
The alternatives are running at about a quarter and they are there, by and large, to 
give you that uptick that added return, which will drive the portfolio to close that gap.17 
 
 
A positive view of the way one of the funds had contractually structured their energy efficiency 
investments was particularly helpful to one investment manager acting on behalf of a major 
pension fund.  
 
For us, the key for it to be an appropriate asset class is the project finance wrapper 
around the investment. That’s something you don’t always see.  
 
This particular fund is bringing that project finance discipline to areas where it 
traditionally hasn’t been. For us, given that, and then all of the government subsidies, 




This is attractive to the investment manager as it was contractually structured in the same way 
as infrastructure transactions they had been used to with cash flows for performing assets being 
made in a familiar way, though a ‘Special Purpose Vehicle’ structure. To them this represented 
a disciplined way of structuring the transaction which went a long way to helping them to 
decide on investing. 
 
 
                                                          
17 Interview 3.6, Investor, 17th July 2017. 
18 Interview 3.4, Investor (Investment Manager), 14th November 2014. 
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6.2.3 Investment Return 
 
An important aspect of any investment is the return it generates and an investor will make 
investment decisions, as discussed, by assessing both risk and return. Investors may initially 
be sensitive to the return that will be achieved in an investment, particularly a new type of 
investment and one firmly in the ‘Alternatives’ classification that may be part of a strategy to 
enhance the overall portfolio return.  
 
Yes, so [8% return] that’s the minimum return you could accept from an equity-based 
product in energy efficiency. You’d probably even want higher than that, but that’s 
where they start earning their fee. That’s where you incentivise them. 
 
Yes, [12% return] that’s what you model the portfolio on. 19 
 
 
[The fund] Absolutely does [meet our] minimum return requirements. The fund, I 
believe, is expected to do something like a 12% return. Very comfortable in terms of 
what we would require as a minimum spread. 20 
 
 
Yes, it did [meet our return requirements]. And actually, in general both funds have 
been well above the minimum threshold that we had. And actually, we are seeing that 
there is always a promise to deliver a return at this time. But it is higher than what we 
have seen in other sectors. 21 
 
 
The previous investor quotes demonstrate that the absolute return achieved from their energy 
efficiency investments was comfortably within what they expected and were required to 
achieve from such an investment. However, return is only one element of the investment that 
will concern them and the second issue is that of risk. Energy efficiency is in the main a new 
and unknown sector for most investors and they would want to understand as much about the 
underlying investment as possible, from the technology and processes used to the expected 
performance of the investment and the security of the project revenues, in order to assess the 
risk of actually realising the stated return.  
 
                                                          
19 Interview 1.1, Investor (GIB), 13th April 2015. 
20 Interview 3.4, Investor (Investment Manager), 14th November 2014. 
21 Interview 3.9 & 4.5, Investor, 23rd November 2015. 
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The level of perceived risk will dictate how much actual return they would require in order to 
take that risk. Many investors have no way of assessing the level of risk with energy efficiency 
investments as they are a relatively new investment type, with new and unfamiliar technology 
and with little or no investment history to call upon. Investors will therefore rely on their 
advisers in the form of investment managers and the fund managers they have relied on in the 
past to provide the returns they require in related sectors.   
 
So, if we felt it was a good level of return for the level of risk and it was hopefully above 
our overall return requirement, or if it wasn’t, it was very safe, then we would invest, so 
it’s a kind of portfolio diversification type approach that we take. We try and find the best 
return per year risk across all asset classes. 22 
 
 
So, across their entire portfolio I imagine they have expectations as to what they need to 
deliver to their clients, being their pensioners, and within that bucket, within that overall 
umbrella portfolio they will have different exposures to different asset classes depending 
on the risk return basis, to get that blended overall return that they need to deliver. 
 
I imagine that as part of their asset allocation and looking to invest capital, they will have 
‘x’ millions or billions to invest per year. They will have to find funds that meet some of the 
higher end targets, which possibly is why they looked at the Equitix Energy Efficiency Fund 
and would have made an investment based on our risk return profile, which then has to sit 
within their bucket. 23 
 
 
Yes, it has delivered the returns that we had expected. It has been managed within the 
context of constrained risk, and therefore, we have had a tick, both in terms of the absolute 
riskiness, but also the co-movement with other assets. And it has delivered cash flow on 
budgets, so we have been able to disperse distributions to end investors. 24 
 
 
The investor and fund manager quotes clearly demonstrate that investors view potential 
investments in terms of both risk and return. The nuances to those risks mentioned above which 
the investors will have no information about and no resources at hand to investigate will form 
part of their risk assessment and they will rely on their advisers and fund managers to educate 
them and to inform their risk assessment and ultimately their return requirement. In the case 
below the fund manager is stating that his investor will require a higher return as some of the 
                                                          
22 Interview 3.12 Declined Investor, 18th January 2016. 
23 Interview 3.3, Fund Manager, 24th October 2014. 
24 Interview 4.4, Investor (Investment Fund), 22nd January 2016. 
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energy efficiency investments do not have a government backed income stream as per the usual 
infrastructure PFI and PPP investments they were used to participating in. He is therefore 
suggesting that a higher return will be required, but takes comfort that the energy efficiency 
fund is being managed by the familiar fund manager.  
 
Yes, I get a sense that lots of our investors do have a, certainly a higher return 
allocation for energy efficiency projects, mainly because, as I've stated, the fact that 
there is more exposure to non-Government income streams. 25  
 
 
So, a good example is the [..] Pension Fund, which has invested in the Equitix core 
funds, so obviously has an exposure to 100% Government-backed income streams 
through the PFI and PPP assets which we have through the core funds. But also, they 
are looking to invest in the EEEF, the Energy Efficiency Fund, and have made an 
allocation to date. 
 
Clearly the difference with the EEEF projects is that there will be a number of projects 
which will have a mix of income streams, whether they'll be Government backed 
through the Renewable Heat Incentive or the Renewable Obligations Certificates, or 
then through, for example, wholesale power price or heat sales price, which will give 
them some exposure to hosts, whether it's the heat user, or wholesale power, whether 
it's through a PPA-type structure. So, it gives them more of a blend of assets within the 
asset class that they invest in. 26 
 
 
A further reason why investor return may need to be higher is that the funds on offer are illiquid 
and not easily tradable as in equities or able to be sold quickly. It is accepted that this issue 
would also apply to conventional infrastructure investments within an unlisted fund however, 
infrastructure investments in such funds are much more mainstream and other investors and 
funds would be more willing to buy assets on a secondary basis lowering the premium for 
illiquidity. 
 
No, we don’t [require a minimum return percentage from investments]. The caveat to 
that is that, obviously, for illiquid investments, we require a premium for illiquidity, 
and generally that’s in the region of anywhere from 1% to 4%. 27 
 
 
                                                          
25 Interview 3.2, Fund Manager, 15th October 2014. 
26 Interview 3.2, Fund Manager, 15th October 2014. 
27 Interview 3.7, Investor (Investment Manager), 27th July 2015. 
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The research has highlighted instances where the energy efficiency fund investment 
opportunity offered was declined due to an assessment of the perceived risks associated with 
the underlying investment, even though the level of return predicted more than achieved the 
levels that were required by the potential investors. 
 
Yes, so I wouldn’t say for the investors that haven’t invested in our fund that the return 
was the primary driver for them not doing so. 28 
 
 
[The] target returns were 12% net so at face value it probably would [meet return 
requirements], but then when you look at the risk I noticed there are some small 
investments. And, as I said before, an element of anaerobic digestion and biomass type 
class assets. […] I probably didn’t like the sound of it. 
 
[…] it’s the likelihood of them meeting that return and then the level of risk that they’re 
taking to get there. 29 
 
 
The declined investor clearly didn’t like the profile of some of the target investments in terms 
of size and technology, even though the returns potentially on offer met their requirements and 
in comparison to other infrastructure investments are at the high end. One of the fund managers 
has even stated that when investing in the sector, investors don’t understand it and rely on them 
to advise them on the risk profile. 
 
[…] that comes back to Equitix’s role in this, I think. They probably don’t understand 
the real detail of what an energy efficiency project looks like and what the risk profile 
looks like, but they rely on a fund manager’s judgement to say, “On balance, it’s like 
this, but with a bit more risk here.” 
 
If you try to take institutional investors from a bottom-up analysis of all the risks in a 
project, you [would need an inordinate amount of time to do so]. 30 
 
 
A further issue that has arisen through the research that has a bearing on investors view of risk 
is that of speed of deployment. This concerns the amount of time taken to source, structure and 
place the investment by the fund managers. Interestingly, there is divergence of opinion on this 
                                                          
28 Interview 3.1, Fund Manager, 13th November 2014. 
29 Interview 3.12 Declined Investor, 18th January 2016. 
30 Interview 3.1, Fund Manager, 13th November 2014. 
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issue. A fund manager states that he believes speed of deployment is a reason some investors 
may not invest in an energy efficiency fund. In contrast an investor discusses that they were 
very happy with the speed of deployment in comparison with other infrastructure investments, 
albeit with an investment in a different energy efficiency fund. 
 
I think, if anything, it’s [the reason for not investing] perhaps a slight nervousness 
about it in asset class, questions about speed of deployment of capital in the context, 
something we might come on to, and the size of projects, and how many projects you 
have to do to get capital deployed at scale. 31 
 
 
The commitment we have to SDCL in the context of the overall portfolio is very small. 
So, we would like the disbursement to be more rapid, as always, but I would suggest 
that in the context of our overall experience of infrastructure, deployment of cash has 
been fine.  
 
Perhaps, just by way of background, I should explain that we began investing in 
infrastructure in 2007. We have experienced relatively slow deployment of cash overall, 
and relatively poor returns from a number of projects. In that context, we think SDCL 
has done very well. 32 
 
 
6.2.4 Inflation linked income matching liabilities 
 
Investors are looking for inflation linked returns, in order to match their inflation linked 
obligations, that are not correlated to their core investments of inflation linked equity and bond 
investments.  
 
[With]the nature of the investments, because our investors typically have long-term 
liabilities that are inflation-indexed that they’re trying to match […]. 
 
They have substantial exposures in their portfolios to long-term inflation-indexed 
investments, whether they’re debt, equity or something else, so the general needs of the 
liabilities are driving investment decisions, which make infrastructure generally quite 
attractive.  
 
                                                          
31 Interview 3.1, Fund Manager, 13th November 2014. 
32 Interview 4.4, Investor (Investment Fund), 22nd January 2016. 
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…I think, generally, you will see investors who invest in these sorts of asset classes 
being attracted by things such as inflation linkage.  
 
Infrastructure is, to a certain extent, less correlated to equity markets, bond markets or 
whatever they may be, and enhanced returns.  
 
[Their] approach to investing in infrastructure and renewable energy will tend to be 
looking for index-linked returns for projects that offer an enhanced return compared to 
other index-linked classes, risk-diversification away from index-linked gilts, or index-
linked corporate bonds. 34 
 
 
I’d say for the clients where we make energy efficiency investments, they tend to have 
an inflation-linked objective, so it would be something like a 4% to 5% outperformance 
of inflation, which translates to a, roughly, 7% to 8% nominal return as a minimum. 35 
 
 
Yes. It [required return] was not set in stone but what we were driven by, is knowing 
that our liabilities went up every year by the lower of RPI or 4½%. It’s just the rules of 
the scheme. So as part of thinking about a de-risking flight plan and fully funding 
strategy or whatever, we knew that, that would be the minimum we’d need to cover the 
ongoing increasing liabilities, the lower of RPI or 4½%. So effectively that was our 
minimum band. It applied to everything. Nothing had any special treatment. 36 
 
 
From the research the matching of index-linked liabilities to index-linked returns is seen as an 
essential requirement across the spectrum of interviewees from fund managers, investors and 
their investment managers and is perhaps unsurprising given the nature of the investors’ 
obligations and, of course, it is to be expected as it mirrors the investors stated investment 
strategies.    
 
 
                                                          
33 Interview 2.1, Investor, 24th February 2015. 
34 Interview 3.1, Fund Manager, 13th November 2014. 
35 Interview 3.4, Investor (Investment Manager), 14th November 2014. 
36 Interview 3.5, Investor, 22nd April 2015. 
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6.3 Low Carbon Investments   
 
There is a continual move by investors towards taking ESG issues into account when making 
investments with wide ranging SRI strategies being developed (Freshfields Bruckhaus 
Deringer, 2005, Jansson et al., 2014, BNP Paribas, 2016, BNP Paribas, 2017). Low carbon 
investments, of which investments in energy efficiency are an example, would sit very well 
within that approach. An objective of the study is to understand whether investors positively 
discriminate in favour of these types of investments at the expense of alternative investment 
opportunities, perhaps even compromising on the level of return that is achieved.    
 
 
6.3.1 Low carbon strategies 
 
There is a general understanding by the fund managers that investors are focusing on low 
carbon strategies and that they are increasingly looking for low carbon investments in order to 
fulfil these strategies.  
 
I think, investors generally, and certainly in Europe, are looking increasingly to understand 
and manage their investments in terms of a more holistic, green, double-bottom-line 
approach, let’s say. 37 
 
 
Yes, I think increasingly they are. I think also the fact that the – I think there's two things 
happening. One is that the PFI / PPP [Infrastructure investments] market's becoming 
slightly more saturated, so there's less projects for them to invest in within that space.  
 
And secondly, within the energy efficiency space, if they're looking for potentially higher 
returns as well as having a good green story and energy efficiency story, that this is an 
asset class which offers them more attractive returns as well as hitting, you know, carbon-
saving and renewable targets. 38 
 
 
                                                          
37 Interview 2.1, Fund Manager, 24th February 2015. 
38 Interview 3.2, Fund Manager, 15th October 2015. 
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The fund managers themselves are also moving towards implementing low carbon investment 
strategies and on the part of Aviva, one of the world’s largest investors and fund managers, it 
is part of a wider ESG initiative. 
 
So, Aviva, right through Aviva, there is a low carbon agenda anyway, not just from an 
investment perspective, but just in terms of, as a good corporate citizen, so the low carbon 
agenda is quite important at the Aviva level. Within the investment space, we actually have 




There is also an indication that some of the smaller more niche find managers are also taking 
this on board and implementing low carbon investment strategies. 
 
Yes, so we take it very seriously, and we have a number of clients for whom it’s a very 
serious matter.  
 
We represent a lot of public sector entities, including the [XYZ] Pension Fund, who, 
naturally, have a pretty big focus on this area. 40 
 
 
Although the view of the fund manager participants that the investors will have low carbon 
strategies is generally true, it was not exclusively the case. The following two quotes are from 
large institutional investors, which demonstrates that this is indeed the case and they are taking 
it very seriously.  
 
[We are] very advanced, is probably the word I am sort of hesitating on but it doesn’t quite 
capture it. But we are at the forefront of investment thinking from a sustainable perspective. 
And we have got a separate team entirely focussed on this. 41 
 
 
So organisationally we have a kind of three-year planning window and we have targets 
within that planning window for different sectors and technologies. Mostly sectors in fact 
but technologies are its role beyond this point and the key metric is what we call climate 
action. So, 25% of our lending volumes should be climate action and then clearly energy 
                                                          
39 Interview 2.2, Fund Manager, 17th March 2015. 
40 Interview 3.4, Investor (Investment Manager), 14th November 2014. 
41 Interview 2.3, Investor, 8th July 2015. 
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efficiency falls within that climate action. So, anything that can contribute to the 25% target 
is a high priority for the Bank. 42 
 
 
The quote below is from a very small investor who has also embraced the carbon reduction 
initiative and has implemented a quite sophisticated approach to assessing low carbon 
investments to the extent that it will not invest if an investment does not meet their strict criteria. 
 
We take a sustainable approach for a start. I could take you through what we have here, 
this is Earth Capital. We’ve won awards for what we call the Earth Dividend and it’s a 
calculation of whether or not you’re positively contributing to CO2 reduction through a 
business. You rate it and you calculate it. The idea is that when we invest, we can look at 
the business forecast and say, “Well, what’s it going to do, will we make a positive 
contribution to CO2 reduction?” and if we do then it meets that criteria and then we’ll do 
it for financial reasons. The answer is yes. 43 
 
 
In contrast the following quote is from a pension fund investor representing the pensioners of 
a major media organisation, which clearly has no low carbon or sustainability strategy when 
considering its investments. In the research this was the exception, however the fact that the 
pension fund of such a company makes no allowance for low carbon in their investment 
decisions suggests that a significant, albeit minority, proportion of other company pension 
funds are likely to take the same approach.    
 
There wasn’t really one. No specific targeting. There are sustainability initiatives within 
the wider business, but in terms of a definitive impact or strategy exposure within the 
pension scheme, no. 44 
 
 
6.3.2 Pressure to show investing responsibly 
 
Despite the fact that some pension funds are not implementing a responsible investment 
strategy including lowering carbon emissions, there is clearly an imperative for pension funds 
to do so. The following quote is from a fund manager that is seeing this trend in its investors. 
                                                          
42 Interview 3.11 & 4.7, Investor, 23rd November 2015. 
43 Interview 4.3, Investor (Investment Fund), 29th June 2015. 




There is increasing pressure on pension funds now to certainly show that they are investing 
responsibly and there are different organisations that they can sign up to, to declare the 
ways in which they are investing their capital and how it is being (a) delivering returns to 
their pensions. But also investing in a responsible way that will see the growth of the U.K. 
sustainably, economically, environmentally and all under a robust governance structure.45 
 
 
Although this may be more evident in public sector pension funds, as the government will have 
more influence over them than over private sector pension funds and investors, there are other 
influences that may encourage the private sector to follow suit. The quote below is an 
observation by an investor representing the GIB.  
 
So, there’s greater press coverage of people investing into carbon intensive industries, then 
there’s a risk in the future that they will be at a discount because they’re going to be more 
penalised by other investors, because there’s going to be less traction for them. 46 
 
 
What he is suggesting is that as time goes on, carbon intensive investments will become less 
attractive and the value of the investments made today may not be realised in the future when 
the time comes to sell them. Therefore, there is pressure now to make sustainable or carbon 
reduction investments as a commercial decision, in order to maximise returns when the 
investment or investments are sold on. This may be the imperative for investors to start to 
implement a responsible investment strategy, even if they are not doing it necessarily because 
they believe in a green agenda. 
 
Investors’ desire for responsible investing is often reflected in their choice of fund manager. 
The following quote from an investor demonstrates that even though the primary reason for its 
selection is that of performance and investment philosophy, responsible investment practices 
would then have an influence.   
 
When choosing fund managers, it wouldn't be a prime concern that one is greener than 
another. You'd have to look at aspects like past performance, structures, fit with your 
investment philosophy. But once you get that list of people that meet those criteria, then 
those aspects take on more importance. 47 
                                                          
45 Interview 3.3, Fund Manager, 23rd October 2014. 
46 Interview 1.2, Investor (GIB), 15th May 2015. 





The following is a quote from a fund manager demonstrating investors’ desire to use fund 
managers that are fully committed to ESG issues and low carbon investing.  
 
More and more often we are seeing as a manager, we are seeing more and more pension 
funds who want to understand our commitments to ESG and how we demonstrate, not just 
investing for the environment but investing for economic, social, adding to the ESG as a 
whole, in benefiting the country as a whole. 
 
There is an increased pressure from pension funds to demonstrate this. 48 
 
 
The following quote is from an investor into the energy efficiency fund that is itself operating 
as a fund manager, managing funds for institutional investors. They make responsible investing 
an integral part of their investment process, which again appears to flow from the mandates 
that they have from investors to take environment factors very directly into account. This again 
demonstrates the commercial pressures to move to a responsible investment agenda.  
 
Well, we have some investors who have mandated us to take environment factors very 
directly into consideration. But as a house overall, we are signatories to the UN PRI, and 
therefore, we do have a responsibility agenda. The responsibility agenda, from our point 
of view, requires us to consider, for all investors, unpriced risk that may impact, over time, 
on the financial returns they achieve. 49 
 
 
6.3.3 Low carbon strategy taken into account in investment decision 
 
As responsible investment strategies are becoming more prevalent among investors, the 
research investigated whether these strategic considerations are taken into account when 
investors considered investing in the energy efficiency funds. The research participants were 
asked whether investors would perhaps compromise on investment return in order to achieve 
their strategic responsible investment objectives. Pension funds and other institutional 
investors do of course have a fiduciary duty to maximise the return of investments for the 
                                                          
48 Interview 3.3, Fund Manager, 23rd October 2014. 
49 Interview 4.4, Investor (Investment Fund), 22nd January 2016. 
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benefit of pension holders and other beneficiaries. However, there is a growing view among 
the investment and academic community that ESG issues can be considered in the investment 
decision and can be considered equally alongside return maximisation as a benefit to the 
beneficiaries of the fund as it provides them with a positive investment impact which they may 
value at the expense of monetary value maximisation.  
 
There does not appear to be any evidence from the research that indicates that ESG issues in 
the form of a responsible investment or low carbon investment strategy have any bearing on 
the decision-making process apart from on a secondary basis. Value maximisation appears to 
remain as the primary objective related to fiduciary duty. There is a consensus among the 
majority of investors that monetary value maximisation is the primary consideration. The 
following investor quotes demonstrate this.  
 
No, definitely not. It has to be green and profitable, it can’t be green or profitable. 50  
 
 
Probably we do [have a low carbon investment strategy] and, in all honesty, I know we’re 
in favour of it, but at the end of the day we would always look for the return, you know. The 
return versus risk is paramount and these kinds of things are secondary. 
 
Nice to have [a low carbon investment strategy] but our immediate fiduciary duty is to 
those with our pensions. No, no, we wouldn’t [accept a low return for an energy efficiency 
investment], no. 51  
 
 
[If] we went to a client and said, “This is a great idea. It doesn’t fit on a risk-return basis, 
but you’re doing some good for the environment,” we would get laughed out of the room. 
I mean, they have a fiduciary duty. 
  
It needs to work on a risk-return basis, and the green, feel-good basis […] 52  
 
 
But each sector and each risk profile would justify a different return, well back to your 
words different minimum return. You obviously go out of your way to get as big a return as 
possible. But just, the last bit of the sentence is just because it met your low carbon 
investment criteria, no. 53  
                                                          
50 Interview 1.1, Investor (GIB), 13th April 2015. 
51 Interview 3.12, Declined Investor, 18th January 2016. 
52 Interview 3.7, Investor (Investment Manager), 27th July 2015. 





No, we didn’t have one [a low carbon investment strategy] but even if we did, no [we would 
not accept a lower return]. 54  
 
 
People will do a green investment if it gives the same return, but they won’t take a 200 bp 
haircut or anything.  
 
For us, I think the answer is “no” and I think for the wider market, the answer is “no” as 
well. 55  
 
 
We categorically, from a sustainable point of view, start from the premise it’s got to make 
money and if it makes money, then fine we’ll do everything we can to make the sustainability 
work better. 56  
 
 
One of the fund managers did at least suggest that, should investors be faced with two 
infrastructure investments providing similar return for a similar level of risk, some may be 
inclined to invest in the one that can demonstrate the added benefit of carbon savings. His 
opinion was not that the majority would go for the carbon saving investment and he did also 
emphasis that the added carbon saving benefit would not be at the expense of return.  
 
I would say the answer to that is “No” but I think to put the question in a slightly different 
way, if they were weighing up two infrastructure investments where all the other 
parameters were the same, then, I suspect maybe not all but some may be inclined to go for 
something that they can demonstrate also has the added benefit of carbon savings.  
 
I think that added benefit probably does help in the allocation of capital to the sector, but 
not at the expense of return […]. 57  
 
 
There were however some positive comments but generally they do not provide any evidence 
that ESG considerations are being taken into account alongside financial return or indeed being 
considered as the primary criteria. The following quote from a fund manager suggests that a 
                                                          
54 Interview 3.5, Investor, 22nd April 2015. 
55 Interview 4.2, Investor (Investment Fund), 9th June 2015. 
56 Interview 4.3, Investor (Investment Fund), 29th June 2015. 
57 Interview 3.1, Fund Manager, 13th November 2014. 
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lower return may be acceptable in the circumstances where a blended portfolio is the objective 
and the investment would be used to achieve that objective, even if the investment has a low 
return.  
 
I imagine there's probably, as you say, competing demands between the risk profile of an 
energy efficiency type project, which I think at the moment is relatively high, but will come 
down as people get more comfortable with the asset class. And I think there is, again, a 
strong push to make sure there's a blended portfolio, and hence in some cases there may 
be some acceptance of a lower hurdle [return rate]. 58  
 
 
The following quote from an investor who is an investment manager representing institutional 
investors is quite positive but does not quite endorse the situation where an investment with a 
low carbon objective is prioritised over financial return. He can envisage a situation where this 
could happen but also states that investments have to stand up, meaning financially. 
 
I think we possibly would [accept a lower return]. I think, for us, investments have to stand 
up [financially]. 
 
We don’t have a mandate today where sustainability overrides performance, but that could 
conceivably happen and I think on the margin, we could do that. Generally, not, but I can 
see situations where we would be fairly relaxed. 59  
 
 
The following investor quote is encouraging in that it does state that other factors can be taken 
into consideration and that financial maximisation is not the only consideration but then states 
as long as they do not prejudice the effectiveness of the investments, meaning presumably 
financial value maximisation. 
 
The fiduciary duty to maximise isn't the be all and end all. You are allowed to take these 
other factors into consideration, but only where they don't prejudice the effectiveness of the 
investments. 60  
 
 
                                                          
58 Interview 3.2, Fund Manager, 15th October 2014. 
59 Interview 3.4, Investor (Investment Manager), 14th November 2014. 
60 Interview 3.6, Investor, 17th July 2015. 
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Finally, an investor did say that he would accept a lower return when deciding between 
investments. This is a result of the effect previously mentioned where investors are concerned 
about the profitability of investments that offer higher returns now but there is uncertainty 
about whether those returns can be realised in the future. However, this is in a situation where 
low carbon investment is part of their investment mandate. This is the most positive of the 
responses but it does not represent a trend towards low carbon considerations taking precedence 
over monetary return in investment decision making.   
 
Simply, yes, in so far as we worry that there are higher returns immediately available in 
exchange for significant risk participation. We worry that the downside risks associated 
with climate are sufficient that they cannot be addressed through a normal probabilities-
based distribution that would otherwise create transparency on forward returns. In these 
much more dramatic risks, we are happy to accept a lower return, if it gives us high 





6.4 Decision to invest / not invest    
 
This section of the research seeks to identify the factors and influences that lead investors to 
make the decision to invest in energy efficiency opportunities and in the GIB Funds in 
particular. Of course, some investors may have decided not to invest after having been 
presented with the investment opportunity and making their assessment of the risk and rewards, 
and these insights are just as valuable. 
 
There are many factors that influence the decision by investors to invest in a particular asset or 
investment type. By far the most commonly quoted issue that influenced investors was the 
experience and familiarity of the fund manager itself. This issue is in fact an individual category 
of inquiry being pursued in the research and will be expanded in a further section however it is 
worth stating that this appears to be a major influencing factor in the decision to invest.  
 
 
                                                          
61 Interview 4.4, Investor (Investment Fund), 22nd January 2016. 
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6.4.1 Influence of the Green Investment Bank 
 
The influence of the GIB on an investor’s decision to invest in the energy efficiency funds is 
key issue as it is unknown whether the GIB will in fact repeat their investment to increase 
activity in the sector or whether the exercise of investing and creating the three funds was 
purely an attempt to ‘kick start’ the market and their intention is not to invest further. This is 
particularly uncertain since the announcement by the UK government of its intention to sell the 
GIB and its eventual sale in 2017 (Pickard, 2015, Plimmer and Pickard, 2017). If it could be 
established whether the GIB or UK government’s presence is essential for further funds to be 
successful, at least in the short term, or whether investors will find other newly created funds 
that do not have the GIB on board attractive enough to commit funds to, this will provide a 
valuable insight to future success of energy efficiency funds. 
 
It is useful understand the views of the GIB themselves regarding their involvement in the 
energy efficiency sector. A stated aim was to encourage investment but it would appear that by 
no means were they convinced that this objective could be fully achieved. The following 
interview quotes are from an interviewee who was involved in the energy efficiency offering 
from the early days of the GIB and was instrumental in shaping its energy efficiency strategy.  
 
 So, my guess is, well the GIB involvement could be a plus or a minus and this was one of 
the big issues we had in setting up the GIB. If the GIB is perceived as a pot of dumb public-
sector money that is investing without due consideration of returns, then actually for a 
private investor, investing alongside the GIB would be a negative. 
 
The worry would be that the investments would not be made on a commercial basis and 
they would be made for policy reasons and not commercial reasons and therefore why 
would you put good private money, wanting a reasonable private return alongside public 
money?  62 
  
 
A clear concern was that the GIB would not be seen as commercial enough with due cognisance 
of the risks and rewards of a commercial investment which would subsequently dis-incentivise 
private investment.  
 
                                                          
62 Interview 1.3, Investor (GIB), 9th June 2015. 
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One of the key concerns we had in setting up the GIB was to make sure that the GIB evolved 
as a respected investor in the market and that is something that you earn over time and I 
guess the case is still not proven. 
 
The way the GIB has got to attract capital into these markets is by being seen to be a real 
expert, investing commercially, perhaps investing more than a commercial bank would or 
investor would do in the due diligence and the expertise around the technology on the 




There was a real recognition that the GIB had to demonstrate that they were not only a UK 
public sector sovereign entity but they needed to be a well-respected and knowledgeable 
investor able to exercise sound investment discipline. It is interesting to note that at the time of 
the interview the interviewee was not convinced that the GIB had achieved this. The way that 
they chose to demonstrate technical knowledge to the market was to invest via the three funds 
in question.    
 
The positives of the GIB is not a given. For these funds what the GIB did was encourage 
dedicated energy efficiency investment teams into the market that didn't exist beforehand 
by giving them a bit of a platform or giving the opportunity to create a platform which 
would have higher profile. 
 
You had Equitix they were infrastructure to come out of PFI. So, without the GIB fund they 
would not have created an energy efficiency labelled fund and therefore there wouldn't be 
anything to invest alongside. 
 
SDLC again, Jonathan [Maxwell, CEO] had been struggling for a number of years to get 
it going and this was a catalyst to potentially to get it going.  
 
Presumably it made it more attractive for the pension funds that Equitix had been able to 
get into its fund. It happened with GIB though, it is probably an attraction […]. 64 
 
 
However, this early uncertainty on behalf of the GIB was not universally shared by the GIB 
interviewees with the following being a quote from a senior executive at the GIB once the bank 
had been fully set and operating. When asked whether the GIB’s presence influenced the 
private investors decision to invest his response was: 
 
                                                          
63 Interview 1.3, Investor (GIB), 9th June 2015. 
64 Interview 1.3, Investor (GIB), 9th June 2015. 
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I think it’s the fact the GIB’s involved. 65 
 
 
Once its strategy was in place then the GIB felt that its involvement did encourage further 
investment by institutional investors. This has been echoed by all the fund managers responses 
to this issue in the study. The first two quotes strongly endorse the GIB’s involvement and see 
it as a strong brand that can be used to sell the investment proposition including on the second 
case to sell it as if the investment is actually in the GIB. 
 
I guess, from my perspective, it can’t be a bad thing. They’ve got a great brand. Pretty 
much anyone in the UK will know who they are and what they’re doing, and it’s, from my 
perspective, an immediate stamp of approval: that, if the GIB is doing it, it should be at 
least worth a look.  
 
We think it’s a very good relationship from that perspective, yes. 66 
 
 
I would say it was important to most investors.  
  
Obviously, that’s the way we told them the story, so it’s difficult to know whether they would 
still have invested if GIB weren’t there. The whole investment proposition is to invest in 
GIB. The commitment from the government and the expertise and the endorsement of the 
asset class, if you like, that a Green Investment Bank investment brings has been important 
to them. 67  
  
 
The fund managers definitely saw the GIB involvement as a positive factor influencing 
institutional investment in the funds.  
  
 [The] GIB has also been a key driver for a number of investors, seeing the GIB pretty 
much 50/50 in all the investments which we make, and having them sat on the other side, 
and giving the endorsement to Equitix as a fund manager, that's another strong driver, 
which facilitates a lot of investment.   
 
Yes, I think in pretty much all cases, it was, or it is a positive factor. I think, given the 
quantum they've invested, that's a big, strong driver. And also, the fact that people would 
look at ticket sizes and measure against the amount the GIB have committed. 
 
                                                          
65 Interview 1.1, Investor (GIB), 13th April 2015. 
66 Interview 2.1, Fund Manager, 24th February 2015. 
67 Interview 3.1, Fund Manager, 13th November 2014. 
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And that's, in a number of cases, increased the amount that they've been prepared to commit 
to the sister fund. 68 
  
 
Yes, no, absolutely, and I think it does certainly carry some weight, to say that our fund has 
got the Green Investment Bank as the cornerstone investor in the fund. It certainly carries 
quite a bit of weight clearly, with the investors. So, no, absolutely, I think that it does have 
an influence on the decision, yes. 69 
 
 
I think it helps. It was created and is managed by the UK government so I think it helps in 
terms of being an anchor, in terms of the capacity and the ability to continue raising further 
funds. Then it’s just a question of how you can deploy that, how successful you are in 
deploying and mitigating the risk. 70 
 
 
In some cases the fund managers introduced their potential investors to the GIB which then 
further convinced the investors to decide to invest in the funds. 
 
 
So, our investors have spoken to GIB, just in terms of GIBs outlook and their foresight into 
what the market has to offer. So, I think that the GIB have been very useful and are very 
supportive obviously in our fundraising process. Because the more capital that we get from 
the private sector side, the more we can invest of the Green Investment Bank capital, so it 
goes hand in hand. 71 
 
 
In the main the investors interviewed also affirmed the view that the GIB presence was a 
positive influence on their decision to invest. One investor actively worked with the GIB, 
comparing and sharing their due diligence outcomes and a second stated that they respected 
the quality of their research. Therefore, not only were the GIB a positive factor because they 
were seen as a UK sovereign entity, they also provided valuable expertise in the evaluation of 
the market, which enabled some investors to get comfortable and commit to an investment. 
 
If we had GIB not there, we wouldn’t have invested solo in this fund […]. 72 
                                                          
68 Interview 3.2, Fund Manager, 15th October 2014. 
69 Interview 2.2, Fund Manager, 17th March 2015. 
70 Interview 4.1, Fund Manager, 27th February 2015. 
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It was very helpful, obviously. It obviously provided the Management team with a bedrock 
of capital to start to show proof of concept in the early stage.  
 
We were a pretty early-stage investor. I think we were the second investor in the 
institutional parallel vehicle. I think, for us, on the due diligence side, it helped to know 
that they had been through a process, and we actually directly compared due diligence 
notes and findings with the Green Investment Bank to help with our process, so having that 
second opinion, which is, for us, quite unique in that, typically, other investors alongside 
us are, in effect, competitors. Here, you had someone who was just pretty aligned with you 
without any competitive issues.  
  
It was helpful but I wouldn’t say it was absolutely fundamental to the decision. 73 
 
 
With both Funds we are together with the Green Investment Bank, I think they were there 
at the same time. I think it was important in terms of, I mean EIB is a new pan-European 
institution the forum where we know individual markets. I mean we take comfort of people 
which are more into the markets to be involved in the projects that we finance. And clearly 
in this case I mean having the involvement of the Green Investment Bank, knowing them 
and having in mind what the requirements in terms of due diligence and objectives were, I 
think we felt comfortable having them in the Fund. 
 
We run through the due diligence process of someone who we consider a reputable player. 
It is positive, yes. 74 
 
 
Yes, absolutely. No, I mean, the GIB cornerstone was absolutely critical to getting this 
thing off the ground. 75 
 
 
Absolutely, 100%. Let’s be clear about it, they backed a very young team in SDCL. Lots 
and lots of knowledge but no real provability of what they were able to do and so there is 
a double benefit here for Green Investment Bank. Lots of diversity and all that stuff, but if 
they want to go into energy efficiency who would they go to on that basis, because there 
was a very, very limited number of investment management teams? An awful lot of them 
have started to add energy efficiency into their mandates with limited expertise, energy 
efficiency is what we do. I don’t think any of them really know what they’re doing in quite 
the same way. 76 
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A significant factor, because we respect the quality of their research. They are a far larger 
entity than ourselves. Realistically, we like to work with third parties who undertake 
rigorous and detailed due diligence, and with whom we can pool our insights and our 
information.  
 
The Green Investment Bank is a classic entity, where there is a confluence of interest 
between ourselves and themselves, so they are not trying to structure the agreement where 
they get more than we. Yet, at the same time, there is an absolute requirement from all of 
our point of view to approach this robustly and with rigour, to maximise the probability 
that the outcomes are as we all expect. 77 
 
 
Although the investor comments regarding the GIB presence being a positive influence on their 
decision to invest were mostly positive, there were some dissenting voices and when asked 
directly about whether the GIB had an influence the following two responses were also 
received along with the many positive comments. The first very short response is clear and 
unequivocal, the particular investor was not influenced at all by the GIB involvement and his 
assessment was based solely on the fundamentals of the fund in terms of risk return and 
strategy. The second investor dismissed the GIB as an influencing factor as they valued the 





Well, actually, to be frank, it wasn't because by then we'd already made investments into 
funds one and two. I don't think they got involved until about fund three. 79 
 
 
The intention of the GIB was always to stimulate the market and encourage institutional 
investors into the sector be they public sector pension fund or from the private sector. Whether 
they intended to make further investments in similar funds once the initial three were fully 
committed was unclear, although some of the fund managers felt that this had been the 
intention. Now that the GIB had been sold, the situation regarding energy efficiency is even 
more unclear. However, one avenue of enquiry has sought to establish whether the institutional 
                                                          
77 Interview 4.4, Investor (Investment Fund), 22nd January 2016. 
78 Interview 3.5, Investor, 22nd April 2015. 
79 Interview 3.6, Investor, 17th July 2015. 
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investors in the funds would invest in further energy efficiency funds that did not have the GIB 
involved, assuming of course that all other aspects of the fund investments had met their 
investment criteria. If this was positive then this could indicate that other similar energy 
efficiency funds could also be successful in the market attracting institutional investors, 
perhaps with the current institutional investors as cornerstone investors that would attract 
others that were new to the sector, again of course subject to the existing funds being seen as a 
success.   
 
In terms of the study, the responses from the GIB themselves as to whether they felt 
institutional investors would invest in further funds that did not have the GIB involved was a 
little mixed. 
 




I think they probably would. I am probably jumping ahead but the big challenge is the 




The interviewee providing the first comment didn’t think so, but the second was a little more 
positive about the how investors consider investments generally and as long as the volume of 
investment opportunity was present and the fund managers had a track record, then the GIB 
did not need to be involved.  
 
The fund managers were again mixed in their views. The first comment below suggests that 
investors would query why the GIB was not investing further, which would subsequently raise 
questions about the energy efficiency proposition. The second fund manager comment warns 
that although their fund has been successful, if the GIB then did not invest further perhaps due 
to government changing its focus or policy, then it could create investor uncertainty which the 
GIB needs to manage. 
 
                                                          
80 Interview 1.2, Investor (GIB), 15th May 2015. 
81 Interview 1.3, Investor (GIB), 9th June 2015. 
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Whether those investors would invest in future funds if the GIB wasn’t invested, I think as 
an LP [Limited Partner] investor coming in I would be querying why the GIB would not be 
reinvesting or investing further if they were truly committed. In other words, is there 
something wrong with the proposition or the team or the current investments? It would be 
a factor. 82 
 
 
 GIB and Equitix have done a very good job with the first fund in saying, “We have 
deployed GIB’s capital and private sector capital. We have generated a good return and 
proven and stable cash flows. It’s been a success. It’s demonstrated to the market that this 
is a valid asset class and it’s been a success.” 
 
Then, I do think that us raising a follow-on fund or others raising funds is a good possibility 
and I think people will invest in them. I think if the GIB were to not invest in the next fund 
because of other reasons, because investment in the sector hasn’t been a success, and then, 
I guess, it doesn’t really matter, or perhaps even because of a change in political 
[climate]…If the GIB were to [not invest further], because of a change of government or a 
change of government policy or whatever it may be, change their focus that caused 
uncertainty in the investor community about the commitment of the government to the 
sector, then, I think that would potentially be different, but I think that’s part of the way the 
GIB need to manage themselves going forward, and they’re well aware of that. 83 
               
 
There were also views from fund managers that investors would indeed invest in further funds 
without the GIB based on the track record of the existing funds and the opportunities presented 
by a further fund. 
 
I would like to think so. I think that due to, you know, the strength of the investments made, 
I would like to think, and the returns coming back to investors, I would like to think that 
yes. A number of the projects, particularly the small-scale biomass for example, start 
yielding very quickly, which I think is hopefully very attractive to a number of investors.  
 
And I also think that because there's the Equitix relationship, and it's been proven through 
the core funds, that when further rounds of fundraising have taken place, people have 
committed additional funds, whether it's fund 2 or fund 3, based on the track record of the 
fund manager. So, whether or not GIB is involved, I would like to think that there would be 
strong appetite if we were to raise an independent fund that could invest 100% in projects.84 
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83 Interview 3.1, Fund Manager, 13th November 2014. 
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I think that if Equitix was indeed to deliver what we have said we will deliver to our 




When discussing the issue directly with investors, they all responded positively that they would 
consider investing in other funds that did not have the GIB also invested and some stated that 
they have already done so or are actively looking for such investments. Certain investors stated 
that they would reinvest in other funds as a direct result of the experience they had with the 
GIB funds and based on the knowledge and information that they had gleaned from the 
experience. However, they still didn’t feel that it was essential for them to be involved but 
merely helped them into the sector.  
 
Yes, and we have looked. I think we’re going to do one where it’s not the central strategy 
but they will do similar energy efficiency type projects as part of their portfolio.  
 
[as a result of the experience you’ve had with the Equitix fund?] Well, I think so because, 
clearly for us, it’s a pretty niche area of infrastructure. We definitely garnered a lot of 
knowledge which we didn’t have before from doing it. 86  
  
 
Yes. Based on the experience we’ve had with Equitix, as well as the experience we’ve had 
with GIB, to be honest. They’re quality investors, but they’re not any better or any worse 
than other […]. 87 
 
 
Will we. Yes, no definitely I mean we are actively looking to invest in energy efficiency 
funds all across Europe. I think, let’s put it this way I mean the initiative launches because 
both Equitix and SDCL follow a call for investments made by GIB and the forum. So now 
this has opened up the market for us as well. 
 
But we are looking after other investments all across Europe. 88 
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There were clearly other investors where the GIB presence was not an issue and as long as the 
fund and investment fundamentals such as financial return, level of risk, quality of management 
etc were indicating that the investment made sense, then they would invest again.  
 
Yes, we would. So GIB involvement not really an issue, much more on the fundamentals of 
the fund, so yes. 89 
 
 
The answer is yes, in so far as, as long as we were dealing with a set of proposals where 
we could clearly analyse, understand and consider the risk characteristics, including 
management, then we would be happy to invest. It is, in my experience, hard to find 
propositions which have full transparency, low technology risks, and strong management 
at a fair price. 90 
 
 
Some investors were less illuminating and just happy to invest again without the GIB but not 
expanding on their reasons. 
 
Yes. I think the key issue; my colleagues probably don’t think about it but is if we had two 
equal Funds and we had to choose between two equal Funds would the GIB influence? I 
think my colleagues would struggle to say it did, frankly. 
 






6.4.2 Transaction contractual structure 
 
Each individual transaction’s contractual structure is important, as investors will need to be as 
certain as possible that the required returns will be made and that the investments can deliver 
them. If it is too unclear or unfamiliar then investors will not feel comfortable investing, even 
if all other indicators are positive, particularly if there are other competing investments that 
                                                          
89 Interview 3.5, Investor, 22nd April 2015. 
90 Interview 4.4, Investor (Investment Fund), 22nd January 2016. 
91 Interview 3.11 & 4.7, Investor, 23rd November 2014. 
92 Interview 3.6, Investor, 17th July 2015. 
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could be made. This issue has come across strongly as an important factor across the spectrum 
of investors. One investor made the point that a familiar project finance structure was a key 
driver allowing them to invest and that they attributed significant value to this issue when 
making their investment decisions. They emphasised it a number of times in the same interview 
as demonstrated by the following four extracted comments.  
 
Actually, energy efficiency for us has got two aspects. The first is infrastructure-type 
projects; so, whether that’s things like biomass boilers, CHPs, heat capture or fit-outs of 
buildings into more energy-efficient assets. All of that in infrastructure would have, if you 
like, a traditional project finance wrap around it. 93 
 
 
For us, the key for it to be an appropriate asset class is the project finance wrapper around 
the investment. That’s something you don’t always see.  
 
This particular fund is bringing that project finance discipline to areas where it 
traditionally hasn’t been. For us, given that, and then all of the government subsidies, etc, 
and the contractual structures, that becomes an infrastructure investment at that point. 94  
 
 
I think I’ve mentioned before the application of traditional project finance contractual 
architecture to areas where it hasn’t been before. 95      
 
 
I think I’ve mentioned it several times. That project finance wrap being there for the first 
time made a huge difference. A huge difference.  
 
What we were able to do, and I don’t think we would have done it [invest] if we couldn’t, 
was actually have legal reviews of all the contractual set-ups. We were actually able to use 
a typical renewable/infrastructure lawyer. It was just like a wind project or a bridge. It had 
all the same types of contracts, arrangements, etc.  
 
In terms of due diligence, it could be done in a very clear, well-trodden path. 96 
 
 
In this last comment the investor actually states that the familiar structure allowed them to use 
an infrastructure lawyer as it had essentially become an infrastructure investment rather than 
                                                          
93 Interview 3.4, Investor (Investment Manager), 14th November 2014. 
94 Interview 3.4, Investor (Investment Manager), 14th November 2014. 
95 Interview 3.4, Investor (Investment Manager), 14th November 2014. 
96 Interview 3.4, Investor (Investment Manager), 14th November 2014. 
121 
 
an energy efficiency investment, which had allowed them to satisfactorily review the 
transaction legally and without which they would not have made the investment. This is 
significant if investors are to be positively influence to make further energy efficiency 
investments.  
 
Contractual structure was raised by a number of investors throughout the study and a strong 
theme emerged. 
 
No but I think Equitix is targeting a lot of renewable heat incentive stuff which is much 
easier business case. From a private investment perspective that is much easier to do 
because they understand it, right, you can do the cash flows and it is much closer to 
traditional project finance type approaches, right. 97 
 
 
Well essentially this was the first type of fund like this that I’d seen. So, we’d been an 
investor in the Equitix PPP Fund, so I was familiar with the sorts of long-term contractual 
infrastructure investments that sit in those funds. 98 
 
 
I think, on the positive side, the project finance type of approach that Equitix was very 
attractive. I think we talked to a number of other people in this area and they were running 
it more on a developer model, but the long-term project finance made a lot of sense for 
managing the risks. 99 
 
 
The following comment was made by a declined investor and although it wasn’t related to the 
investment’s project finance structure, it does demonstrate the issue around confidence of fund 
structure or strategy for an investment to be able to achieve the required and promised returns.   
 
So, the manager risk I’ve touched on is the complexity of the opportunity and how visible 
or plausible that is. There’s a term so it may be that there’s a good opportunity but it’s 
structured in not a suitable way, you know, in an unsuitable way, meaning it may be in an 
onshore, offshore fund or it may have certain elements of it that aren’t tax efficient or it 
may be that the manager is charging too high an incentive for your base management fee.100 
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6.4.3 Risk, reward and opportunity 
 
Investors’ decision to invest will be influenced by their assessment of risk, reward and their 
propensity to exploit a potentially advantageous opportunity within the market.   
 
 
6.4.3.1 Security of income and level of return 
 
As already discussed, investors assess potential investments through the lens of risk and return. 
In the responses to questions about what factors influenced investors decisions to invest in 
energy efficiency, government revenue incentives were mentioned as a positive factor. 
 
The Green Investment Bank are publicly owned, so the Green Investment Bank and EEEF 
together are gaining returns and a lot of these returns are driven by responsible heat 
incentives, the RHIs, the ROCs, FiTs if applicable. 101 
 
 
One of the features of the fund, in fact, of Equitix as a house [financial institution], is that 
they have been very canny in tapping into quasi-guaranteed investments underwritten by 
government and that bond-like aspect of it has been quite attractive. 102 
 
 
However, they were also mentioned in the context of being a risk in that the government could 
discontinue their use and, more problematically, the risk of a retrospective discontinuance. 
Once the income from these instruments has been factored in to the transactions return the 
investors want to be totally confident that they will realise that return which would not be the 
case if the government retrospectively discontinued providing the enhanced revenues achieved. 
 
As I said, the things that we spent a lot of time on and tried to get our investment committees 
comfortable with […] was just around the government’s continued use of the RHI and not 
changing things retrospectively. 103 
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In general, the investors were attracted by the returns offered and the risk-return profile. 
 
I think, then, for us, there are just some characteristics of the return, being predominantly 
income-focused, for example, which just suit our client mandates very well.’ 104 
 
‘Actually, the returns were really quite attractive for what was quite a low risk thing. 
Sticking a new big boiler in a hospital actually – and if you secured your feed stock supplies 
and your off take actually it’s very low risk. 105 
 
 
It’s very much the risk-returns, being in a new institutional investment asset class offering 
you reasonably strong returns for the risk that we thought we were taking. 106 
 
 
If the risk adjusted return, at the fund level, let’s say, is 10%, there or thereabouts net of 
fees and costs, that is a pretty sensible return in the current environment when you look at 




Risk return coupled with strong investment case and investment partners including the fund 
manager was also a feature of the responses. 
 
 
Yes. If I were to summarise it in a sentence, I would say probable forward net returns over 
time. But that simple sentence includes a great deal of luggage. If I were to unpack the 
luggage, the probable forward returns are a set of expectations about the reliability that 
this investment will deliver the cash flow that we believe is appropriate at outset. We think 
that because this is proven technology, with clear benefits to all parties, that actually, this 
is a relatively safe and secure investment to make. 
 
That is coupled with the challenge that over time, this will be dependent on the parties to 
the agreement and the delivery. So SDCL itself, but also its industrial partners. We consider 
them to be robust and capable, and therefore able to deliver to us. 108 
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Yes. I think it’s all about fundamentals. That was the benefit of us having an internal team. 
That we would look at things that I think pretty much – [XYZ – investment managers]  
looked at this because we asked them to. As well as the fact that they knew Equitix, so they 
knew we were a potential client of this fund. So, having an in-house team, gives you the 
ability to do interesting things that are slightly less mainstream. So, when we see them it’s 
all about the strength of the investment case, the clarity, the approach, the expertise of the 
team, the fees, the net returns you’re going to get, the risk that’s [...]. There’s no rocket 
science here. It’s basic investment appraisal, going through all the elements of the fund. 109 
 
 
In terms of technology, we want to be involved in proven technology, so they should not 
have significant technology risk. We want there to be immediate cash flow, because in our 
experience, investments not untypically unravel if there is a delay in implementation, with 




Investors, depending on their risk appetite, have a propensity to exploit a potentially 
advantageous opportunity within the market to varying degrees. As energy efficiency is a new 
area of investment, which may become its own asset class or a distinct and established sub 
class of infrastructure, the risks are initially perceived as higher than more established asset 
classes. The period of highest risk is always during the initial construction phase, certainly in 
infrastructure, and should a potential investor take the risk to invest during the construction 
phase of an investment with no operating history then it would expect a premium on its return. 
Once the class is proven and satisfactory operational data is available then the potential investor 
would expect to see the returns or yield to lower and would be able to exit its investments for 
a higher value. This is known as Yield Compression and investors who see the success of 
energy efficiency in the long term and are happy to take the risk would be seeking to take 
advantage of Yield Compression in the sector by investing early. A number of investors made 
this point. 
 
If you are a pension fund, this is a new asset class. I mean I think part of the selling story 
has got to be around potentially yield compression. If you are investing in, I suspect PFI 
assets and infrastructure assets, I mean they are being bid ever more aggressively, because 
there is a shortage of income assets out there. So, you come to the energy efficiency, get in 
early in the asset class and then benefit from the yield compression ride, would be the key 
sell here would be my guess. 111 
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 As investors in this fund, if you take construction risk, you expect to earn a premium for 
taking the construction risk. Post-construction, or particularly a year or two post-
construction, when the asset is performing and you can get to ‘kick the tyres’ as operational 
data, you would expect to exit at a lower yield and gain a bit of an uptick in terms of overall 
investment performance because of that yield compression. 
  
Now, at the moment, none of the fund managers, I think, have approved it on a large 
portfolio basis, but that’s certainly part of the investment thesis in the market, and we will 






Aspects of certain energy efficiency transactions, particularly those involving biomass boilers 
that have attracted government subsidies, require a secure fuel source. This is also a concern 
for investors and is viewed as a risk that they need to fully understand. 
 
There may be things like fuel risk, which on more conventional investments may not have 
any requirement to source biomass or waste, or any such sort of fuel to ensure that the 
project works. So, it's weighing up, to the extent that those contracts are robust, and there's 
parties in place which can meet any obligations within those contracts. 113 
 
 
As I said, the things that we spent a lot of time on and tried to get our investment committees 
comfortable with were, first of all, the feedstock issue and how that was going to work over 
time, given that we hadn’t been involved in investments that had had those issues over time. 
We needed to spend a bit of time getting our heads around that. 114 
 
 
If you’ve got a solid set of counterparties, a solid set of technologies deployed, and, in the 
case of biomass, also a solid on the feedstock side, that’s a good set of risk parameters. 115 
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6.4.3.3 Small projects, volume of investment opportunity and deployment 
 
One of the established barriers to investment in energy efficiency projects is scale and the small 
size of the projects involved. This is one of the reasons why the GIB elected to use fund 
investment to attract matching investment from institutional investors, as the individual 
transactions were deemed too small to interest most pension funds etc. Alongside this is the 
concern that the investment opportunities are not readily available. Although it is recognised 
that investment into energy efficiency is needed and can have a significant effect in the 
reduction of CO2 emissions, opportunities to invest in energy efficiency are still scarce. The 
following quote from a GIB representative illustrates that the GIB recognised this issue and 
although they set up the investment vehicles, they were still concerned about there being 
sufficient investment opportunities. 
 
I am probably jumping ahead but the big challenge is the volume of investment opportunity 
[…]. 
 
There is a real suspicion of investors investing in funds where they can't demonstrate deal 
flow, which is again one of the GIB's challenges. It has been set up by government perfect 
bureaucracy, but actually what are the investment opportunities out there? And they are 
not that great. 116 
 
 
One of the fund managers approached the issue of energy efficiency projects being small in 
value by actively structuring them as typical infrastructure assets and we have seen that this 
has been well received by investors in their fund. The fund manager had actively sought to 
market their fund as just another infrastructure fund in order to appeal to investors.   
 
I think the key one is deployment of capital, and investors are very aware that if we have 
historically gone to them with PFI projects that said […]. The average PFI project is £50 
million, let’s say, and 10% of that is equity. Roughly speaking, your average ticket size is 
£5 million a project. If you’re looking at LED lighting schemes, your average project is 
£50,000 or whatever it is.  
 
I think that one of the real things that investors have had to get their minds around is how 
to, this is the thing we’ve had to do. We’ve helped with how you structure a portfolio of 
what can be relatively small assets in an efficient way and deploy capital at scale in an 
efficient way, in a way that makes it, in aggregate, look and feel like an infrastructure 
investment, because that’s really what they want it to look like. Actually, when you do all 
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that right, it’s perhaps innovative in some ways, but the outcome is something that looks, 
in a lot of ways, like a very boring infrastructure fund. That’s part of the strategy, to try 
and set it up in that way. 117 
 
 
Investors were concerned about the small scale of the investments. 
 
…clearly scale is an issue. So, there are so many small transactions; changing the windows 
in your house, changing the boiler in your home, putting some insulation in the attic. I 
mean like a Pension Fund that has to deploy a billion Euros in every transaction, how does 
he deploy a billion Euros in a single transaction? It is not easy. 118 
 
 
However the following investor, although expressing concern about the size of the transactions, 
clearly got comfortable that there was sufficient deal flow and that the capital would be 
deployed in a reasonable timescale. He went on to state that deployment had been slower than 
they would have ideally liked perhaps indicting that the opportunities were not readily available 
to the fund as they had previously understood.   
 
At first, we were [concerned about the size of the transactions], but ultimately, you then get 
comfortable with the fact that there are, individually, very small projects but, actually, there 
are pipelines of portfolios. 
  
It’s gone a little bit slower than we would have probably ideally liked in practice, but we 
like the fact the guys are being a bit cautious at times.  
 
I think it’s an area which can accept more capital quite comfortably and I know that Equitix 
have got a lot of the capital wrapped up; so, a concern, yes, but I think one we’re relatively 
relaxed about. 119 
 
 
One of the fund managers felt that the small scale of the investments was in fact an advantage, 
in that they would yield or produce returns quickly however this would only really be beneficial 
if a sufficient number of investments had been made in order for the return to be of sufficient 
size to have an impact. 
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I think that due to, you know, the strength of the investments made, I would like to think, 
and the returns coming back to investors, I would like to think that yes. A number of the 
projects, particularly the small-scale biomass for example, start yielding very quickly, 
which I think is hopefully very attractive to a number of investors. 120 
 
 
Interestingly one investor did view the small scale of the investments as a positive factor, seeing 
the investments as big enough to make economic sense with sufficient return while also being 
too small individually for most investors to take notice. 
 
So, when this fund came along and said, “Well this is all we’re going to do.” and went 
through some of the opportunities that are found, you could actually see that they were big 
enough to make sense as investments, but not so big that people are going to be doing them. 
So, there’s a nice little niche there. 121 
 
There were also some responses positively advocating the use of the fund structure among 
investors. This reflected the view that small scale direct investing in energy efficiency is 
impractical and unfeasible to undertake for institutional investors. 
 
[So], the first issue is why Funds? Because why are we even doing Funds in energy 
efficiency? And I think the answer is given the challenges of lending at scale to energy 
efficiency Funds are actually a reasonable business model to do that. 
 
And we will see how successful that is when they have closed, when they are through their 
investment period […]. But at this point it is very difficult to finance energy efficiency so 
that is important. 122 
 
 
We did look at energy efficiency direct investment for [XYZ]. We found it almost impossible 
to structure an agreement. Because, for example, in [example building], if you were to 
introduce energy efficiency with a premise that you would receive your return as a portion 
of the cost saving, quite often, they will want to spend the same amount on energy, and just 
be more comfortable.  
 
So, they will allow the building to be warmer. They will be less effective at managing 
temperature and lighting, because they are not so incentivised. Whereas the counterparts 
in the SDCL agreement are first-class entities who wholly understand what the agenda is. 
There is absolute transparency and clarity on how this will be measured and the returns.123 
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6.4.3.4 Access to long-term stable index linked cashflows 
 
it has been explained previously that long-term stable index linked cashflows are important to 
investors in order that returns match their index-linked liabilities. This is a key issue recognised 
by the fund managers when responding to the question of what are the factors that have 
influenced investors to invest in their funds. 
 
I’ve touched on access to long-term, relatively stable index-linked cash flow projects that 
fall within in it or an investment that falls within a recognised asset class of infrastructure 
or renewables, wherever you might want to put it. 124 
 
 
We may have talked about it before, but it’s worth mentioning that REaLM, actually, is a 
trademarked name, and it stands for ‘Return Enhancing and Liability Matching’. 
  
That’s the tin. We’re trying to do what it says on the tin, which is we’re using illiquid 
investments and we’re using real assets to help liability matchers produce a very defined, 
transparent indexed cash flow, but at materially higher rates of return than they were 
getting in traditional liquid investments.  
 
That’s the raison d'être for the fund and what we do. 125 
 
 
Investors also state this in their response to this issue. 
 
Another aspect of this asset class, and not just our fund but the asset class in general, is 
elements of indexation built into it. Not across the piece, but things like biomass, for 
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6.4.3.5 Regulations influencing transactions 
 
Regulation also featured as an influencing feature for investors when considering whether or 
not to invest in energy efficiency. This issue is perhaps one that would have been expected to 
be a consideration.  
 
We look at the sensitivities. If, for example, they are investing in investments which are 
really skewed towards regulation so there's a big risk on that, so we need to understand, if 
there's a change in regulation, how does that reflect on the investment? We look at all these 
key components of the assessments. 127 
 
 
We then want low policy risk, by which I mean we don't want a high dependency on 
governments or other third parties making statements about their preferences, which may 
ebb and flow according to the political cycle. Energy efficiency, because it is rooted in hard 
economics, is much more reliable than some of the forms of participation in low 
hydrocarbon economics. 128 
 
 
6.4.3.6 Alternative Investment Opportunities 
 
The issue of whether investors decided to invest the energy efficiency funds at the expense of 
alternative investment opportunities is an important one. If investors do invest at the expense 
of alternative investments, then energy efficiency has investment attributes that encourage this 
and they could perhaps be further emphasised or developed in a strategy to encourage wider 
investment.  Below are a number of positive responses but perhaps the most surprising of them 
is the first, where it appears that the investment funds to make the investment into the energy 
efficiency fund came direct from the ‘pot of money’ allocation to mainstream equities. 
 
Yes, on the basis that in the general sense the pension scheme is a closed pot of money. So, 
the state we were at we were closed to new entrants. The scheme was just about cash 
neutral. So, there was no wall of money coming in that we just had to deploy. If we wanted 
to put something into a new investment, we’d have to extract that money from somewhere 
else. At the time we were looking at the asset allocation. The allocation into this actually 
came out of mainstream equities. 129 
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I’m guessing that that was the case, yes. Yes, we did. I mean, you know, we set a guide 
amount that we’d look to commit, in both infrastructure and private equity and, you know, 
we try and look at it as much as we can and take the best opportunities, so given that we 
didn’t invest that would have been a factor. 
 
There were other things that were taking our time and getting our attention in a more 
positive way. 130 
 
 
We did invest in the Equitix Energy Efficiency Fund at the expense of alternative 
opportunities, and two reasons, really.  
 
One is just from a very, if you like, hard-nosed risk-return consideration. We just felt that 
it stacked up, at this point in time, very well against other opportunities.  
 
I guess, secondly, the investment was made primarily on behalf of one client, [..]. For them, 
it fitted their criteria extremely well, as you can appreciate, and it is one that they’re going 
to put up in bright lights themselves.  
 
It suited us. As I say, risk-return, and we are recommending it to other clients, but, in 




Yes. There's always options. The universe is huge. 132 
 
 
There wasn’t any specific that was the alternative. We didn’t consider the other Energy 
Efficiency Fund that was being offered. 
  




Well, in so far as there is a limited pool of capital, and we must deploy wisely to achieve 
our customers' objectives, it would be correct to say that SDCL's proposition competed and 
won capital that could've been deployed elsewhere. I would not, however, argue that we 
have considered SDCL's investment in the context of there being a high opportunity cost.  
                                                          
130 Interview 3.12, Declined Investor, 18th January 2016. 
131 Interview 3.4, Investor (Investment Manager), 14th November 2015. 
132 Interview 3.6, Investor, 17th July 2015. 




Because the characteristics of the investment are, on our expectation, relatively high return 
and low risk in absolute space, and highly diversifying in the context of other material asset 
classes. So not bearing the same characteristics as quoted equities, conventional real estate 
or bonds. 134 
 
 
6.5 Fund Manager     
 
The selection of a fund manager is likely to be a key factor in an investor’s decision to invest 
in energy efficiency via a fund structure. This section of the research seeks to establish the 
various attributes that investors are seeking when choosing a fund manager or deciding to 
invest in an opportunity presented by a fund manager. It also attempts to establish whether 
investors would consider investing in a wider number of funds managed by different fund 
managers once they had a level of understanding of the underlying asset and had a level of 
expertise in the sector. In this way investment in energy efficiency could be expanded. 
 
 
6.5.1 Investment Strategy 
 
The fund manager’s investment strategy is of key importance as it can determine how likely 
the projected returns are achieved. Questions can be asked about the correct level of risk being 
taken for the likely return, what volume of investment opportunities are there for deploying 
funds, is the strategy focused enough etc. The following comments are by investors who have 
identified the investment strategy followed by a fund manager as a key consideration. 
 
Yes, what we are looking at particularly in energy efficiency, in terms of investment in the 
private equity funds we look to two things basically; the quality of the team and the 
plausibility of the investment strategy, right as to whether or not we consider the investment 
strategy credible and commensurate to the risk that we have taken […]. 135  
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The reason that they invest in the fund, it’s probably three main reasons which are typical 




Talk to your fund manager, then the strategy. The pipeline must be a reflection on the 
investment strategy. Their strategy track record, the investment strategy and the pipeline, 
they all must be aligned. 137 
 
 
The issue of strategy was also recognised by a declined investor and a fund manager 
respectively in the following two quotes. 
 
You know, I mean, we didn’t invest in this case. If we had have invested, the things we’re 
looking for are a kind of strategy that’s perhaps transparent, visible. And when I say visible 
I mean have some confidence in the… you know, the future returns. 138 
 
 
[If] you buy into the strategy or you have an allocation in your portfolio to a given strategy, 
that’s the first big thing. 139 
 
 
Concern was expressed by one investor that there are fund managers that are too diversified in 
their proposed strategy and needs them to be more focused. This of course can be difficult in a 
market with few opportunities. 
 
We want businesses that are really clear on what they're going to do and the delivery of 
what they're going to do. We find that there a surprisingly large number of people calling 
for capital, who have overly diversified business plans, who have a lack of understanding 
of the key requirements for them to be able to deliver, and who therefore maximise the 
probability of failing by being overly diversified and less focused. 140 
 
 
Another investor stated that they were willing to give more weight to a fund manager’s strategy 
over their experience in structuring energy efficiency investments previously, which is not 
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always the case among investors. This indicates a recognition that energy efficiency may be a 
relatively new type of investment with few experienced teams, however a potential fund 
manager must have a well thought out investment strategy for it to be considered for 
investment. 
 
What we always look for in Managers is that they have clear ideas what would work right 
and a well-defined idea on what is their route to the markets […].  
 
Somehow for energy efficiency we are willing more to give more weight a little bit to the 
idea of what are the investments that they want to tackle rather than to having vast 




6.5.2 Knowledge of the market and pipeline 
 
Another key issue is the fund manager’s knowledge of the market, which in turn allows it to 
identify a credible pipeline of investment opportunities. This was recognised early on by the 
GIB. 
 
Well they’ve got to demonstrate a knowledge of the market, obviously. Very importantly 
they’ve got to have a credible pipeline. 142 
 
 
The fund managers themselves also realise this and know from direct experience what it takes 
to identify sufficient opportunities that match the stated investment strategy they marketed to 
their investors. This includes exploiting their existing partners in their established mainstream 
infrastructure funds who may be able to provide energy efficiency opportunities for investment. 
This could also be a selling point. 
 
[…] this isn’t a commoditised mainstream business where you just evaluate deals and pick 
the best, it’s actually going out there, building the market. It’s a service-oriented approach 
therefore being able to build that pipeline, maintain it and manage those relationships, it’s 
quite an involved process. 143 
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I guess the other factor is having a pipeline of opportunities, so being able to demonstrate 
that once funds have been invested, have been committed, that there's a series of projects 
which, you know, the fund manager can then invest in. 144 
 
 
There are a lot of opportunities that come from our connections through all our big 
infrastructure partners that have brought us opportunities that are in our pipeline for the 




6.5.3 Track record and ability to deploy funds 
 
The fund managers interviewed, as would be expected, felt that track record is an important 
factor when evaluating a fund manager. The second of the following two quotes from fund 
managers focuses on its track record of meeting target returns and identifies energy efficiency 
as a niche sector, thus intimating that there are not many fund managers who operate in the 
sector and can produce the required returns. 
 
I mean in terms of evaluating whether to invest in a fund manager or not, the importance 
is, I would suggest, having a track record in investing as a starting point… 146 
 
 
I think the key things that would be assessed would be the track record of the fund manager, 
in terms of obviously delivery against target returns, and ability to meet hurdle rates, target 
hurdle rates. Particularly in this sector, it's quite a niche sector and there's not many 
investment professionals who focus on energy efficiency, particularly in non-domestic 
energy efficiency. 147 
 
 
The next two fund manager quotes emphasise that they have a well-established track record in 
an alternative, albeit related, sector and have deployed capital successfully and delivered the 
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returns to investors successfully. Therefore, they believe that they are able to demonstrate that 
they would be able to do the same for energy efficiency investments.  
 
Obviously Equitix is a well-established developer and manager of core infrastructure 
assets and has been around for seven to eight years. We have a strong track record with 
our core infrastructure funds which investors I think do like to see.148 
 
 
Maybe I would say this, wouldn’t I, but ‘Track Record’. I think, for us, to be able to 
demonstrate to investors that we have raised three PFI funds, deployed capital successfully 
to time in good quality assets within those funds, are delivering the returns to investors that 
we said we would deliver, continue to be successful in that sector, and to be able to say, 




The investors interviewed have confirmed that track record is a key issue for them in their 
investment decision looking at all aspects of the fund managers previous experience and 
knowledge if the market. The investors realise that they are looking not only for experience of 
energy efficiency but also a successful investment history of financial return and investment 
exit, ideally in related fields such as infrastructure and property.  
 
We look at the fund manager's track record, the experience. We look at the investments 
they've made in the past. We look at the way the market received them. We look at the 
proposed exits. We look at who they partnered before. 150 
 
 
We look at the strength of the team, we look at the resources, we look at the track record 
and we look at their experience and knowledge of the sector, especially if it's a new thing 
like energy efficiency, for instance. 151 
 
 
I think track record is important. 152 
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One investor identified the sector currently as very inflexible and therefore choosing a fund 
manager is important for the very reason that investors will not be able to exit investments very 
easily or not at all as there is no liquid market to do so. There are no ready investors to sell to 
therefore investors will most likely be stuck with the initial fund manager. 
 
 
I think the answer to the first one is “track record”. This is an asset class which is long-
only, illiquid and the classic fund structure is a 10-year closed-end fund structure. This is 
an asset class where you want to choose your manager particularly carefully upfront 
because jumping horse halfway through is not trivial. In fact, it’s almost impossible. The 
track record of the fund manager and particularly in this sector is a key component. 153 
 
 
6.5.4 Past relationship and familiarity with the fund manager 
 
A past relationship and subsequent familiarity with a fund manager is an important issue and 
factor in deciding to invest further for investors, as there is an element of trust between them 
which reflects a predictable behavioural issue. The following two quotes are from fund 
managers when asked if familiarity is a factor in investor’s decision to invest in their energy 
efficiency fund. Certainly it appears from their perspective that familiarity is a significant factor 
in the decision process although it was a little contradictory in that, according to the second 
quote, some investors were happy to sign up purely on the basis of their participation in its 
other core infrastructure funds which have presumably performed well but also surprise was 
expressed that more of the core funds investors hadn’t signed up for the energy efficiency fund. 
 
I think greatly, and I think it’s either familiarity because they’ve invested in our other funds; 
familiarity because we’d spoken to them about our other funds, and maybe they didn’t 
invest in those because the timing was right or whatever it may be; or they were just able 
to look us up.  
 
I think it would be much harder if we weren’t a, I wouldn’t say we were a household name, 
but you know what I mean: a recognised name in infrastructure. 154 
 
 
I think, looking at our investor pool, it's really varied. There's some investors who that 
relationship, and the experience they've had with Equitix on the core funds, means it's 
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almost a no-brainer. "Where's the documents, we'll sign tomorrow." And that's been the 
case with a couple of our investors. 
 
So, the role of the fund manager, and the familiarity of the fund manager, I think it's kind 
of split, and it's mixed across the [investors]. But I guess, from my perspective, I was 
surprised that there weren't more of the investors in the core funds which have invested in 
this space. 155 
 
 
Generally, the investors’ responses, perhaps unsurprisingly, confirmed that familiarity was a 
strong factor in their investment decision.  
 




Yes, it did, in the sense that we had a lot of trust in them as an organisation, and their 
ability to deliver was key. 157  
 
 
Oh, it definitely has a weight. I mean when you know the Manager, where you know that 
they are professional, you know that their due diligence processes are good so it is much 
better than a poor Manager which you don’t have any experience on it. In the end due 
diligence processes are limited in time than in depth so it is much better, you really have 
the experience of having worked with them on other projects. 158 
 
 
It was a highly significant factor. We had worked, we'd studied, monitored, followed SDCL 
for an extended period before electing to commit capital. That period allowed us to build 
a record of their track record as an entity, but also as individuals.  
 
We have discussed investing with them over a number of years and a considerable period, 
before we ended up committing capital. So, they were not an entity that turned up saying, 
"We think we can make a lot of money. May we have some capital. This week, the idea is 
delivery of garden ponds." This is something they have done all the time, and they have 
demonstrated considerable competency. Even in the difficult periods, they have not 
forsaken the targets and their points of focus. 159 
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One investor who recognised familiarity as a positive, having invested in all three of the fund 
manager’s previous infrastructure funds, then started to get concerned about concentration risk.  
 
It helped. It was a really positive factor as I say because we knew them. It took one of the 
elements of risk away. 
 
We were investors in all three of their PPP [Infrastructure] funds. Actually, that was almost 
a negative, because as we had investments in three funds already we were saying, “Well 
actually do we want the concentration risk of investing in another one?” So, it almost 
tipped it the other way. 160 
 
 
6.5.5 Quality of the team, depth of resource, trust and integrity 
 
Perhaps understandably, the quality of the team involved in placing investment in the fund 
manager is paramount and this goes hand in hand with the trust placed in them and the level of 
integrity expected. This issue runs through the various parties involved. The GIB when 
selecting find managers obviously needed to select teams with credible individuals in not only 
the energy efficiency sector but in raising further capital also. The second criteria may have 
been reasonably straightforward as there are many fund managers with a track record of 
fundraising but fund managers who are able to manage and source projects in the niche sector 
are much more difficult to identify. The following is from the GIB. 
 
[…] credibility of the individuals, do they have the skills to source projects and to manage 
projects? Do they pass the smell test? So certainly, when we were selecting at the GIB Fund 
Managers, the proven ability to raise money was important. 161 
 
 
The fund managers also recognise this and the two quotes below from fund managers discuss 
this requirement and the fact that they have it. 
 
The quality of the investment team, and in quality, meaning the depth and breadth of 
experience, the extent to which you’ve got a depth of resource, and the third component I 
suppose is also the quality of the organisation around those individuals... 162 
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Obviously Equitix is a well-established developer and manager of core infrastructure 
assets and has been around for seven to eight years. We have a strong track record with 
our core infrastructure funds which investors I think do like to see.  
 
We have a big team, a strong team with very varied disciplines and varied backgrounds 
who add value to the team. Across all backgrounds we have got people who have worked 
in the construction world, in the financial world. People who have worked on infrastructure 
deals, energy efficiency deals, across the U.K. and abroad. So, there is a strong team …, 
there is a dedicated Energy Efficiency team with expertise and knowledge in the 
technologies that they are implementing. 163 
 
 
The investors also identified the individuals in the investment team as a key investment 
consideration. At times investors devote significant time and resources to investigate the 
individual’s capabilities even to the extent of undergoing individual interviews, per the second 
investor quote below.  
 
So, it’s key. The people in the organisation that understand what they’re doing. 164   
 
 
We look at the strength of the team, we look at the resources…  
 
To come back on the fund manager, we spend a lot of time also doing due diligence with 
them. Sometimes we have individual interviews with people really to assess their capacity 
and their capability of doing the business. 165 
 
 
Some investors, when investigating a fund manager’s teams expertise, recognised that 
experience and direct knowledge of energy efficiency investments would be difficult to achieve 
and looked at similar type investments in their background. The first quoted below also 
identified that one particular individual in the team had a high level of technical experience and 
did have relevant experience. 
 
There were two factors for us which were important with them. One was the fund manager 
hadn’t been involved in energy efficiency before, but he had been involved in very small-
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scale infrastructure projects, which were small schools; so, a lot of lessons learned in the 
way the contracts and other things were put together.  
 
Secondly, they had internal technical expertise. One of the guys who was assigned to the 
fund for 100% of his time, who had undertaken energy efficiency in other more technical 




Experience of the team [is a factor that is important when placing an investment with a 
fund manager], as I mentioned. They don’t have a track record per se, but having 
experience of investing in similar types of investments… 
   




Often investors are wary of established finance professionals offering a fund management 
service in energy efficiency. They recognise that the personnel may be very experienced in 
their field, however they are not able to trust them when it comes to knowledge of the more 
specific issues in energy efficiency. 
 
But when we look at any Fund there is obviously a whole series of things we look at but 
from my side one of the things we think is very important is that they have some experience 
or knowledge of what they are talking about. Frequently, Funds are opportunistic. There 
are some very smart finance guys, I mean that is great, very smart finance guys trading 
financial products probably do really well. But very smart financial guys doing 
infrastructure or doing energy specific investments I am less convinced. So that is one of 
the things we would like to see in the technical side is that they have some understanding 
of what they are trying to address. 168 
 
 
Yes. We put a significant first hurdle on raw competency. I would suggest that as a result 
of the global financial crisis and the reduction in investment bank activity, there have been 
a relatively large number of what one might describe as “refugees” from banking, who 
have decided it would be quite smart to see if they can make lots of money out of clean tech, 
one way or another. They may be fine at financial transactions and structuring, but know 
nothing about the underlying business, and we don't touch any of them. 
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So, they're silver-tongued, they produce fantastic spreadsheets and economic models, but 
our capacity to trust in them being able to manage the underlying business is not there. So, 
competence is number one. 169          
 
 
6.5.6 Robust processes and risk management 
 
Another consideration is that of the sophistication of the fund managers’ processes and controls 
that any fund manager would require. 
 
[The] process around risk management, control the environment, to ensure that the 
investments are actually conducted in a risk aware environment.170 
 
 
If I’m giving these guys pension scheme money, you have to be comfortable they’ve got the 
right controls and processes and compliance, and regulatory stuff in place. 171 
 
 
Additionally, the understanding of the specific risks associated with the energy efficiency 
sector is identified as another key factor. 
 
I think, again, you’ve got to also have people who understand the risk analysis. At the end 
of the day, our business is all about understanding risks. Anyone can build a spreadsheet 
that calculates an IRR or a return calculation, but to actually understand the risks is the 
value-add.  
 
There are a number of areas of risks in energy efficiency. Counterparty risk and technology 
risk are the two general big ones, but if we move to biomass, there are also feedstock and 
supply chain risks as well. Understanding those risks, understanding when to take them, 
when not to take them and how to understand them is critical.  
 
We spend a lot of time fussing about counterparty risk and looking at enhancements. We 
spend a lot of time worrying about technology risks and laying off that risk contractually 
and how we do that, and ditto on biomass. The last deal we did with this fund was a biomass 
deal. There, we did have feedstock risk and a lot of wood pellets to feed the biomass boilers. 
Laying off the risks there on the supply side was a very key component of the transaction.  
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I think that ‘Risk’ piece and the manager’s understanding of where the pitfalls are and 
what the risk analysis is are absolutely crucial. The ‘Returns’ bit is easy after that. 172 
 
 
6.5.7 Using other fund managers 
 
It is recognised that there are relatively few fund managers that are specifically experienced in 
energy efficiency albeit there are more with relevant backgrounds. In order to assess whether 
the market for energy efficiency investments via funds can be expanded successfully, the 
respondents were asked whether if they have had a good experience with their investment in 
the GIB funds, and with their capital being deployed at a reasonable rate and required returns 
being realised, they would consider investing in other energy efficiency funds run by other 
fund managers that were perhaps less experienced in the sector. 
 
When asked the fund managers were all very positive and feel that there is room to expand the 
number of fund managers operating in the market and that investors would expand their 
investment base to include other fund managers. However, one fund manager did comment 
that some investors may be reluctant only because it could mean yet a further fund manager to 
report on internally and this could be a negative factor. 
 
If you’ve gone down the road and made a decision that “Actually, this is an interesting 
fund because what it says it’s going to do is very helpful to the goals or challenges I have 
as a portfolio manager,” and then that fund delivers, why wouldn’t you be more 
predisposed to try to replicate that in other regions or with other managers, potentially?173 
 
 
Investors: I can’t pretend to understand them completely, but I think they have a number 
of things that they will consider. One is the asset class and the number of asset classes that 
they’re investing in. The other is the number of fund managers they work with.  
 
I’m sure they would consider it if the asset class was right because, obviously, one of the 
things is if they’re investing in a new area, they will never need to become, because that’s 
what they pay us to do, a true expert in the asset class, but they need to understand enough 
about the investment they’ve made to be able to value it in their portfolio. Somebody in 
their team has to understand a little bit about energy efficiency, and obviously, we help 
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them with that. Going forward, after somebody has spent all the time understanding it as 
an asset class, then, if they like it, I’m sure they will invest in it again.  
 
Equally, some are not necessarily constrained, but some do constrain themselves on the 
number of fund managers they work with because, in the same way they have to report on 
asset class, they want to report on fund managers. For a large investor, it might not be that 
attractive an opportunity to invest another small amount of money with another fund 




Well absolutely. I mean can this market expand? Yes. Is it expanding? Yes. I mean when 
we started this there were no energy efficiency funds out there. That’s seven years ago. 
Now, there are at least, I would say, five to seven funds in each country. My personal view 
is that we call this a niche market but really energy efficiency has been around for a very 
long time. 175 
 
 
The investors’ responses were also very positive as they looked at the performance of the 
investments rather than the focus solely on the attributes of the fund managers. Of course, they 
would still need to see that the fund manager had all of its processes in place and they would 
like some related experience but there would be less emphasis on experience of energy 
efficiency specifically. 
 
…if Equitix failed would that stop us investing in energy efficiency funds? I would think at 
this point no because we still see plenty of potential. There is plenty of opportunity to further 
develop the market… 176 
 
 
Absolutely, as long as they have that internal technical expertise. 177 
 
 
Yes, we would. We are extremely open-minded as to with whom we work. But I go back to 
my earlier comment that we do not want to work with refugees from investment banks who 
lack technical competency. 178 
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Some investors did provide some more interesting answers. The following quote from an 
investor respondent at first suggests that they would absolutely invest in further funds run by 
other fund managers as long as the strategy works, as this provides diversification benefits 
which is good practice for investors to achieve. However, he then goes on to state that by doing 
so it would encourage more funds into the market which would, in turn, lower the returns. He 
is focused on maximising returns but of course if the market expands then he would have more 
opportunities to invest in.  
 
So yes, is the answer. If the strategy works and you see good execution delivering returns 
on a strategy, then absolutely. If you invested in another fund that was doing similar then 
you get a bit of diversification benefits. You lose some idiosyncratic manager risk. 
 
The down side on that is are you encouraging more people into the space, and competing 
overall returns down? So, there’s a delicate balance. In some new and innovative areas, 
it’s often better to have more than one manager there, because it just develops the market. 
It becomes less niche and more mainstream. 179  
 
 
Well, I guess the answer is, “Yes.” We’re not tied into Equitix, so the answer is, “Yes.” 
The irony is, though, if Equitix does what they say they’re going to do, we’re probably more 
likely just to invest with Equitix again.  
 
Yes, we would consider [other fund managers], but the practical issue is probably more 
that we won’t. I think the reality is, “Are we more likely to invest in someone else?” We’re 
more likely to invest with someone else if Equitix doesn’t do well. If Equitix doesn’t do well 
through their own fault rather than, obviously, the market, then, well… 180 
 
 
There are also some investors that don’t see an expansion of the market with investors willing 
to invest in other funds, however this appears to be the exception rather than the rule. 
 
No, I don’t. I think it is too small a niche and they will choose something and decide that is 
my choice. Now I don’t make that decision but having seen, I haven’t done a detailed 
analysis but having seen who has invested in similar funds I don’t think, with the exception 
of the Green Investment Bank and the European Investment Bank that I have ever seen the 
same name twice. 181 
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6.6 UK government and EU polices   
 
It is important to gauge investors’ attitudes to government policy as in the main they require a 
clear, stable and consistent regulatory environment. The application of the RHI and ROCs, 
prior to them being phased out, had gone some way towards satisfying this requirement 
allowing some degree of security of revenues on qualifying transactions. It would be useful to 
understand the extent to which the UK government’s and the EU’s aims of reducing CO2 
emissions has an influence over investors’ decision to invest in energy efficiency or whether 




6.6.1 Were carbon reduction policies influential in the investment decision? 
 
It is, perhaps, unsurprising given the traditional view of fiduciary duty of pension fund trustees, 
that they have an obligation to maximise return for a given level of risk, that investors are not 
actively going to invest into energy efficiency just because of the government’s stated aims of 
reducing CO2 emissions. The GIB themselves recognised this fact. 
 
So yes, there is a strong policy desire and drive to improve energy efficiency and reduce 
carbon emissions. That is probably on its own not going to induce investors to take the 
market too seriously. 182 
 
 
The following quotes are from fund managers, the first recognises that the legislation and 
incentives around income security are there to incentivise investors, it being the way it sells its 
fund. The second recognises that they are clearly driving investment and providing security. 
 
[…] that’s certainly a key anchor to our story, and certainly, even beyond energy efficiency, 
but some of the investments that we do in the renewable energy space are absolutely [due 
to policy]… we emphasise all the regimes that are in place around feed-in tariffs, and 
differences of contract, so we do certainly, and the ROC regimes, and we do educate the 
investors into those various regimes that are in place, to capitalise the investment in 
renewable energy and energy efficiency. 183 
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I think at the macro level, the 2025, 2020 targets, the 80% reduction by 2050 certainly is a 
driver. Sort of linked to that are our own institutions' CRC targets. 
 
And also, things that have stimulated the market that we've seen and experienced have been 
the Renewable Heat Incentive, for example, which has really driven investments within 
particularly – well, the RHI covers a whole range of technologies, but particularly within 
the biomass to heat space, and that has certainly driven significant investment, in particular 
the non-domestic energy efficiency area. 
 
But more wider things like the Renewable Obligations Certificates have driven significant 
investment in solar, onshore and offshore wind, which are obviously flowing down, or 
flowed down from the macro level, from the EU targets down to the UK targets, down to 
individual policies within different technology areas. 
 
So that certainly has stimulated attractive, I guess, mechanisms and subsidies, which is 
then filtered down to the investor level, where they can see there's a relatively long-term, 
stable subsidy regime for 20+ years across a number of these technologies, which has been 
attractive, and has stimulated and I believe influenced a number of investors into investing 
into this space. 184 
 
 
There is an interesting perspective from one investor where he feels that the government 
policies have increased the likelihood of investors even bothering to look at the sector. It is a 
rather cynical view as the polices do offer some income security, however in his view they are 
at least making the sector worth a look. 
 
…the policies and the implementation of those policies rather has driven, has increased the 
likelihood of scale. It hasn’t increased the economics but it has increased the likelihood of 
anyone bothering. 185 
 
 
Other investors have recognised that the government incentives are a big driver but the 
underlying economics are also an important factor in the decision, and in some cases the 
investment may have attracted investment without the incentives. 
 
Yes. There’s, kind of, two sides to this. One would prefer the opportunity to have legs and 
to be able to stand on its own and be market driven. That would be the ultimate. But when 
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the Government stands behind something and says, “We’re going to guarantee it to pay 
you this,” it’s hard not to. 186  
 
 
I think they're a big factor. I've mentioned before this bond-like quality. Clearly, they're not 
bonds and clearly you look at examples of Spain and most latterly in the UK with wind 
farms. You have to recognise that there is a certain element of risk there and governments 
do irrational things or are driven by other factors. But, you can only work with what you've 
got and at the moment, that does count as quite a consideration. 187 
 
 
Massively [investment decisions are affected by UK government and EU policies]. 
  
Well, being hard-nosed, knowing that half of your revenue comes from a government 
grandfathered subsidy with price flaws and RPI linkage, makes assessing these investments 
a hell of a lot easier.  
 
Frankly, if some of those subsidies were cut, we’d still be very comfortable investing.  
Let’s say 12% is the target on Equitix. If someone said 8 or 9, purely because of a reduced 
subsidy, we would feel fairly comfortable about that, but having that policy support in the 
UK, and in particular the RHI policy, which is just that little tiny bit more robust than, say, 
the ROC regimes, because we are dealing with smaller-scale stuff on Equitix, helped a lot. 
  
Knowing that the EU carbon reduction targets are there lurking in the background, as well 
as, as we know, the decommissioning going on in things like coal and the problems that 
are never addressed with nuclear, we think that is a good backdrop for renewable investing 
generally let alone energy efficiency.  
 
Energy efficiency, we think, has some particularly accretive policies which help it on a 
relative basis at the moment. 188 
 
 
One of the fund managers did have an investment from one investor that was primarily driven 
by its ESG policy but any investment that did meet it needed also to meet returns that matched 
its long-term liabilities as other investors need to do. It was unusual in that the first criteria was 
its desire to match its ESG policy and then to see if the required returns were achieved rather 
than the return first and if it met the ESG policy it was a bonus. 
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I think that they like to tick that sustainability box, that environmental box. I think they like 
to be able to say, “Yes, we are meeting our target returns.” Sorry, “This is going to deliver 
our target returns, this is going to help us to contribute to our ESG policy.”  
 
One of our current investors, the [XYZ] Pension Fund, they were looking for an 
environmental investment, which is what we are delivering to them. So, they came to us on 
that basis, that they were looking for investment that addressed ESG policy. But then on 
top of that, they are looking to match their long-term liabilities as a pension fund. 
 
They have got to do both, but they came to us on the basis that it was an environmental 
investment. An investor who is looking to make an investment, in fact two, including the 
[…]. [XYZ] was pretty focused on the environmental side and have many restrictions within 
their own investment criteria, as to what is energy efficient, etc., etc., and what investments 
they can and can’t make. So, they are also partially driven by environmental targets. As is 
another investor, they came to us and haven’t made an investment yet but are almost there. 
Based on they were looking for a sustainable investment opportunity. 
 
So yes, I think that that all has affected, to a lesser extent some of our investors, but to a 
quite high extent other investors. It is certainly a factor that they have considered and has 
made them interested in the opportunity. 189 
 
 
There were some investors that were negative about the government targets and took a totally 
commercial view of the investments and were solely concerned with fiduciary duty of matching 
liabilities with returns achieved.  
 
Not really. It wasn’t a major factor. 
 
Ultimately as a pension fund you have very singular fiduciary responsibility, to generate 
the returns that enable you to meet the liability of the pension scheme. So, these things can 
be supportive in the round because you could argue, well without government support the 
economic case for doing these energy efficiencies wouldn’t be there. So, they wouldn’t be 
able to deliver the investment return, so there would be no fund for us to invest in, de, de, 
de, but it’s that kind of thing. 190 
 
 
No. Our clients aren’t here to help the government out around meeting their commitments. 
The fact that the government has made that commitment offers a bit more comfort around 
the long-term sustainability of that incentive regime […] 191 
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The following investor again was negative on whether the government incentives have affected 
their investment decision but went on to express how he could not understand why, while there 
are incentives for generating clean energy, there are no incentives for saving energy in Building 
retrofit type transactions. 
 
I think they’ve given me no encouragement whatsoever. It’s had no influence whatsoever. 
Where’s my tax break? I didn’t get one. 
 
Well, you know, you go and put a load of nasty looking things up in the country up north, 
people get really irritated and you give them a feed-in tariff or a ROC, whereas if you 
actually went to the factories two roads down and you said, “Well, let’s go look at another 
power generation that saves you 40% of your energy efficiency bill”, you may not need to 
put it in the field next door that nobody wants to see. It just seems really odd that there’s 
no incentive to these guys to go save money. Lots of incentive to go and generate it. Hence 
the reason why we’re in both. 192 
 
 
6.6.2 Policies that could ensure or incentivise energy efficiency investment 
 
In the discussions on what policies that force energy efficiency upgrade or incentivise it that 
are in place or could be there were a range of responses. Many references to ‘carrots’ and 
‘sticks’ were made. The GIB representatives interviewed held the strongest opinions on polices 
to force investment, the so called ‘sticks’. 
 
I think what would help more, though, is a combination of a carrot and a stick, where you 
say that a certain energy efficiency target within the sector within technology has to be met. 
For example, the building regulations that are coming in 2018, no new-builds without a 
certain level of installation or energy performance certificate. Rigorously applied but then 
at the same time you give incentives somehow for those who have met them early. 193 
 
 
I think one of the positive elements has been the introduction of the European directive on 
energy efficiency from 2012, which includes the obligation to all companies above 250 
employees to do an energy audit every 4 years, the first one has to be finished by the 5th of 
December this year. For companies which have got a €50m of turnover or more, or net 
assets of €40m and above, those companies have to do it. 
  
The ones which are smaller than that don’t have to do the energy audit, but obviously if 
you can see companies who are quite similar to your size are actually getting a competitive 
                                                          
192 Interview 4.3, Investor (Investment Fund), 29th June 2015. 
193 Interview 1.1, Investor (GIB), 13th April 2015. 
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advantage because they’re cutting their costs then you’re going to want to replicate that as 
well. So, I think that’s going to be a positive move to stimulate energy efficiency because 
all of the companies who do have to do the energy audit have to get a director to sign off 
on it. That means it gives the opportunity for shareholders to then say, “Let’s see that 




Regulation forcing investment has to be a fine line, the point was made again by a GIB 
representative that imposing too much regulation by the UK government could force energy 
intensive industries offshore.  
 
Well I suppose forcing people to invest. So, you have got your domestic energy efficiency, 
the rules on retrofit will drive investment. I guess with industrial equivalents the problem 
is that UK government has to be very careful about driving energy intensive industries 
offshore. How much regulation can you really impose upon people? 
 
Yes, so policy does have a part to play. 195 
 
 
The same GIB representative advocated more subsidies or incentives in the market, the so 
called ‘carrots’, and again mentioned the lack of incentives for pure energy efficiency 
transactions. There is no obvious subsidy that can be made. In his view there is no appetite in 
government for introducing more incentivisation, rather the opposite. The interview was 
conducted in 2015 however the political climate has not changed in this respect. 
 
What does make them take the market seriously is the subsidies in the system that make 
investments as attractive, if not more attractive than investments that might be made 
elsewhere. That is why FIT based projects are attractive. Renewable ROCs and stuff, and 
the challenge with energy efficiency is that actually there is no obvious subsidy, which is 
one of the reasons why it is the least subsidised of all the GIB's asset classes.  
 
What you have got to do is, you have got to introduce some subsidies for demand reduction. 
When I was involved there was no appetite in DECC to do that and I can't believe the 
current administration has any increasing appetite. 
 
I think the whole thinking will be about reducing incentives to stop distorting the market... 
196 
 
                                                          
194 Interview 1.2, Investor (GIB), 15th May 2015. 
195 Interview 1.3, Investor (GIB), 9th June 2015. 




When asked what further policies could be introduced, one of the fund managers offered the 
following opinion. He is again suggesting that there is no subsidy regime for building energy 
efficiency retrofits and it would be a positive should incentives in this area be introduced. He 
is also suggesting that companies do not take seriously the regulations or ‘sticks’ designed to 
encourage investment in energy efficiency whereas subsidies and incentives in other sectors 
are a real driver for investment. 
 
…but also having, I guess, incentives in certain areas which would facilitate and attract 
investment. So, for example, in the building retrofit area, there's no real subsidy regime, 
and I think it's a market where, or certainly a sector within the industry which isn't 
attracting as much investment as one would hope. And in that space, it seems to be there's 
more sticks rather than carrots. 
  
So, in terms of companies having to meet CRC targets, and carbon reduction targets, as 
opposed to there being stimulants and incentives to, and subsidies to really boost their 
investment in certain – whether it's technologies, or you know, energy efficiency measures. 
It seems to be that there's not those drivers, it seems to be there's more sticks and things 
happening in the future to try to – which just doesn't seem to be, people don't, or companies, 
entities don't seem to be taking those seriously. Whereas the other subsidies and incentives 




There were some surprising responses regarding regulation and in particular incentives and 
subsidies. The following quote from a fund manager confirms that he is against any kind of 
subsidy and liked the energy efficiency sector because of the lack of subsidies.  
 
I have to say, and I’m probably unusual as an infrastructure manager, I don’t like, as a 
general rule, regulated businesses and I don’t like subsidies particularly much.  
I understand why they exist and I invest in loads of businesses that are regulated and have 
subsidies, so I can certainly get over those issues, but one of the very attractive features of 
energy efficiency, for me, is that generally, not completely, it’s just totally devoid of 
government support and subsidies. 198 
 
 
An interesting comment was made by an investor who suggested that investment in energy 
efficiency could be incentivised by having favourable tax treatment, effectively making 
                                                          
197 Interview 3.2, Fund Manager, 15th October 2014. 
198 Interview 2.1, Fund Manager, 24th February 2015. 
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investment in an energy efficiency transaction ‘off balance sheet’. He suggested that the 
government should be supporting this view. If it was treated in this way then companies would 
not be dis-incentivised to invest in energy efficiency, adding it to their balance sheet and 
thereby restricting further borrowing. 
 
The other thing that they could do, actually that might change, is put some influence upon 
the way in which people are having to account for this stuff too. If people would like to be 
off balance sheet by having an energy saving structure, then actually endorse it rather than 
say, “We’re going to change the rules over here”, i.e. give it or influence the accountants 
or what have you to make those sorts of decisions more strongly, ie. yes, you will get the 
benefit of this approach if you did this type of stuff. I think that would certainly help. 199 
 
 
6.6.3 Stable policy framework 
 
A very strong, clear and consistent message that came through the interviews from fund 
managers and investors was the need to have a stable policy framework. If the government 
makes a policy with subsidies and incentives, investors want to be able to rely on it without the 
threat that policy could change unduly, affecting the economics of a transaction. The following 
three interview quotes were from fund managers.  
 
I think frankly, having a clearer energy policy would actually [be] a good start.  
 
I think from a UK perspective, I think that’s been… well, that’s a well-rehearsed argument, 
that the UK doesn’t have a clear UK energy policy, and the consequence of that somehow 
therefore hasn’t really driven the investment perhaps, that it could have done, over the 
years. Because there’s been a little bit of uncertainly as to where the policy would go.  
 
So, I think some sort of stability… some sort of clear policy, and stability in that policy, 
regardless of what the political agenda of the respective parties might be, actually, would 
probably go a long way. 200 
 
 
I’m not sure investors would be able to focus on individual policy areas, but I think as a 
general thing, just ‘stability of policy’. That’s the thing that is absolutely key.  
 
                                                          
199 Interview 4.3, Investor (Investment Fund), 29th June 2015. 
200 Interview 2.2, Fund Manager, 17th March 2015. 
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No retrospective subsidy cuts and no changes in subsidy regimes, even future-looking, 
halfway through a process without a clear strategy for why it’s… All that sort of stuff that’s 
not unique to energy efficiency by any means, but just a clear and stable regime.  201  
 
 
I think that having been in the renewables space for the past four or five years, the key thing 
[…] which hinders investment is an unstable regulatory environment. And having 
experienced it through the ROC regime, and leading on now to the CFDs, by not having a 
clear framework under which investors can invest in a range of projects which rely on 
Renewable Obligations support, that has hindered the market and essentially led to delays 
in projects. And a lot, so not just the incentive support mechanism, but also then the 
quantum of support, and the budget which has been allocated to particular technologies. 
 
So, I guess it's having a clear and stable framework, which remains in place over, you 
know, a significant period of time. The Government's learned a little bit, in terms of the 
Renewable Heat Incentive, by having a relatively stable framework, and having 
mechanisms whereby subsidies can be reduced if certain budgets and targets are hit. And 
that's actually worked relatively successfully, because investors can see where potential 
reductions would occur. 202 
 
 
There were equally strong opinions from investors about the need for a stable policy 
environment. 
 
For us this is all about policy should create a consistent, stable, environment because you 
need that for funds to develop, and investment propositions to develop. If people are 
worried that there’s a support package there this year but it won’t be there next year, well 
they won’t be able to deploy the capital in time, or they won’t have enough projects coming 
forward. So, it’s stability and consistency of policy is key because people can then develop 
businesses. Pension schemes are long-term thinkers or long-term investors, so you need 
long-term policy framework to operate in. You don’t want a flip-flop. 203 
 
 
[…] changes are terrible. Retrospective is obviously the worst, but even these changes that 
are announced and happen reasonably quickly, despite having grandfathering periods, are 
difficult.  
 
I mean, it’s probably the same thing that everyone always tells the government. Just have 
a long-term framework in which we can make our investment decisions in that lasts a long 
period of time and have a lot of transparency around when those are going to change and 
timeframes over which they’re going to change. 204 
                                                          
201 Interview 3.1, Fund Manager, 13th November 2014. 
202 Interview 3.2, Fund Manager, 15th October 2014. 
203 Interview 3.5, Investor, 22nd April 2015. 





Okay apart from the obvious thing that there is the support of the policies and maybe as 
they did for renewables to contribute a little bit with subsidies just to kick-start the market. 
I think the most important thing is that we see the stability. 205 
 
 
We think the policy framework is a critical component that assists decision taking. But we 
would distinguish between the direction of policy towards a lower hydrocarbon economy, 
which we consider, now, to be an irreversible commitment, and the actual detail of policy, 
which we think is unclear, uncertain, and therefore, not to be relied upon.  
 
From our point of view, energy efficiency, because it is based on hard economics, is far 
more likely to be reliable than some of the new technologies and processes designed to shift 
us towards a low carbon future. 206 
 
  
                                                          
205 Interview 3.9 & 4.5, Investor, 23rd November 2015. 
206 Interview 4.4, Investor (Investment Fund), 22nd January 2016. 
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7 Findings and Conclusions 
 
As an output of the research each of the research questions needs to be addressed in the context 
of the research findings, provided again below. 
 
What are the barriers to attracting capital investment at scale for energy efficiency in the 
context of institutional and pension fund investment? 
 
1. How do institutional investors decide whether to invest in energy efficiency? 
 
2. Why, when environmental social and economic benefits are apparent, have 
institutional investors not invested in energy efficiency at scale? 
 
3. What are the enabling conditions that would facilitate institutional investors 
investing in energy efficiency at scale? 
 
 
Additionally, the research should be able to inform a refined conceptual model of the 
investment decision making process based on the data analysis so that it can be better 
understood an acted upon. Figure 22 is the conceptual model of the energy efficiency 
investment decision process developed from Clark’s general model of the investment decision 








Figure 22: Energy Efficiency Investment Decision process 
 
After commencing the interviewing process in October 2014, the early findings of the research, 
based on the first six of the semi structured interviews, four being with fund managers and two 
with institutional investors in one of the funds in the study were published (Parker and Guthrie, 
2016). Of the two institutional investor interviews, one was with an advisory firm that invests 
funds on behalf of its client on a discretionary basis. The output was assessed prior to the full 
coding system was developed ,however some emerging trends were apparent. 
 
How energy efficiency projects are classified in investment terms was seen as being important. 
Ambiguity over whether they should be classified as infrastructure, renewable energy or some 
other type of investment in a conservative world of prescribed investment asset classes caused 
at least one investor to decline an investment in the sector and this emerged in the early 
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findings. In ‘an ideal world’ energy efficiency would be viewed as an individual asset class on 
its own account. This is important as the ‘Alternatives’ classification is viewed increasingly as 
a lower risk for the reward gained and higher percentages of funds are allocated to it  
 
Contractual structure of the individual transactions was also seen as an important issue 
emerging from the research at that stage as it provides a level of familiarity to investors. The 
issue of fund manager familiarity was also a very strong theme and at that stage it was 
considered that it may restrict the expansion of the sector. Until the investors understand the 
underlying transactions better themselves, based on them having a greater number successful 
investments, they won’t be able to place less reliance on familiarity of fund managers and 
widen out the number of fund managers able to operate in the sector. Within the first six 
interviewees it appeared that although the Green Investment Bank presence was generally a 
positive incentive for investment by institutional investors, it was by no means universally the 
case and at that stage it was deemed interesting to see whether this theme was continued in the 
wider study. 
 
Figure 23 is an amendment to the original conceptual model of the energy efficiency 
investment decision process provided in Figure 22 and was formulated after the first six 
interviews were analysed. The three main emerging themes have been given prominence, the 
influence of the fund manager which was an originally assumed construct and the two new 
emerging constructs of investment asset class and transaction structure. The other original 
influencing factors remained in the model as it was too early to discount them, however some 
of them were deemed likely to be seen as less important or disappear altogether once the full 







Figure 23: Energy Efficiency Investment Decision process – early findings 
 
 
7.1 Research findings 
 
The research has been focused on five topics into which specific questions have been asked 
and the data has been analysed. Conclusions can be drawn from the outcomes of the data 







7.1.1 Asset allocation and return requirements 
 
This section investigated asset allocation and return requirements of investors in the energy 
efficiency funds under investigation. Energy efficiency investments are not correlated with 
investors’ core investments in equities and bonds, which matches their enhancement strategy 
of investing in non-correlated investments that can enhance the return of the portfolio. 
However, little is known about the performance of energy efficiency investments, which 
hinders the analysis of the investment class by investors and their investment managers when 
or if they were to consider an energy efficiency investment within their asset allocation 
strategy, which vary in sophistication. A degree of performance information would be required 
with even the most basic allocation strategy. Investors to date appear to have been relying on 
their investment managers or fund managers to educate and advise them on the risks associated 
with such an investment. 
 
Ideally, for energy efficiency investments to thrive they would ideally need to become an asset 
class of their own within the ‘Alternatives’ asset classification. Investors and their advisers 
would be familiar with the underlying technology and potential investments are contractually 
packaged in a consistent manner preferably in a standard contractual framework with standard 
approaches, with a ready secondary market. If they continue to match investors’ inflation-
linking requirement to match their obligations then the market for energy efficiency project 
would be sustained and the sectors potential for CO2 emission reduction may have a chance of 
being realised. 
 
However, this situation is a long way from being a reality. Although investors are confused 
about the nature of energy efficiency projects, the prevailing asset classification appears to be 
as a sub class of infrastructure, although some investors mis-classify them as renewable energy 
and some in the study as private equity due to the similarity of one of the funds in question to 
private equity funds. This leads to investors requiring private equity level returns whereas the 
risk return approach to assessing these investments should over time result in a lower return 
being required when more information is known about the technology and investment 




The diverse nature of the underlying investment would appear to be hindering the development 
of a homogeneous asset class. One of the investment managers was very clear that he valued 
the contractual structuring of the investments within the fund as having a ‘project finance 
wrap’.  This was very familiar to him with all the contractual protections that he was used to, 
with cash flows for performing assets being made in a familiar way, though a ‘Special Purpose 
Vehicle’ structure when investing in infrastructure. This represented a very disciplined way of 
structuring a transaction. One of the other funds takes a similar approach when financing an 
ESCO through Energy Performance Contracting. 
 
The return from energy efficiency projects is more than adequate to satisfy investors, however 
it would appear that the risks remain an issue when assessing investments on a risk return basis. 
A number of risks remain that need to be addressed, such as lack of understanding of the 
underlying technology, the reliance on non-governmental cash flows and speed of deployment 
or perceived speed of deployment which may be an issue for new entrants that do not have a 
history of investing in infrastructure.  
 
If we can conclude that ‘Alternatives’ are becoming a ‘safer’ investment in risk terms or at 
least more investors are seeking to invest in ‘Alternatives’, a higher allocation of funds will be 
made available and this trend can only increase for energy efficiency investments once there is 
a track record and the expected returns have been realised over a period of time. 
 
 
7.1.2 Low carbon investments 
 
The research demonstrates that, in general investors have formulated and implemented low 
carbon or (SRI) strategies, with one or two exceptions, and that is likely to be reflected in the 
wider investor population as a whole. However, there has been no acceptance of SRI strategies 
as the primary driver in the decision-making process when considering alternative investments. 
The maximisation of financial return will always be the primary consideration. There was no 
significant evidence of the wider social and environmental benefits to the pension holders and 
other ultimate beneficiaries of the investments being  considered equally alongside financial 
value maximisation, as they can provide positive investment impacts other than the purely 
financial. There has, however, been a growing view among the investment and academic 
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community that ESG issues should be considered in the investment decision-making process 
in this way. 
 
Where energy efficiency investments can gain some advantage is where they are one of a 
number of competing investment opportunities in a similar asset class, be it infrastructure, 
renewable energy or private equity. Investors would tend to stick with what is familiar. When 
faced with choosing between, say, two infrastructure investments with the same returns and 
risk/reward characteristics, one being with the same fund manager they have previously 
invested with in a familiar sector and the other being in energy efficiency, then the investment 
in energy efficiency may be chosen due to its carbon reduction potential. 
 
It appears that some fund managers are increasingly being asked to demonstrate the full 
spectrum of (ESG) aspects to their investments, indicating that these issues are increasingly 
finding their way into the policies of pension funds of large corporates and public entities. 
Energy efficiency investments can be presented in a favourable way in this respect. 
 
 
7.1.3 Decision to invest/not to invest 
 
There are many factors that influence the decision by investors to invest in a particular asset or 
investment type. This category of inquiry investigates specific issues that led investors to 
commit to investing in the GIB energy efficiency funds. By far the most commonly quoted 
issue that influenced investors was the experience and familiarity of the fund manager. This 
issue is in fact an individual category of inquiry being pursued in the research, however it is 
worth stating that this appears to be a major influencing factor in the decision to invest.   
 
Interestingly, the involvement of the GIB was not universally seen as an influencing factor in 
the decision to invest in the funds. Again, the fund management team members felt that the 
GIB did attract investors into the funds but it was the investors and those representing investors 
that were not so reliant on their involvement. It was seen as important for some investors as 
they viewed the GIB as UK sovereign involvement and they were able to demonstrate ‘proof 
of concept’. This will be less of an influence going forward with the recent sale of the GIB by 
the UK government. Additionally, it appears that some investors were able to discuss their 
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potential investment with the GIB and gain additional comfort from that process. However, 
there was also a strong opinion that the GIB involvement did not necessarily influence 
investment decision making but it was the other factors involving the fund manager’s team, the 
risk/reward assessment of the investment and the contractual structure of the transactions that 
were far more important. 
 
The issue of contractual structure of the transactions was raised by a number of participants. 
Where a fund manager has traditionally operated in the infrastructure world they are used to 
contractually structuring transactions in a prescribed manner. This gives investors comfort as 
they can understand very well the cash flow of the projects and risk associated with achieving 
their financial returns. These fund managers had tended to contractually package their energy 
efficiency projects in the same way, enabling investors to gain some comfort from this, and in 
one particular case the interviewee said that they were more comfortable as they could use the 
same lawyer that they use on infrastructure transactions to undertake the legal due diligence. 
Structuring transactions in this way is more straightforward on the ESCO EPC model, as these 
lend themselves to the infrastructure type contractual structure with setting up of a Special 
Purpose Vehicle company; however, those fund managers who have concentrated on the 
biomass type of deals have also actively created a familiar contractual arrangement in their 
deals which has appealed to investors. 
 
The level of financial return made was certainly a factor that attracted investors and it was the 
government incentives that drove the higher level of returns that could be made. Investors will 
view investments in terms of perceived risk and potential return. As a new sector, investment 
in energy efficiency will most certainly represent a risk, but for the reasons outlined previously, 
investing in a fund run by an experienced or familiar fund manager reduces or manages that 
risk, certainly until the investors become more familiar with the sector themselves. Matched 
with this the potential returns are considered high and in particular when the investments utilise 
certain technologies, biomass for example, that attract government subsidies such as the 
Renewable Heat Incentive and Renewable Obligation Certificates (ROCs) that provide a 
significant proportion of a project’s revenues in a secure way, making the risk reward profile 
more attractive. ROCs are being replaced by an alternative government incentive scheme 
‘Contracts for Difference’ (CfDs) and it is yet to be seen whether this will prove as attractive 
to the sector. However, there is also the possibility of taking advantage of Yield Compression 




The investment appeared so attractive to at least one investor divested from mainstream 
equities to invest in one of the energy efficiency funds in what they viewed as a relatively low 
risk due to the profile of the fund manager and a part ring fenced revenue stream by virtue of 
the government subsidies securing index linked cash flows. This need for stable index linked 
cash flows was shared by other participants in the research. When asked if they would invest 
again in future funds that didn’t necessarily have a GIB involvement, all the responses were 
positive. It was the fundamentals of the fund and the risk/reward assessment of the investment 
that was important although one fund manager thought the absence of the GIB in future funds 
may in itself lead investors to question why this would be the case in their investment appraisal 




7.1.4 Fund Manager 
 
Issues relating to the fund manager as a factor of the investment decision making process form 
a separate category of inquiry within the research and it seems that there is some justification 
for this which is reflected in the findings of the research.  
 
The investment strategy being offered by the fund manager is key, as it needs to be able to 
match the investor’s own investment aspirations and links clearly into another major area of 
concern, whether the correct level of risk is being taken for the amount of return being realised. 
There has been a concern expressed that some fund managers are too diversified and need to 
be more focused in their approach to energy efficiency investments. This may be difficult if 
there are few market opportunities and fund managers are looking to raise significant funds 
from institutional investors. They may feel that they would have difficulty investing the funds 
promptly if it was focused on energy efficiency and may struggle to find experienced personnel, 
however it is clearly an important issue as one investor did suggest that they would give more 
weight to the strategy than direct experience in the sector. 
 
Leading on from the previous comment, fund managers need to be able to demonstrate that 
they have sufficient knowledge of the market and a credible pipeline which is difficult to 
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achieve. The fund managers felt that they were able to do this to some extent by exploiting the 
existing investors in their established mainstream infrastructure funds. However, a fund 
manager must be able to demonstrate a credible pipeline as it is essential for attracting 
investment.  
 
Track record of the fund managers’ team is also an important assessment criterion for investors. 
If this is being considered solely in energy efficiency terms then it is difficult to achieve for the 
reasons previously stated, however it appears to be approached more along the lines of fund 
managers having met investment returns and of having deployed capital successfully in related 
fields such as infrastructure and property. The fund managers certainly believe that they are 
able to demonstrate that they can transfer that background into the energy efficiency sector. 
One investor identified the sector currently as very inflexible and therefore choosing a fund 
manager is important for the very reason that investors will not be able to exit investments very 
easily or not at all as there is no liquid market to do so. There are no ready investors to sell to, 
therefore investors will most likely be stuck with the initial fund manager. The decision on the 
fund manager is therefore a crucial one. 
 
Familiarity with the fund manager and investor’s existing relationships with them was seen as 
important. Investors’ knowledge of the team members and their background helped 
enormously. The fund manager had therefore previously demonstrated its professionalism, 
depth of resource, robustness of its processes and its management of risk. Above all the fund 
manager would have already convinced investors of its level of integrity and a level of trust 
existed between them and the investor.  With the GIB energy efficiency funds being very early 
funds in a new asset class or sector, trust between fund manager and investor is crucial.  
 
Finally, generally most investors were positive when asked whether they would invest in 
further energy efficiency funds runs by unfamiliar fund managers who were inexperienced in 
energy efficiency investments, assuming of course that they had a positive experience and 
made or bettered the returns expected. This would ultimately assist in encouraging more fund 
managers into the sector and more institutional investors to make an investment. 
 
Some respondents did provide some more interesting answers with one investor at first 
suggesting that he would absolutely invest in further funds run by other fund managers as long 
as the strategy works, as this provides diversification benefits, which is good practice for 
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investors to achieve. However, he then went on to state that by doing so it would encourage 
more funds into the market which would, in turn, lower the returns. He was focused on 
maximising returns but of course if the market expands then he would have more opportunities 
to invest in. 
 
One of the fund managers made the point that large investors need not only to report internally 
on the performance of investments made, but also on the overall performance of the fund 
manager. His view was that as the fund manager is managing other infrastructure funds that 
investors may also have invested in, they as a fund manager of an energy efficiency fund 
become more attractive to its existing investor base, as those investors would not have to report 
internally on an additional fund manager. They would have to do this should they have invested 
in an alternative energy efficiency fund run by a different fund manager with whom they do 
not already have funds invested. This may be an understandable viewpoint from a particular 
fund manager with a number of funds under management that likes to feel its investors would 
trust them with alternative investment types, but in the research this has not been echoed by 
any of the investors or those representing investors. 
 
 
7.1.5 UK government and EU polices 
 
It is important to gauge investors’ attitudes to government policy as in the main they require a 
clear, stable and consistent regulatory environment. The application of the Renewable Heat 
Incentive and Renewable Obligation Certificates had gone some way towards satisfying this 
requirement, allowing some degree of security of revenues on qualifying transactions. This has 
been borne out by the responses given on this issue. The incentives and subsidies on offer only 
apply to certain technologies and leaves a whole swathe of potential energy efficiency 
transactions in the building retrofit area without any government support. This has surprised 
some of the research participants, given the governments commitments to reduce CO2 
emissions. Comments such as ‘there appears to be more sticks than carrots’ were used by more 
than one participant. Government policies and commitments have influenced the investors’ 
decision processes,however the government’s decision to change the incentive regime by 
discontinuing ROCs is running the risk of destabilising the policy landscape and in turn 




It wasn’t exclusively the case that all of the early participants agreed that government 
commitments, policies and incentives had an effect on their investment decision making 
processes, as some investors discounted this as a factor and asserted that all their decisions 
were driven by the level of returns. 
 
 
7.2 Conclusions and development of the conceptual model 
 
The research has focused on non-domestic energy efficiency in the context of energy efficiency 
funds and how to increase institutional investment at scale, therefore the revised conceptual 
model reflects both the investment landscape and the fact that the investment decision concerns 
investment into a fund and not as a direct investment.  
 
The conceptual model of the energy efficiency decision making process required further 
refinement from its position after the first six interviews were carried out and at the time the 
research concluded. Further insights have been gleaned into the issues in order to develop and 
refine it. It is apparent that return and risk play an extremely important part in an investor’s 
decision making process generally and that of course applies to investments in energy 
efficiency as it does to any investment. Therefore, within the revised conceptual model, return 
requirements remain an influencing factor but not highlighted as being specially related to an 
investment in energy efficiency.  
 
Standardisation has been added to the model again as an influencing factor but not highlighted. 
This is important for a number of reasons. Firstly, if the underlying processes, protocols and 
contracts are standardised then it would facilitate a more distinctive investment and allow 
energy efficiency to develop as a definite sub asset class of infrastructure, or ideally as an 
individual asset class in its own right. Ambiguity over whether energy efficiency transactions 
are infrastructure, renewable energy or some other type of investment in a conservative world 
of prescribed investment asset classes has caused at least one investor to decline an investment 
in the sector. Secondly, contractual structure is clearly an important issue for investors and 
standardisation of approach will allow transaction contractual structures attractive to investors 
to be applied more readily. Finally, once a fully standardised approach is established, it will 
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facilitate a transition from institutional investment in an energy efficiency fund to direct 
investment, as it will increase familiarity with the asset and increase the number of financeable 
transactions. 
 
ESG considerations are coming into play in the value placed on them by trustees and individual 
pension holders. There is a debate going on among academics and practioners as to whether 
they should be a fiduciary issue alongside maximisation of return and in some instances take 
precedence over return. However, the research has not supported this view since those 
interviewed must comply with current expectations, although ESG issues are a consideration, 
but only in as much as they don’t compromise return. For this reason, ESG consideration does 
not feature in the revised conceptual model as an influencing factor in its own right but the 
existing influencing factor ‘Internal low carbon and sustainable policies’ is amended to 
‘Internal low carbon, sustainable policies and ESG considerations’. The investment strategy of 
the fund managers and funds they manage has also emerged as a key issue in the decision to 
invest. Perhaps this is an obvious outcome, however the degree to which the fund is focused 
on energy efficiency as opposed to other forms of green investment is key to instil sufficient 
confidence that the fund managers have the expertise and knowledge required to be successful 
in the sector. 
 
The contractual structure of the individual transactions is also an important issue that was clear 
from the early findings and from the wider research, as this provides a level of familiarity to 
investors, as does the very strong reliance on experienced and familiar fund managers. This 
issue of fund manager familiarity may restrict the expansion of the sector in the short term until 
investors themselves understand the underlying transactions better, based on them having a 
greater number of successful investments (via funds) and the continuing standardisation of the 
underlying transactions. This will place less reliance on familiarity of fund managers and widen 
out the number of fund managers able to operate in the sector and will ultimately allow direct 
investment to be made confidently as previously discussed. Transaction contractual structure 
and fund manager familiarity remain as significant influencing factors and are highlighted in 
the revised conceptual model. 
 
Although the GIB presence is generally a positive incentive for investment by institutional 
investors, it is by no means universally the case, however with the GIB now in private 
ownership it is the UK government involvement, rather than the GIB, that is an influencing 
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factor. The GIB influencing factor in the refined conceptual model has been amended 
accordingly. UK & EU legislation, CO2 reduction targets and competing investment 
opportunities remain important factors.  
 
Finally, the preferences for certainty and similarity have come through strongly, related to both 
the investments to be made and in respect of the fund manager. These two habits of prudence 
have therefore increased their prominence in the revised conceptual model.  
 
The revised and refined conceptual model of the energy efficiency investment decision process 








7.2.1 Review of the code frequency 
 
Of the 70 codes identified in the research and the 1,465 code assignments, Table 8 indicates 
the top 16 codes in terms of the frequency that they were assigned in the transcripts. This quasi-
statistical view in general supports the conclusions made in the research. The highest frequency 
is the level of return which would be expected and would be applicable to any investment 
decision. Asset classification has come through significantly as an issue concerning investors 
and their decision to invest, as has the fund manager in a number of different coding 
classifications. Code 0408 deals with fund or investment strategy of the fund manager, 0401 
with the fund manager track record, 04 familiarity with the fund manager and 0402 its technical 
capability. Code 0901 Reliance is associated with trust in the fund manager. Although code 
0505 Contractual structure is not near the top of the ‘top sixteen’ it is still highly referenced in 
the transcripts and as this research is qualitative in nature the researcher has highlighted this 
issue in the revised conceptual model as being seen as sufficiently important by the interview 





Table 8: The top sixteen codes in terms frequency of allocation  
 
 
01 03 Level of return 79
05 02 Asset classification (eg infra, renewables, private equity) 59
04 08 Fund Strategy / Fund Manager size 51
04 01 Track record in infra, Renewable energy and EE 41
01 01 Risk/reward - Fiduciary Duty 38
02 03 Governement incentives 38
07 01 Positive allowance for low carbon investments 29
04 Familiarity with (and capability of) the fund manager 28
04 02 Technical capability of team 28
02 01 Stable regulatory environment 27
09 02 Preference for certainty 27
09 03 Preference for similarity 27
05 04 Risk/return approach (safer investment, higher allocation) 25
05 05 Contractural structure 23
05 08 EE investment models eg ESCO, Biomass etc 23
09 01 Reliance 23
Code or sub code Frequency
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7.3 Response to research questions 
 
What are the barriers to attracting capital investment at scale for energy efficiency in the 
context of institutional and pension fund investment? 
 
1. How do institutional investors decide whether to invest in energy efficiency? 
 
The research reveals that, as in any type of investment, the level of return for a given level of 
risk is a key consideration for investors. They will weigh up the risks and as energy efficiency 
investments are a relatively new investment opportunity then the level of risk is not yet well 
known. The research investigates investment into a fund that is managed by a fund manager 
rather than direct investment, as institutional investors would neither have the level of 
understanding or the level of personnel required to acquire the necessary expertise or the will 
to acquire it for such an asset class.  
 
For investors to invest in energy efficiency it will need to be either part of a defined asset class, 
such as infrastructure, or an individual asset class in its own right. The current position has led 
at least one investor to decline investing as it did not know how to classify it for its expected 
return requirements, etc. Currently investments made at scale have been through a fund 
manager and this is the focus of this research. Familiarity, experience and competence of the 
fund manager are key in this respect, together with the fund investment strategy. In time, as 
standard processes and protocols are introduced into the sector, a more distinct asset class can 
be demonstrated, with known levels of risk and greater volume of transactions. When this is 
achieved, direct investment could be made into individual deals or portfolios of deals, and 
investment at scale could be achieved through securitisation.  
 
 
2. Why, when environmental social and economic benefits are apparent, have 
institutional investors not invested in energy efficiency at scale? 
 
For investment to be made at scale, institutional investors need to be making significant 
investment. The research has demonstrated that this has not occurred to date as the transactions 
available have been small in nature with no standard approach to how they are structured. 
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Investors do not have the in-house capability and experience in the sector to adequately assess 
the risks involved. There also has to be a sufficient number of viable projects to invest in. This 
is why the GIB took the decision to create and invest in a number of funds to ‘kick start’ 
institutional investment and ultimately develop a standardised investment asset class. Although 
there is a debate taking place, ESG consideration is not yet a key factor in driving investment 
decisions, except for certain niches investors. 
 
 
3. What are the enabling conditions that would facilitate institutional investors 
investing in energy efficiency at scale? 
 
From assessing the issues that have been discussed within this research dissertation a number 
of enabling conditions that would facilitate institutional investment in energy efficiency at scale 
have become apparent.  
 
• Development of an asset class or distinct sub asset class so that investors can understand 
where energy efficiency transactions sit within their portfolio. 
 
• In order to facilitate the development of the asset class, further standardisation of 
processes and protocols underlying the transactions should be encouraged building on 
the work of the Investor Confidence Project.  
 
• Standardisation will also breed familiarity among investors and this would encourage 
wider participation by other fund managers and direct investment into the sector. 
 
• Standardisation of processes could be extended to the standardisation of contractual 
transaction structures, which has come through as an important issue for investors and 
would facilitate an expansion of the sector.   
 
• Encourage initiatives, such as DEEP, that provide energy efficiency transaction 
performance data to prospective investors which will further facilitate the securitisation 
of energy efficiency loans, ie the packaging of loans into a larger bond issuance for 




• In order for wider participation by fund managers and direct investment by institutional 
investors, there needs to be a greater number of larger and financeable projects or 
packaged projects. The underlying standardisation of processes will also encourage this 
development. 
 
• While the GIB involvement has encouraged institutional investment into their initial 
funds, it was not universally seen as a reason for investment but undoubtedly it was a 
positive factor. As the GIB has now been sold to a bank in the private sector, the UK 
government do not have a vehicle to expand their involvement. However, continued 
involvement of the UK government would facilitate the continued expansion of the 
sector. Perhaps a UK government loan / investment guarantee scheme would provide 
sufficient support. 
 
• Government incentives for the investment in building retrofit schemes should be 
introduced to indicate further government support for energy efficiency investment as 
has been the case for renewable energy. 
 
• Encouragement of investment regimes that incentivise investors to commit to the sector 
such as the use of Efficiency Services Agreement allowing for off balance sheet 
treatment for the client, the provision of index-linked returns to match investors’ 
obligations and some form of government support. 
 
 
The research outcome is just the beginning. Rather than the energy efficiency chasm having 
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Appendix A: Examples of Energy Efficiency transactions made by each of the GIB funds 
 
 
GIB Fund – Equitix 
 
Outlined below are Equitix’s investments, which all involve a biomass element which attracts 
government subsidies. They do look at building retrofit projects but their main focus is firmly 
on deals that attract subsidies.  
 
 
Roundwood Energy Limited - Biomass boiler 
 
The transaction involved a £10m investment via Roundwood Energy Limited (Roundwood) 
which replaced inefficient heating systems, in both public and private community facilities, 
with biomass boilers, refer to Figure 25. Roundwood is an energy services company and was 
responsible for financing, installing, maintaining and fuelling the new biomass boilers for 20 
years. It was supported by its technology partner, Woodpecker Energy Limited, a well-




(GIB, 2013a)  Source: GIB, 2013a 
 




The boilers are fuelled by sustainably sourced wood pellets and as a result CO2 emissions are 
expected to be cut by around 150,000 tonnes CO2 over the 20-year life of the investment. 
Sustainable ENplus A1 standard pellets are being used which conform to a standard which is 
regulated by the European Biomass Association. (GIB, 2013a) 
 
 
Tomatin Distillery - Biomass boiler 
 
This £1.2m transaction involved the installation of a new biomass boiler replacing the previous 
heavy-fuel oil usage of the distillery whisky making processes, refer to Figure 26.  It was 
installed in conjunction with a company called Balcus as part of an Energy Supply Contract 
and is projected to improve the distillery’s carbon emissions by over 80%, saving an estimated 
96,500 tonnes of CO2 over the 20-year life of the investment. This transaction also makes use 




(GIB, 2013b)  Source: GIB, 2013b 
 








Bernard Matthews’ Turkey Farms - Biomass boiler 
 
A £24.5m investment to finance the installation of c.179 new biomass boilers installed across 
21 farms in Norfolk, Suffolk and Lincolnshire, covering 40 per cent of Bernard Matthews' 
estate. The dry heat biomass systems also produced a number of benefits due to the improved 
circulation of heat, including reduced ammonia levels, reduced ventilation requirements, and 
increased litter (bedding) quality. (GIB, 2014a) 
 
 
Sheffield CHP - Biomass boiler 
 
A £30m investment to build a new Combined Heat and Power plant incorporating a biomass 
boiler which is expected to cut CO2 emissions by approximately 12,700 tonnes of CO2e per 
year. The plant has been constructed by a specialist District Heating Design & Build company. 
Since being operational the project sells electricity into the grid under a long-term power 
purchase agreement. (GIB, 2015a) 
 
 
Nottingham CHP - Biomass boiler 
 
A further £30m investment involving the building of new Combined Heat and Power plant 
incorporating a biomass boiler. The new plant is expected to generate 6.5MW of renewable 
electricity and to cut CO2 emissions by approximately 8,400 tonnes of CO2e per year. This 




Expansion of Wick district heating scheme - Biomass boiler 
 
A £10m acquisition of Ignis Biomass Limited, the owner and operator of a 3.5MW combined 
heat and power plant and associated district heating scheme, supplying heat via a biomass 
fuelled plant, in Wick in the north of Scotland. The scheme originally supplied local facilities 
such as Pulteney Distillery and Caithness General Hospital along with domestic residences. 
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There are further plans to expand the district heating scheme by implementing a plan to build 
four new smaller scale stand-alone combined heat and power systems for major heat users in 
and around Wick. (GIB, 2016a) 
 
 
GIB Fund – Sustainable Development Capital Ltd (SDCL) 
 
SDCL has approached the issue of investment in energy efficiency in a very different way to 
Equitix, having embraced the EPC ESCO methodology and adapted it to benefit from the 
performance guarantee from an ESCO, while offering a performance-based energy savings 
arrangement with the building owner via an Efficiency Services Agreement or Energy Services 
Agreement (ESA), refer to Figure 27. This is akin to the Metrus Efficiency Services Agreement 
where the end user pays for energy saved, however in the SDCL model there is a Special 
Purpose Vehicle (SPV) company that is central to the contractual structure. Figure 19 illustrates 
the typical contractual structure that SDCL employ in their transactions. Due to the nature of 
the contractual relationships, the payments to the SPV by the Building Owner are operating 
expenses and therefore the assets are ‘off balance sheet’, which is an important issue when 
Building Owners consider these types of transactions. The majority of SDCL investments are 
structured in this way however they will also invest in biomass projects such as the Lincolnshire 
Poultry Farm transaction as outlined below. 
 
 
(Plumbridge, 2011)   Source: Plumbridge, 2011 
 
Figure 27: SDCL energy efficiency contractual structure 
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Kingspan - Building retrofit 
 
SDCL entered into an Energy Services Agreement transaction with Kingspan, a manufacturer 
of high performance insulation and other products for the building industry, to retrofit its UK 
industrial facilities with the aim of reducing its energy consumption by approximately 15%. 
The transaction involved a £5m investment, with Johnson Controls Inc as an ESCO installing 
energy metering, building management systems, lighting upgrades with full digital addressable 
lighting interface control systems, compressed air system upgrade and fan optimisation 
measures. The full programme is estimated to save over 4,500 tonnes of CO2e emissions per 
year across the portfolio of facilities. (SDCL, 2014a)   
 
 
NCP - Building retrofit 
 
SDCL entered into a £10m ESA arrangement, backed by a UK government guarantee, with 
National Car Parks (NCP) to install new energy efficient lighting schemes at 149 locations 
nationwide. A second phase of the project involved a further 110 car parks. The two phases of 
the project combined cut NCP’s energy use by an average of 70%, cutting its Carbon emissions 
by over 12,000 tonnes of CO2e per year. NCP expects to save around £34m over the lifetime 
of both phases of the project. (SDCL, 2014b, GIB, 2016b)   
 
 
Citi - Building retrofit 
 
SDCL entered into a £5.2m ESA arrangement with global banking group Citi to install two 
1.4MW CHP systems expected to generate 24,000 MWh per year to power a data centre in 
London. The CHP systems will generate 71% of the facility’s electricity requirements which 
were previously 100% supplied via the national grid with back-up diesel generators. The 
project will also involve the installation of energy efficiency cooling units and efficiency 
improvements to the building’s air conditioning system serving the building computer servers. 
(Better Buildings, 2014, GIB, 2014b) 
191 
 
Poultry Farms - Biomass boiler 
 
An investment to finance the installation of 60 biomass energy centres at Moy Park farms in 




Santander - Building retrofit 
 
A £17.5m investment into a project that will install 90,000 new LED lamps in Santander’s 
entire UK estate of 800 UK branches and 14 office buildings using an ESA arrangement. The 
project will generate more than 50% energy savings and cut carbon emissions by more than 
7,000 tonnes CO2e per year for the UK’s fifth largest retail bank. (GIB, 2015c) 
 
 
Bart’s - Energy centre 
 
A £4.5m investment to fund a 3.3MW Gas fired Combined Cooling Heating and Power 
(CCHP) system with 250W absorption cooling at St Bartholomew’s Hospital in London. Under 
the transaction Bart’s Health NHS Trust were guaranteed a year one saving of £1.4m (33%) of 
their utility charge with no upfront cost and CO2e savings of 18,300 Tonnes (69%). The 
transaction was complicated by the fact that the hospital was a Private Finance Initiative (PFI) 
scheme and was run via a PFI Special Purpose Vehicle Project company, Capital Hospitals 
Limited (CHL) as the contractual arrangement had to include that entity. The contractual 
arrangement in Figure 28 indicates how this was achieved at the same time as providing a 
performance-based contract akin the Energy Services Agreement with Skanska as the Energy 





Source: CHL, 2015 
 
Figure 28: Bart's energy centre contractual structure 
 
(CHL, 2015)   
 
Bart’s Health NHS Trust issued a Variation Enquiry (VE) and accepted a Variation 
Confirmation (VC) from the PFI Project Company CHL. It pays for its Managed Service for 
utilities contingent on performance which is where it is similar to the Energy Services 
Arrangement. Ultimately the Funder SPV, which in this case is the SDCL SPV, receives a 
monthly payment derived from the Managed Service Payment in the same way as it receives 
the ongoing payments from the Building end user in the traditional ESA contractual 
arrangement. (CHL, 2015) 
 
 
GIB Fund – Aviva 
 
Aviva’s approach to energy efficiency investment involves a different focus to both Equitix 
and SDCL. It works closely with NHS Trusts to invest in Energy Centre energy efficiency 
upgrades. Aviva structure the transactions in a way that the end user takes the operational risks 
of the deal and therefore their funding attracts a lower return. However, it is perceived as being 
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a safe investment with the only real risk to the investor being that of default by the sub-
sovereign counterparty in the transaction, the NHS Trust.  
 
 
Addenbrooke’s - Energy centre 
 
Aviva made a £36m investment in a new Energy Centre for Cambridge University Hospitals 
NHS Foundation Trust. The technology installed is comprehensive and includes a Combined 
Heat and Power engine, biomass boilers, efficient dual fuel boilers and heat recovery from 
medical waste incineration. The project also includes energy conservation measures such as 
new lighting and improved heat and lighting controls, and is for a 25-year contract term. It is 
expected to save the Trust over £20m in energy costs and 25,000 of CO2 savings over the term. 
(GIB, 2013d, GIB, 2013e, Aviva, 2012) 
 
 
Cheltenham Hospital - Energy centre 
 
The project involves a £2.2m investment by the Aviva fund, alongside an £900k grant from the 
Department of Health to finance the installation of a 1.3MW combined heat and power unit as 
Cheltenham General Hospital. The transaction is structured in such a way that the Trust does 
not have to make any upfront capital investment and the repayments will be paid for from the 
cost saving generated by the reduced electricity consumption. It is expected to cut the Trust’s 
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Crossing the Energy Efficiency Chasm: An Assessment of the Barriers to Institutional 
Investment in Energy Efficiency at Scale 






This document outlines proposed PhD research to be carried out by Martin Parker on a part-
time basis through the University of Cambridge (contact: mob 07764 569392, email 
mcfp2@cam.ac.uk). The research aims to engage with institutional investors to investigate 




Martin Parker, chartered engineer and surveyor, director of an international financial 
institution working in infrastructure and project finance. 
 
3. Research questions and sub questions 
 
In order to meet the research aims the researcher seeks to address the following questions: 
 
What are the barriers to attracting capital investment at scale for energy efficiency in the 
context of institutional and pension fund investment? 
 
How do institutional investors decide whether to invest in energy efficiency? 
 
Why, when environmental social and economic benefits are apparent, have 
institutional investors not invested in energy efficiency at scale? 
 
What are the enabling conditions that would facilitate institutional investors 
investing in energy efficiency at scale? 
 
4. Research method  
 
The research method will involve the examination of an organisational case study of a Green 
Investment Bank (GIB) backed energy efficiency fund or funds. The fund(s) will have 
matched or bettered the initial £50m investment by the GIB with funds raised from 
institutional investors. The research method will involve: 
 
• A series of semi-structured interviews with key relevant members of the fund 
organisation and of a number of institutional investors that either have invested in the 
fund or were approached to do so and are integral to the investment decision making 
process. Anticipated duration 1 hr per interview. 
• Examination of relevant corporate documentation, both publicly available and 
potentially confidential internal documents, viewed by agreement, which has a 





A member of the fund organisation would need to coordinate the research process with the 
researcher identifying the most appropriate organisations and personnel within them to take 




It’s recognised that much of the information to be discussed and potentially viewed will be 
confidential to the organisation concerned, the organisation and interviewees will remain 







Centre for Sustainable Development 
 
Department of Engineering 
 
 
Participant Consent Form 
 
Crossing the Energy Efficiency Chasm: An Assessment of the Barriers to Institutional 




Name of Researcher: Martin Parker 
 
1.  Please tick box 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated October 2014  
for the above study.  I have had the opportunity to ask questions and have  
these answered satisfactorily. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, 
without giving any reason, without my legal rights being affected. 
 
3. I agree that the interview be audio-recorded. 
 
3a.     I do not want the interview to be audio-recorded but agree for hand written notes to be 
   taken instead. 
 
4.     I agree that data collected in the interview will be stored securely for 5 years 
 




 ________________________   _____________________  
 ________________________  





 ________________________   _____________________  
 ________________________  
 Name of Research Team member  Date   Signature 
(Please print) 
 















Interview guide for semi structured interviews with institutional investors. 
 
 




• Issue of CO2 emissions 
• The UK governments commitment to CO2 emission reduction 
• The significance of Energy Efficiency investment. 
 
 
Aims of the research and main research question 
 
• What are the barriers to attracting capital investment at scale for energy efficiency in 
the context of institutional and pension fund investment? 
 
 
Research method and methodology 
 
• Case studies of Green Investment Bank energy efficiency funds 
• Review by semi structured interviews and examination of transaction documents 
• The interviews will be audio-recorded (by agreement) 
• Organisations and interviewees will remain anonymous 
 
 
Outcomes the research will hope to achieve 
 
• Develop a better understanding of the investment decision making process in relation 
to Energy Efficiency 
• Identify the enabling conditions that would facilitate institutional investors investing 






Interviewee’s organisation and role within it 
 
1. Please briefly explain the structure of your organisation and the investment decision 
making process. 
 
2. What role and responsibility do you have within the organisation and the investment 








Asset allocation and return requirements 
 
3. Do you have strategic asset allocation policy, perhaps employing a Modern Portfolio 
Theory approach, if so can you briefly outline it. If not, do you have an alternative 
approach to investment diversification in order to decide the split of investment types 
and classes?  
 
4. Do you invest in ‘alternatives’ such as renewable energy or infrastructure and if so 
can you briefly outline the organisation’s approach to investing in this asset class? 
 
5. Which of the asset classes you invest in would investments in energy efficiency fall 
into and how do they meet the criteria for each class? What is the approximate 
percentage of your overall investments allocated to each of those asset classes? 
 
6. Do you require a minimum return percentage from your investments and would this 
equally apply to energy efficiency investments? 
 
7. Does / would an investment in the Equitix Energy Efficiency fund meet the criteria 
for the appropriate asset class within your organisation, including meeting your 
minimum return requirements and if so how does it achieve this? 
 
 
Low Carbon investments  
 
8. Please can you explain your organisations approach to sustainable investment / low 
carbon investment and how this is expressed in the company?  
 
9. Would you accept a lower return on your investment in Energy Efficiency than on 
your more mainstream investments if it met your low carbon investments criteria? 
 
 
Decision to invest / not invest 
 
10. What factors made you decide to invest in the Equitix Energy Efficiency fund? 
(Alterative question: What factors would make you consider investing in the Equitix 
Energy Efficiency fund?) 
 
11. To what extent was the Green Investment Bank involvement a factor in your decision 
to invest or not to invest in the Equitix Energy Efficiency fund? 
 
12. Would you reinvest in further Energy Efficiency funds that didn’t have GIB or 
government involvement? 
 




(Alternative question: Did you decide not to invest in (Would you not have invested 
in) the Equitix Energy Efficiency fund as you had (have) competing alternative 
investment opportunities that were (are) more attractive?   
 
14. When deciding to make an innovative investment such as the one made in the Equitix 
Energy Efficiency fund, what are the issues that you consider when weighing it up 
with respect to potential alternative investments that may be more conventional? 
(Alternative question: When considering an innovative investment such as the one 
that could have been made in the Equitix Energy Efficiency fund, what are the issues 
that you consider when weighing it up with respect to potential alternative 
investments that may be more conventional? 
 
 
Fund Manager  
 
15. What do you consider are the factors that are important when placing an investment 
with a fund manager particularly when the investment is a non-conventional one such 
as in Energy Efficiency? 
 
16. How much did the familiarity with Equitix as fund manager influence your decision 
to invest or not to invest? 
 
17. If familiarity with Equitix was a factor for the initial investment and you achieved or 
bettered your required returns from their Energy Efficiency fund, would you consider 
investing in further Energy Efficiency funds run by other fund managers? 
 
 UK government and EU polices 
 
18. How have the UK and EU commitments and policies designed to reduce CO2 and the 
aim to encourage private institutional investment in Energy Efficiency improvements 
influenced your investment decisions?    
 
19. What do you think the role of policy should play in encouraging further investment in 
Energy Efficiency and are there any government policy initiatives either at the UK or 
the EU level that, if introduced, you feel would achieve this?  
 
 
Any other issues 
 
20. Are there any other issues that you feel have a bearing on your decision to either 
invest in or not to invest in Energy Efficiency investments in general or the Equitix 
Energy Efficiency fund in particular? 
 
21. What do you feel are the conditions that would need to exist to enable investment in 
Energy Efficiency to become a more mainstream investment or at least a more 




Appendix D: Semi-structured interview questions, a priori constructs and research questions 
 
 





What are the barriers to attracting capital investment at scale for energy efficiency in the 
context of institutional and pension fund investment? 
 
1. How do institutional investors decide whether to invest in energy efficiency? 
 
2. Why, when environmental social and economic benefits are apparent, have 
institutional investors not invested in energy efficiency at scale? 
 
3. What are the enabling conditions that would facilitate institutional investors 




A priori constructs: 
 
• Investment return requirements   (a)   Q 1, 2 & 3 
• UK and EU legislation   (b)   Q 3 
• CO2 reduction targets   (c)   Q 3 
• Familiarity with fund manager   (d)   Q 1 
• Strategic asset allocation, use of Modern Portfolio Theory   (e)   Q 1 & 2 
• Competing investment opportunities   (f)   Q 1 & 2 
• Internal low carbon and sustainability policies   (g)   Q 1 & 3 
• Green Investment Bank (GIB) involvement   (h)   Q 1 & 2 
• Behavioural Finance, habits of prudence   (i):  Loss aversion   Q 1 & 2 
        Preference for certainty   Q 1 & 2 
        Preference for similarity   Q 1 &2 
        Regret   Q 1 & 2 
• Behavioural Finance, norms of relationships   (j): Reliance   Q 1 & 2 
(with Fund Manager)     Reciprocity   Q 1 & 2 




Research questions with allocated a priori constructs 
 
1. How do institutional investors decide whether to invest in energy efficiency? 
 
Investment return requirements   (a)    
Familiarity with fund manager   (d)    
Strategic asset allocation, use of Modern Portfolio Theory   (e)      
202 
 
Competing investment opportunities   (f)    
Internal low carbon and sustainability policies   (g)   
Green Investment Bank (GIB) involvement   (h)    
Behavioural Finance, habits of prudence   (i):  Loss aversion     
        Preference for certainty 
        Preference for similarity 
        Regret 
Behavioural Finance, norms of relationships   (j): Reliance    
(with Fund Manager)     Reciprocity 
        Respect 
 
 
2. Why, when environmental social and economic benefits are apparent, have 
institutional investors not invested in energy efficiency at scale? 
 
Investment return requirements   (a)    
Strategic asset allocation, use of Modern Portfolio Theory   (e)    
Competing investment opportunities   (f)    
Green Investment Bank (GIB) involvement   (h)    
Behavioural Finance, habits of prudence   (i):  Loss aversion     
        Preference for certainty 
        Preference for similarity 
        Regret 
Behavioural Finance, norms of relationships   (j): Reliance    
(with Fund Manager)     Reciprocity 
        Respect 
 
 
3. What are the enabling conditions that would facilitate institutional investors 
investing in energy efficiency at scale? 
 
Investment return requirements   (a)    
UK and EU legislation   (b)    
CO2 reduction targets   (c)    




Questions – with coding back to research questions and a priori constructs 
 
Interviewee’s organisation and role within it 
 
22. Please briefly explain the structure of your organisation and the investment decision 
making process. 
 
23. What role and responsibility do you have within the organisation and the investment 
decision making process? 
 
 





24. Do you have strategic asset allocation policy, perhaps employing a Modern Portfolio 
Theory approach, if so can you briefly outline it. If not, do you have an alternative 
approach to investment diversification in order to decide the split of investment types 
and classes?   Q 1 & 2   (e)    
 
25. Do you invest in ‘alternatives’ such as renewable energy or infrastructure?   
Q 1 & 2   (e)    
 
26. Which asset class would investments in energy efficiency fall into and what 
percentage is allocated to that asset class?   Q 1 & 2   (e) 
 
27. Do you require a specific return percentage from your investments and would this 
equally apply to energy efficiency investments?   Q 1, 2 & 3   (a) 
 
28. Does / would an investment in the Equitix Energy Savings fund meet your return 
requirements?   Q 1, 2 & 3   (a) 
 
 
Low Carbon investments  
 
29. Do you have a sustainable investment policy where you favour low carbon 
investments or are committed to making low carbon investments and if so is your 
investment in the Equitix Energy Savings Fund in response to that policy? 
(Alternative question: Do you have a sustainable investment policy where you 
favour low carbon investments or are committed to making low carbon investments 
and if so did you consider investing in the Equitix Energy Savings Fund in response 
to that policy?   Q 1 & 3   (g) 
 
30. Would you accept a lower return on your investment in Energy Efficiency than on 
your more mainstream investments if it met your low carbon investments criteria? 
Q 1, 2 & 3   (a) (g) 
 
 
Decision to invest / not invest 
 
31. What factors made you decide to invest in the Equtix energy efficiency fund? 
(Alterative question: What factors would make you consider investing in the Equtix 
energy efficiency fund?)   Q 1 & 3    
 
32. Was the Green Investment Bank involvement a factor in your decision to invest or not 
to invest and if so how important was it?   Q 1 & 2   (h) 
 
33. Would you reinvest in further Energy Efficiency funds that didn’t have GIB or 
government involvement?   Q 1 & 2   (h) 
 




(Alternative question: Would you not have invested in the Equitix energy efficiency 
fund due to competing opportunities?   Q 1 & 2   (f) 
 
35. When deciding to make an innovative investment such as the one made in the Equiix 
Energy Savings Investments fund, what are the issues that you consider when 
weighing it up with respect to potential alternative investments that may be more 
conventional? 
(Alternative question: When considering an innovative investment such as the one 
that was ultimately not made in the Equiix Energy Savings Investments fund, what are 
the issues that you consider when weighing it up with respect to potential alternative 
investments that may be more conventional?   Q 1 & 2   (i) 
 
 
Fund Manager  
 
36. What do you consider are the factors that are important when placing an investment 
with a fund manager particularly when the investment is a non-conventional one such 
as in Energy Efficiency?   Q 1   (d) 
 
37. How much did the familiarity with Equitix as fund manager influence your decision 
to invest or not to invest?   Q 1   (d) 
 
38. If familiarity with Equitix was a factor for the initial investment and you achieved or 
bettered your required returns from their Energy Savings fund, would you consider 
investing in further Energy Efficiency funds run by other fund managers?     
Q 1 & 2   (d) (j) 
 
 
UK government and EU polices 
 
39. Are you aware of the UK and EU commitments and policies designed to reduce CO2 
and the aim to encourage private institutional investment in Energy Efficiency 
improvements and if so have they influenced your investment decisions?    
Q 1 & 3   (b) (c) 
 
40. Are there any government policy initiatives either at the UK or the EU level that you 
feel would encourage further investment in Energy Efficiency?   Q 3   (b) (c) 
 
Any other issues 
 
41. Are there any other issues that you feel have a bearing on your decision to either 
invest in or not to invest in Energy Efficiency investments in general or the Equitix 
Energy Savings fund in particular?   Q 1 & 2    
 
42. What do you feel are the conditions that would need to exist to enable investment in 
Energy Efficiency to become a more mainstream investment or at least a more 




Appendix E: Code system, created using MAXQDA 
 
Codes created prior to the commencement of the data analysis based on the a priori constructs 
Codes created during the data analysis that were formulated inductively 
 
Code System 
01 Investment return requirements 
01 Risk/reward - Fiduciary Duty 
02 Technology risk 
03 Level of return 
04 Term as a consideration 
05 Risk premium 
02 UK and EU legislation 
01 Stable regulatory environment 
02 Sectors with no government support 
03 Government incentives 
04 Clear energy policies 
03 CO2 reduction targets 
01 Carbon saving requirements 
04 Familiarity with (and capability of) the fund manager 
01 Track record in infra, Renewable energy and EE 
02 Technical capability of team 
03 Deal pipeline 
04 Willingness to invest time 
05 Speed of deployment 
06 New investors unfamiliar/familiar with fund manager 
07 Proven technology 
08 Fund Strategy / Fund Manager size 
09 Fund Manager % of investment landscape 
10 Difficulty of implementation / Fund Manager income 
05 Strategic asset allocation, use of Modern Portfolio Theory 
01 Inflation linked returns 
02 Asset classification (eg infra, renewables, private equity) 
03 Percentage for 'Alternatives' / asset classes 
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04 Risk/return approach (safer investment, higher allocation) 
05 Contractual structure 
06 Government backed income stream 
07 Blended and diversified portfolio (un/collerated) 
08 EE investment models eg ESCO, Biomass etc 
09 Upstream risks, secure fuel source etc 
10 Investment matching liabilities/not matching allocation pol. 
11 Investment Strategy 
06 Competing investment opportunities 
01 EE a less mature market 
02 Size of investment and projects 
07 Internal low carbon and sustainability polices 
01 Positive allowance for low carbon investments 
02 Negative allowance for low carbon investments (return 
only) 
03 ESG as part of Fiduciary Duty 
08 Green Investment Bank (GIB) involvement 
01 Did influence investors 
02 Did not influence investors 
03 will invest in further funds without GIB 
09 Behavioural Finance, habits of prudence 
01 Loss aversion 
02 Preference for certainty 
03 Preference for similarity 
04 Regret 





11 Market conditions 
01 Difficult for new Fund Manager entrants 
02 Move to larger projects 




05 Develop Technology 
06 Market driven returns 
07 Availability of suitable projects / investments - Demand 
08 Tax treatment and breaks 
09 Standardisation 
10 Public Sector process 
11 Energy as % of costs in an organisation 
12 Need to understand complexity of technology or asset 





Appendix F: Semi-structured interview questions with codes mapped 
 
 




Questions – with codes mapped 
 
Interviewee’s organisation and role within it 
 
1. Please briefly explain the structure of your organisation and the investment decision 
making process. 
 
2. What role and responsibility do you have within the organisation and the investment 







Asset allocation and return requirements 
 
3. Do you have strategic asset allocation policy, perhaps employing a Modern Portfolio 
Theory approach, if so can you briefly outline it. If not, do you have an alternative 
approach to investment diversification in order to decide the split of investment types 




05, 05(01, 02, 03, 04, 06, 07, 08, 10) 
 
4. Do you invest in ‘alternatives’ such as renewable energy or infrastructure and if so 
can you briefly outline the organisation’s approach to investing in this asset class?  
 
05 
05(01, 02, 03, 04, 07, 10) 
11(06) 
 
5. Which of the asset classes you invest in would investments in energy efficiency fall 
into and how do they meet the criteria for each class? What is the approximate 
percentage of your overall investments allocated to each of those asset classes? 
 
01(03) 
05(01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 06, 08, 10, 11) 
07 
07(03) 




6. Do you require a minimum return percentage from your investments and would this 






05(01, 03, 04, 06, 07, 08, 10) 
10(01)  
 
7. Does / would an investment in the Equitix Energy Efficiency fund meet the criteria 
for the appropriate asset class within your organisation, including meeting your 
minimum return requirements and if so how does it achieve this?   
 
01(01, 02, 03, 04, 05) 
04(03, 05, 08) 






Low Carbon investments  
 
8. Please can you explain your organisations approach to sustainable investment / low 








9. Would you accept a lower return on your investment in Energy Efficiency than on 








07(01, 02, 03) 
 
 
Decision to invest / not invest 
 
10. What factors made you decide to invest in the Equitix Energy Efficiency fund? 
210 
 
(Alterative question: What factors would make you consider investing in the Equitix 
Energy Efficiency fund?)   
 
01(01, 03, 04) 
02(01, 03) 
04(poss.) 
04(01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 08) 
05(01, 02, 04, 05, 06, 07, 08, 09, 10) 
08(01) 





11. To what extent was the Green Investment Bank involvement a factor in your decision 







10(01, 02, 03) 
 
12. Would you reinvest in further Energy Efficiency funds that didn’t have GIB or 
government involvement?   
 
04(01, 02, 08) 
05(02, 07) 
06(02) 
08(01, 02, 03) 
09(02) 
10(03) 
11(03, 04, 07, 08) 
 
13. Did you invest in the Equitix Energy Efficiency fund at the expense of alternative 
opportunities? 
(Alternative question: Did you decide not to invest in (Would you not have invested 
in) the Equitix Energy Efficiency fund as you had (have) competing alternative 
investment opportunities that were (are) more attractive?   
 
01(02, 03) 
04(04, 06, 09 







14. When deciding to make an innovative investment such as the one made in the Equitix 
Energy Efficiency fund, what are the issues that you consider when weighing it up 
with respect to potential alternative investments that may be more conventional? 
(Alternative question: When considering an innovative investment such as the one 
that could have been made in the Equitix Energy Efficiency fund, what are the issues 
that you consider when weighing it up with respect to potential alternative 
investments that may be more conventional?   
 





04(01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 08) 
05 




09(01, 02, 03) 
10(01, 02) 
11 




Fund Manager  
 
15. What do you consider are the factors that are important when placing an investment 
with a fund manager particularly when the investment is a non-conventional one such 
as in Energy Efficiency?   
 
04 
04(01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 08, 11) 
05(02, 05, 08, 13) 
08(01) 
09(02, 03) 
10(01, 02, 03) 
 
16. How much did the familiarity with Equitix as fund manager influence your decision 
to invest or not to invest?   
 
04 








17. If familiarity with Equitix was a factor for the initial investment and you achieved or 
bettered your required returns from their Energy Efficiency fund, would you consider 
investing in further Energy Efficiency funds run by other fund managers?   
 
04 
04(02, 04, 05, 06, 08, 09) 
05 




10(01, 02, 03) 
11(01, 02, 03, 07) 
 
 UK government and EU polices 
 
18. How have the UK and EU commitments and policies designed to reduce CO2 and the 
aim to encourage private institutional investment in Energy Efficiency improvements 












   
 
19. What do you think the role of policy should play in encouraging further investment in 
Energy Efficiency and are there any government policy initiatives either at the UK or 









Any other issues 
 
20. Are there any other issues that you feel have a bearing on your decision to either 
invest in or not to invest in Energy Efficiency investments in general or the Equitix 






02(01, 02, 03) 
04(02, 05, 07, 08) 









21. What do you feel are the conditions that would need to exist to enable investment in 
Energy Efficiency to become a more mainstream investment or at least a more 
established asset class within the alternatives classification?   
 
01(05) 







11(03, 04, 05, 07, 09) 
 
              
